History of the 2nd Infantry Division

Korean War

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Volume II

FORWARD

This second volume of the history of the 2d U. S. Infantry Division in the Korean conflict covers two campaigns: the Second Korean Winter (28 November 1951 - 30 April 1952) and Korea, Summer-Fall 1952 (1 May 1952 - 30 November 1952).

All efforts were directed to give adequate coverage to all units in the Division and to present an accurate and objective account of their activities from the end of the Heartbreak Ridge action on 25 October 1951, which concluded the first volume, to 30 November 1952. The account of tactical operations for infantry units was carried through until 31 December 1952, when the Division was relieved and moved to reserve. Emphasis was placed upon photographs to record forever this period of the Division's history for the men who lived it. Greatly appreciated by the staff was the cooperation from commanders and staff officers who had left the Division and were asked to submit their photographs. Photographs from some of these former commanders did not arrive before the volume had gone to press, and it was with regrets that they were of necessity omitted. Names of officers and men who were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross and the Silver Star during the period were obtained from files maintained by the Division Adjutant General section. Should inaccuracies be found in this or other sections of the book, the publication staff assumes responsibility and offers apologies to individuals and units concerned. Historical records maintained by Major C. R. Westfall were invaluable as background material in preparation of the text. Lieutenant Rene F. Carroll, Division photo officer, and his section were of great assistance in securing suitable photographs. Additional photographs were obtained from unit photographers Corporal Primo E. Facchini of the 2d Engineer Battalion and Corporal Earl Ward and Private First Class Roy Zehren of the 23d Infantry. Sergeant First Class Robert G. Gass, Headquarters, Division Artillery, lent a competent hand in typing manuscripts and administrative work. The help given by these and many other members of the 2d Division greatly lightened the task of publishing this volume. To all concerned the staff gives a sincere vote of thanks.

2nd Infantry Division

A story of the 2d Infantry Division in the days of the Korean war since October, 1951 could never be written in the same style as the story of the first bitter year of struggle. The shadow of the incessant truce talks gave a new tone to the fighting. The war which had earlier been a series of tremendous offensives and withdrawals now shifted to a stable situation of opposing main lines of resistance. Instead of fast-moving pursuits and l delaying actions, bunker-building, wire-laying and heavy patrolling became the infantryman's chief activities. Massive artillery duels began to out weigh small arms engagements. Just as hopes for a truce alternately mounted and sagged while the negotiators wrangled, so the pitch of battle rose and fell on the many outposts along the line. Places like Hill 1062, Old Baldy and Arrowhead Ridge went down in history alongside I the Naktong River, Kunu-ri and Heartbreak Ridge. And the heroic deeds of the men who fought there insured that the reputation of the Indianhead Division would forever be "Second to None." Forward elements of the 2d Infantry Division, the first Division sent from a post in the United States to take part in the Korean conflict, arrived at Pusan on 31 July 1950. During the early days of retreat and disaster, it was necessary to commit the Division piecemeal. First employment as a unit was on 24 August, when the Division took over a sector of the Naktong River line. A month of defense against the overwhelming odds of the North Korean Army saw the Division still holding fast. At last the long-awaited offensive, coupled with the Inchon amphibious landings, cracked the Communist forces and a race began to the north. Seventy-three miles were covered in one 10-hour period by the fast-moving 38th Regimental Combat Team. Taking part in a special task force, elements of the 2d Division were the first to enter the North Korean capital of Pyongyang.

Victories continued until November when, deep in North Korea, the Division was suddenly met by the armies of Communist China, which had just entered the war. Cut off from the withdrawing army, the Division was forced to fight its way through a deadly Communist roadblock at Kunu-ri. The battle moved southward again through the bitter Korean winter until, at Wonju, a large scale Chinese offensive was stopped in its tracks. The Chinese tried to retaliate in early May with another massive drive expressly aimed at annihilation of the 2d Division. Once again the enemy was soundly defeated, and for this action the Division received the Presidential Unit Citation.

These two stands seemed to have turned the tide, and again the United Nations line moved northward. With truce negotiations now underway, the Division pushed forward against increasing resistance. Fighting reached a bitter climax when stubborn enemy forces were finally driven off Bloody Ridge after a three-week battle. Still more intense fighting followed when the 2d Division pushed farther northward to struggle for and win key high ground known as Heartbreak Ridge. This operation continued into October 1951, when it was learned that the 2d Division would be relieved by the 7th U.S. Division and would move into a well-earned reserve period.

At 2400 hours on 25 October the relief was complete and the 7th Division was in control of this section of the line. Despite the large scale of the operation, involving two complete divisions, there was no evidence that the enemy had discovered it. During its last days on line the 2d Division had maintained a heavy rate of fire to keep the heads of the opposition down. Meanwhile aggressive and continuous patrolling concealed the forthcoming relief. While the bulk of the Division proceeded to a bivouac near Kapyong, South Korea, directions had been received from IX Corps that Division Artillery and one infantry regiment would be directly under Corps control. The 15th Field Artillery Battalion was sent to support the 25th U. S. Division on the central front and the remainder of Division Artillery assumed a general support role. The 38th Infantry Regiment, having been selected as the regiment to come under Corps control, was moved to the high ground west of the Hwachon reservoir on 30 October to establish and maintain blocking positions in that area.

Training and equipping for the approaching winter became the order of the day in the Division. Repeated inspections of training showed that basic weapons instruction and small unit tactics were the chief needs of the Division. Instructors emphasized practical work. Said Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner, Assistant Division Commander, about the theory of training, "It's simplicity itself."

Specialist schools were set up within the Division for those holding jobs other than that of infantrymen. Among these were schools for photo interpreters, mine and demolition specialists, armorers and radio repairmen. A one-week course was established for replacement officers entering the Division.

Besides the mission of reequipping and training for the coming winter campaign, secondary missions were given to several units of the Division. One infantry company was used to provide security for IX Corps command post. Counter-intelligence was of great concern in the guerrilla-infested rear areas. To stop activity of enemy agents, CIC personnel and S-2 sections carried on an extensive program of patrolling, screening of civilians, evacuation of suspects and liaison with civil authorities. Guerrilla activities at this time were also harassing the efforts of United Nations forces in the southern part of the Korean peninsula. Several members of the 2d Division's G-2 section were sent to aid a program, labeled Operation "RatKiller," aimed at mopping up the guerrillas.

A secondary mission of unusual nature appeared when an infantry battalion was ordered to Koje-do island, off the southern coast of Korea, to guard Communist prisoners of war. The First Battalion of the 23d Regiment was chosen and passed to the control of the 2d Logistical Command. This proved to be a mission which later would involve much larger units of the 2d Division.

During this reserve period the Division was honored by visits from two prominent United States government officials. Shortly after the move from the Heartbreak Ridge line, Anna Rosenberg, Assistant Secretary of Defense, visited the Indianhead Division on her Far East inspection tour. On 24 November, Vice President Alben W. Barkley was on hand to add to the Division's colors the Presidential Unit Citation earned at the battle of the Soyang River in May 1951.

As training progressed into December, the expected order to move back on line appeared. The alert called for the relief of the 25th U.S. Division, north of Kumhwa on the central front. Commanders went forward immediately on a reconnaissance, while around Kapyong necessary preparations were made for the winter campaign. The strain on organic transportation necessitated 15,000 pounds of winter clothing to be flown in by airlift to 2d Division troops.

The massive relief once again was completed without mishap and the 2d Division assumed control on 20 December. The tactical situation saw the Division manning a four-regiment front, the 25th Division having left its 14th Regiment occupying one of the sectors. With the extra regiment, the Division was spread across a 22,000-meter line with only two infantry battalions and the 72d Tank Battalion in division reserve.

The sector thus occupied was located in the eastern part of the former Communist stronghold known as the "Iron Triangle," marked by the cities of Chorwon on the west, Pyonggang on the north and Kumhwa on the east. The United Nations line guarded the vital Kumhwa-Chunchon corridor, considered a dangerous enemy approach into South Korea. The Hantan River valley generally bisected the region and likewise provided the best Allied route into Communist territory. Overlooking the western portion of the 2d Division line was a Communist-held hill mass topped by Hill 717, while to the east towering Hill 1062, tunneled with enemy fortifications, was directly to the front.

Hopes for a negotiated truce were at this time at a peak. Consequently the mission given the Division was to hold the present battle line, in accordance with the line of demarcation set up at the truce talks.

Though the situation through the second Korean winter was relatively static when compared with the war up to that time, the defense carried out by the 2d Division was an active one. Extensive reconnaissance by ground patrols and air gave commanders many facts about the enemy's disposition. Continuous improvement of positions was underway. Overhead cover was constructed for every position on the main line of resistance while heated shelters and mess tents located close by gave relief from the chills of outdoor living.

Christmas in Korea, though obviously dimmed by war conditions, was by no means forgotten. The Yule season was brightened by a visit to the 2d Division on Christmas Eve by the prominent Catholic churchman, Francis Cardinal Spellman. Decorations and packages from home were in evidence in every bunker and tent, and the traditional turkey dinner was enjoyed by every man in the Division.

On 27 December, a third battalion from another member of the United Nations joined the Division. This was the Thailand Battalion, which had formerly been the 21st Thailand Regiment and had served in various parts of Korea since 1950. The battalion was immediately attached to the 9th Infantry Regiment. The French Battalion and the Netherlands Detachment had been previously attached to the 23d and 38th Regiments, respectively. Each regiment now had the equivalent of four battalions.

There were few engagements involving large units during the winter campaign. Activity was primarily confined to patrolling and defensive measures. However, several United Nations operations of varying nature were engaged in by the 2d Division and were very effective in harassing the Chinese Communist forces.

The first of these, Operation "Freezeout," was a 9th Regiment program aimed at denying the enemy use of his prepared bunkers and fortifications. Specially trained and equipped patrols ventured through enemy lines almost nightly and during the months of December and January succeeded in destroying 367 bunkers, primarily by use of demolitions.

At 2400 hours on 31 December every infantry, tank and artillery weapon which could be brought to bear on the enemy opened up with a tremendous Army-wide "time on target," wishing the Communist forces a not-so-happy New Year. Later in the month of January, a coordinated air and artillery "attack by fire" was carried on for four days! raining a continuous downpour of high explosives on Chinese lines. Despite these shellings and an extensive system of patrols, the enemy seemed quite well entrenched and efforts to capture prisoners were rather unsuccessful. Consequently Army headquarters conceived the idea for Operation "Clam-up." This operation, scheduled for 10 February, called for a complete halt of activity including all patrols, daytime vehicle and foot movement and radio traffic. No weapons were to be fired unless the line was attacked. This plan, intended to deceive the enemy and trap him into being captured, was carried on for seven days. It was successful in that prisoners taken indicated that the enemy believed that a withdrawal had taken place; however, it had the drawback of allowing the Chinese to build up positions since no harassing fire was placed on them.

An increased psychological warfare campaign was instituted consisting of widespread leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts. Linguist teams instructed front line troops in the use of Chinese phrases. Nevertheless, Communist indoctrination seemed to have instilled in the enemy soldiers an increased fear of surrender. In one instance, a 2d Division patrol leader observed two Chinese soldiers shoot each other in an apparent mutual pact to avoid capture. The 14th Regiment reverted to the control of its parent division on 29 January, necessitating an extension of boundaries to occupy the wide frontage with three regiments instead of four. Return of the 23d's First Battalion from Koje-do gave the Division a total of twelve battalions. The necessary changes in sectors and fire plans were made and the Kumhwa line was now held exclusively by organic units of the 2d Division. The months of February and March passed with continued light action. By this time 2d Division soldiers had become quite adept at conquering survival problems in their second Korean winter. Supply procedures far superior to those of the first Korean winter made life tolerable though never comfortable. Improvised steam tables insured that the men were fed hot meals. Vehicle winterization and tire chains made it possible for supplies to be brought up to the line despite snowbound Korean roads. Shower units located close behind the lines provided welcome hot showers at intervals for everyone. Equipment and clothing, unlike that of the previous winter, was warm and adequate. The new rubber thermal boot, nicknamed the "Mickey Mouse" by the line troops, was now an item of issue.

In April came news that the 2d Division would again be relieved and take part in another training period in Corps reserve. The first elements of the Division left the line when a part of the 40th Division moved in, narrowing the 9th Regimental sector by one battalion. The 7th Division took over the rest of the zone on 26 April and the 2d Division, its part of the second Korean winter campaign complete, began to move again to the Kapyong area. Intelligence reports showed that since the December into action the Division had accounted for 8,869 enemy casualties, 4,325 being killed in action, 4,518 wounded and 26 taken prisoner. A "Second to None" record it was, for a period classified as inactive.

On 27 April the Division was in the familiar training site near Kapyong but with few of the subordinate units actually present for training. Orders from higher headquarters had sent units from regimental size down to company size throughout Korea on other missions. The 9th Infantry, minus the Third Battalion, was occupying the blocking positions west of the Hwachon reservoir, as well as carrying on vigorous training. The entire 38th Regiment, plus the Third Battalion of the 9th, embarked for the Koje-do prison camp, which was reportedly turbulent with riots and insubordination. The Second Battalion of the 23d Regiment was dispatched into the Sangdong area to guard vital tungsten mines. Separate companies were needed to provide security for IX Corps command post, and for a guerrilla-harassed radio station. Division Artillery was ordered into the 9th ROK Division sector, while the 72d Tank Battalion moved back to the L Heartbreak Ridge region under X Corps.

During the first half of May, the 2d Division underwent a complete change in top level command. In an impressive ceremony at the Division airstrip on 4 May, Major General Robert lb N. Young turned over the Division's helm to James C. Fry, then l a Brigadier General. General Fry, who shortly thereafter received his second star, was the possessor of a distinguished I career in both staff and command positions. A 1922 West Point graduate, he began his career as an officer with the 2d Division's own 9th Regiment. He went on to serve with the 27th, 26th, 66th, 20th and 31st Infantry Regiments and also with the 2d Armored Division. During World War II he commanded the 69th Armored Regiment and later joined the 88th Division in the Italian Campaign, first as a regimental commander and then as Assistant Division Commander during the final action in Italy. After the armistice. General Fry assumed command of the 88th Division until his return to the United States in December 1945. Before coming to Korea to take over the 2d Division, he had held the positions of Deputy High Commissioner and Commander of Tactical Forces in Austria. In previous staff assignments he had served as immediate assistant to Dwight D. Eisenhower, then a Lieutenant Colonel, in the Philippines in 1938 and 1939, and as assistant military attache to Turkey and Egypt in 1941.

The reins of the 2d Division Artillery were passed on 7 May from Colonel W. C. Bullock to Brigadier General Thomas M. Watlington, then a Colonel. On 14 May, Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner, Assistant Division Commander, was called l from the Division to take charge of forces at Koje-do. This position remained vacant until July when Brigadier General Lionel C. McGarr arrived to become General Fry's assistant.

General McGarr was a veteran of ten World War II campaigns with the 3d Infantry Division. He had served as a regimental commander and Assistant Division Commander with the Third. He was on duty in Austria as Chief of Staff of the Tactical Command before coming to Korea.

In spite of the limited number of troops on hand, the Division carried out its Corps reserve missions of preparation of blocking positions, counterattack plans and intensive training. Training was particularly directed at 4,466 replacements received during the months of May and June. "Buddy courses" and small unit problems set up by the 9th and 23d Regiments drilled men in the principles of fire and maneuver. A Division-wide noncommissioned officer school was established, providing small unit leaders with a 30-day course in all phases of infantry training. Combat readiness tests administered in June showed that the Division, though filled with new men, was prepared to fulfill the forthcoming mission of line duty.

In early July commanders learned that the Division would relieve the 45th U.S. Division on the front west of Chorwon. A reconnaissance showed that the 45th maintained two distinct lines, the main line of resistance and the outpost line of resistance. The latter was a series of strong points at varying distances out from the MLR. Certain of these strong points included a hill called Old Baldy in the left part of the sector, and Eerie and Arsenal, on the tip of T-Bone Ridge. These outposts were recent acquisitions of the 45th Division.

The 23d Regiment, the first to relieve, moved into the left half of the Division sector. It was soon apparent that Old Baldy was the center of activity and proved to be the repeated target for concentrations of enemy artillery and mortar fire. At 2200 hours on 17 July incoming rounds reached a devastating rate. During a 20-minute preparatory fire a battalion of Chinese overran the positions of F Company, the unit occupying the crest. E Company quickly formed a counterattack. When the unit reached the hill, the crest had been lost but a successful counterattack placed elements of E and F back on Old Baldy by 0345 on the 18th The Chinese quickly retaliated. Supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire, they were able to win back the crest on the morning of the 18th.

In the next four days the hill changed hands a number of i: times. It was temporarily regained by a provisional battalion of I, L and B Companies, and later by K and G Companies. Each time, however, the Chinese used the tactics of withdrawing, plastering the hill with barrages and following closely with counterattacks. On 22 July the 23d withdrew from the outpost. I Continuous artillery concentrations and air strikes were directed against the enemy on the scarred slopes of Old Baldy.

A five-day siege of heavy rain beginning on 26 July hindered operations for both sides and permitted the 23d to prepare for its next counterattack. It came on the night of 31 July when the First Battalion, with A and C Companies leading, moved up with a double envelopment which successfully seized Old Baldy and put the 23d there to stay. More than 1,150 casualties were suffered by the enemy during the two-week engagement.

Meanwhile the Chinese had also committed a battalion in another part of the 23d's sector. The French Battalion outposts on the T-Bone and another finger to the east had been hit by heavy fire and by sizable infantry attacks on 24 and 28 July. The French beat off every effort of the Communists without loss of any of the outposts.

The action on this front had taught the Division several things, among them the fact that the enemy could deliver tremendous amounts of high explosives. Incoming mortar and artillery for the period was estimated at 25,000 rounds, although the rate of shelling defied count at times. Another lesson learned was that existing fortifications and communications in the sector 28 left much to be desired. Long hours of work during the sub sequent period were aimed at improving this situation.

Men of the 23d worked day and night on their positions in spite of harassing fire and torrential rains during July and August. The new prefabricated bunkers devised by the 2d Engineer Battalion proved invaluable to the line troops. Nearly 400 of the existing bunkers collapsed under the rains but not one of the 230 new "Abe Lincoln" prefabs fell. Use of M-39 armored personnel carriers for front line resupply was another effective innovation.

The 23d was relieved of its sector by the 38th Infantry on 19 and 20 August and moved back into reserve to concentrate on training its many replacements. The 38th, in the left sector, and the 9th, remaining on the right, maintained an intense rate of raiding and patrolling deep into enemy lines. Reconnaissance and observation indicated that the enemy was not yet convinced that the 2d Division would not give up its outposts.

This belief was substantiated when on 16 September there was a marked increase of incoming shells in the Old Baldy area, including fire from tanks and recoilless rifles. The shelling reached a climax when an estimated 1,000 rounds fell on Old Baldy in a ten-minute period prior to 1900 hours on 18 September. The Chinese again moved in under their own supporting fires and hit the positions of the 38th's K Company. An entire battalion had moved to striking distance unobserved and assaulted Baldy from all sides. At the same time another enemy force hit Porkchop outpost, to the northeast. This platoon-size out post also received heavy preparatory fire. The action on Pork chop appeared to be a diversionary raid. The Chinese overran the hill but withdrew with their wounded and dead after a hand to-hand battle.

On Old Baldy the enemy captured the crest with lightning speed and held off two patrols from the 38th that night. A counterattack on 19 September was also beaten off by heavy and accurate Chinese artillery. Air strikes and friendly artillery began to pound the outpost while the 38th readied another counterattack. I Corps had directed that it would be coordinated with a similar attack in the adjacent 3d Division sector.

The Second Battalion carried out the attack on the night of 20 September. After slow progress through the hail of enemy fire, the force cleared the crest and the 38th was again in control of Old Baldy by morning on 21 September. Again Communist casualties for the action exceeded 1,100. Praise was high for the efficient and fearless attack by the Second Battalion. General James A. Van Fleet, Eighth Army commander, said, "The recapture and subsequent consolidation of this key terrain feature against a determined Communist force supported by intense ; artillery and mortar fire exemplified the spirit and resourcefulness of this command."

With Old Baldy once again secure, the remainder of September was spent once again rebuilding the outpost's defenses. The 23d, having relieved the 9th in the right sector, also busily improved positions. Indications were that the Communists might be preparing to strike in that zone. This belief was borne out by a great increase of incoming shells and in sightings of enemy movement during the first few days of October. Excellent intelligence by Division units and the adjacent 9th ROK Division disclosed that a large-scale Chinese attack was imminent in the Chorwon valley area, near the boundary of the two divisions.

The Division and the ROK's, to the east, set about preparing the region for a stand-or-die defense. Arrowhead Ridge (Hill 281), in the sector of the 23d's French Battalion, was receiving heavy fire from all types of enemy weapons. The preparatory E fires received there on 6 October, were in the words of General l Fry, "beyond anything I have known in my previous consider able military experience." The Chinese infantry struck, almost precisely as intelligence had forecasted, against White Horse Mountain (Hill 395) and Arrowhead on the night of 6 October.

The battle raged for possession of Arrowhead and the other l positions of the French Battalion for the next four days and I nights. Outposts to the north of Arrowhead were overrun by the enemy but never did he succeed in capturing any part of the MLR. A see-saw fight was waged in the ROK sector for White Horse from 6 to 15 October. It was learned later that the Chinese had used two divisions in the action. The powerful 38th Chinese Communist Army was badly crippled by the heroic United Nations defenders and every position was back in friendly hands by 15 October.

White Horse Mountain changed hands 24 times while both the ROK's and the Communists poured in replacements.

9th ROK Division won high praise from everyone. It was apparent that modern training and equipment had brought a great improvement in Korean units since the early part of the war.

To divert the enemy's attention from the battered right boundary of the Division zone, a battalion-size raid was executed on Chinese strongholds on the T-Bone. The Second Battalion of the 9th Infantry was brought forward from reserve. The raiding mission was carried out effectively by this battalion on the night of 10 October despite a lack of time for preparation and determined enemy resistance. Tank patrols also operated in the T-Bone area during 11 to 14 October to harass the enemy further and hinder his efforts in the Arrowhead-White Horse region.

Disheartened and broken, the enemy gave up his efforts on 15 October. Thousands of Chinese dead littered the slopes of the two hills. Action slowed in the Division sector during the remainder of October. The 38th Infantry, now well entrenched in the left sector, was relieved by the 9th on 25 October. Several patrol contacts occurred in the next week in the Alligator Jaws area, but the center of activity was now shifting to outpost Porkchop, held by the Thailand Battalion.

Enemy probes on this outpost were regularly repelled by the defenders in the first few days of November. These probes grew in size and were supported by intense artillery and mortar fire. The climax came on the night of 10 November when an enemy battalion made repeated attacks on Porkchop throughout the night. Several groups of Chinese reached the trenches of the Thailanders but the outpost was never lost. A Thai patrol cleared the slopes of any remaining Communists by morning of the 11th. Probes of smaller size continued to hit Porkchop in the succeeding days and were driven off each time.

Icy weather hit the front lines during late November and signaled that the Division would soon be entering its third winter campaign of the Korean war. The 38th Regiment relieved the 23d in the right half of the Division zone. All units were now well dug in across the MLR and the chain of hill outposts. Winter clothing and equipment of all types had been distributed and the 2d Division was prepared for cold weather as no previous force had ever been prepared.

Early December was marked by light action on the front, and by the history-making visit of President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower on 4 December. Accompanied by Generals Oar Bradley, Mark Clark and James Van Fleet and Secretary of Defense appointee Charles Wilson, "Ike" was briefed on the tactical situation at the Division command post on the cold December morning. Soldiers from every company in the Division and color-bearers from five nations formed an honor guard for the next Commander-in-Chief.

Patrolling and defense against probes continued to be the most significant operations for the Division during December, in spite of the hazards and difficulties presented by the snow covered terrain. The white-suited patrols became more efficient as time went on in the now-familiar tactics needed for operation in the snowy wastes of no-man's-land. The largest of the probes was a company-size Chinese push against the Thailand Battalion on 21 December.

Rumors of a coming relief, though always a topic of conversation, reached a peak just before Christmas. Before the Division left the line, however, a full-scale battle for outpost Arsenal was waged on 23 December by elements of the 38th Infantry. A battalion of Chinese was completely routed by the rugged defense of B Company.

The 2d Division's third Christmas in Korea had few of the aspects of a holiday for the infantrymen, but morale was lifted by visiting entertainers from Hollywood and by the second Christmas day visit to the Division by Francis Cardinal Spellman, who conducted Catholic services at Division headquarters. The speculated relief materialized shortly after Christmas. 7th Division troops moved into the area on 26 December and by the end of 1952 the 2d Division was once again on route to reserve areas.

Division headquarters was established east of Uijongbu. The 9th and 38th Regiments began a training schedule in nearby reserve areas, while the 23d prepared for a move to Koje-do and prison guard duties. What new missions the Division might receive in the seemingly interminable Korean conflict, no one could predict. The 2d Division looked hopefully toward a possible peaceful settlement, but confidently promised that, whatever the future might bring, its part in the action would be, as in the past, "Second to None."

9th Infantry Regiment w/Thailand Battalion

The 9th Infantry Regiment, more commonly known as the Manchu Regiment, was the first 2d Division unit to arrive in Korea, debarking at Pusan on 31 July 1950. Committed as a Regimental Combat Team while other elements of the Division were still at sea, the 9th saw most of its first action in the Korean War alongside the 24th Infantry Division. The first battles were of a defensive nature along the Naktong River line. The success of the 9th in securing Hill 201 was a great factor in the United Nations breakthrough and subsequent offensive.

The Manchu Regiment suffered heavy losses along with the rest of the Division when the Chinese armies entered the war and forced the disastrous withdrawal at Kunu-ri. Later the Regiment helped stem the CCF tide by capturing the key city of Wonju on 21 January 1951. In the northward push which followed, the 9th pressed forward stubbornly and captured enemy strong points in the fights for Kim-Il-Sung, Bloody and Heartbreak ridges.

After 102 consecutive days of line duty in the Heartbreak sector, the Regiment was relieved on 24 October by the 7th Division's 31st. Movement followed to a well-earned rest period in the reserve area near Kapyong. Immediately the 9th instituted an intensive period of training and equipping. The chief aim was complete preparedness for the coming winter, a state which the Regiment achieved by continuous training and inspections of both line and service personnel. In early December came the word of the coming move back to the line and preparations for winter were stepped up to an even greater rate. Attesting to the high state of cold weather discipline instilled in the Manchu men, a five-hour truck trip in icy weather was made to the new assembly area without a single case of frostbite in the Regiment. The 9th moved into the area formerly occupied by the 35th RCT on 16 December.

Christmas Eve saw a change in command. Colonel Wilbur Wilson took over from Colonel John M. Lynch, who rotated to the United States. One of Colonel Wilson's first official actions as regimental commander was welcoming the new Thailand Battalion, which had been attached to the 9th. Ceremonies attended by General Young were held, with the Division Band playing the Thailand and United States national anthems. The Thailand Battalion had been serving in Korea for more than a year with various Eighth Army units before coming to the 2d Division. They had earned great respect by outstanding performance with the 1st Cavalry Division in action near Uijongbu. A serious problem confronting the Thailanders at this time was acclimatization, since many of the soldiers had never seen snow. Several of their number were cold weather casualties on the long trip north. They were quickly fitted with American winter clothing and equipment. Their officers were supplied with ready-made log bunkers for use as command posts. Two hundred Thailand replacements who arrived shortly thereafter joined in an intensive cold weather training program for the entire battalion.

The static situation on the central front had permitted construction of a well-fortified MLR. Manchu infantrymen continued deepening the communications trenches and equipping bunkers with woven bunks and homemade stoves to make the freezing conditions a little less uncomfortable. One of the chief actions of the 9th in the early stages of the winter campaign was Operation "Freezeout." This entailed nightly patrols, equipped with demolitions, roving out into no-man's-land and blasting the many bunkers there which the enemy had been using as patrol bases. The vicinity of Haso-ri village was the chief target of these bunker-busters. On one night a Company A patrol alone destroyed 19 of these positions. By the end of January, 367 bunkers had been leveled and patrols reported that the mission of Operation "Freezeout" was complete. There wasn't a bunker left between the opposing lines.

From an overall viewpoint, the situation remained quiet throughout the winter and early spring. To the men who patrolled across the snow-covered rice paddies, however, the war seemed far from quiet. On occasions too numerous to count, vicious fire fights took place between 9th Infantry and enemy patrols. The Thailand Battalion had an especially high number of contacts with Chinese patrols and probes. Count after count was received of enemy dead and wounded from the actions of 9th Infantry patrols.

Operation "Clam-up," a concealment of operations intended to deceive the enemy, was participated in to the fullest by the 9th. For six days in mid-February, men confined all their movement and activity to hours of darkness. Many enemy positions were disclosed by the operation and were taken under fire afterwards by weapons of the 9th and the big guns of the attached elements of the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion.

Continued patrolling and defensive construction went on for the remainder of the campaign. On 7 April, the neighboring 40th U.S. Division took over the left battalion zone of the regimental sector, causing a boundary change throughout the unit. The 9th in turn took over a battalion sector in the 23d zone to the left. The Regiment occupied this new sector until 25 April, when elements of the 7th Division moved in to relieve. The destination of the 9th this time was the region west of the Hwachon reservoir. The mission was to maintain the positions there and meanwhile carry on a training program similar to that of the rest of the Division, which was located farther south at Kapyong.

Replacements streamed into the units to fill the spots vacated by men leaving on rotation. Master Sergeant Robert Alexander, of Regimental Headquarters Company, became the 25,000th rotatee to return to the United States from the 2d Division since the Korean War began.

Training schedules were aimed at integrating the new men into their units. A platoon combat course was run during May by all front-line units of the Regiment. This included a compass course, patrolling and various phases of attack by platoon-sized units. Battle drill, emphasizing tactics on a squad level, was also initiated. A Sniper school, including instruction on sniper techniques and equipment, was established, with Sniper's emblems being awarded to graduates.

During this time the Third Battalion was released from Regimental control and shipped to Koje-do island to guard the prisoner camp. There the battalion joined with other units in controlling the riotous Communist prisoners. Demonstrations and escapes were common during this period, until the organized compounds were broken up in June.

Movement back to the new Division sector was accomplished primarily by rail in mid-July. Three battalions of the Regiment relieved elements of the 45th Division and the 9th assumed control of the eastern section of the new front on 18 July. Positions stretched from hills behind the T-Bone on the left to the Yokkok River on the right. Strong points in the right portion of the zone overlooked Chorwon to the southeast and guarded the vital corridor leading into that city.

Action during the first days on the new front consisted mainly of aggressive patrolling and rebuilding the many defensive works which during the rainy season had collapsed. A company size raid on enemy outposts northwest of Hill 281 was carried out by C Company on the night of 13 August. Initial efforts of the 108-man raiding force were successful, but a bitter fire fight in the early morning hours repelled the raiders and killed the prisoners they had captured earlier. Just as in the winter campaign on the central front, the enemy seemed quite averse to capture. In an effort to increase the raiding capabilities of the Regiment, special "Ranger" platoons were formed at this time in each battalion. These units were given strenuous physical conditioning and trained expressly for raiding deep into enemy territory. Stealth, aggressiveness and teamwork were emphasized. Similar units were formed in other organizations of the Division and were used subsequently in many raiding actions, with varying degrees of success.

Typical of the actions carried through by these specially trained units was a patrol involving the First Battalion Ranger platoon later in the fall. The mission of the Rangers was to raid a Chinese outpost on the left side of the T-Bone hill mass, to capture prisoners and to inflict casualties on the enemy.

Shortly after dark, 18 men, led by First Lieutenant Robert Stonecipher, filed through the main line of resistance and into the soggy rice paddies which make up no-man's-land. Passing the last friendly outpost on the T-Bone, the Rangers increased their stealth as they neared the enemy lines. They had gone but a short way from the outpost when noises were heard to their front. Peering through the darkness, they made out the forms of several enemy soldiers moving up a trail toward their positions.

Lieutenant Stonecipher, accompanied by his radioman, Private First Class J. R. von Thorme, and an automatic rifleman, Private First Class John Lauther, moved forward to investigate. After advancing some twenty yards, the fluttering sound of concussion grenades flying through the air brought home the realization that they had been seen. The grenades roared off just a few yards to their front, stunning all three of them. They quickly recovered more angry than hurt and rejoined the rest of the patrol which was now under fire by three enemy machine guns.

"Etiwah.... Surrender," called Lieutenant Stonecipher up the hill, and the Chinese replied with some unmistakable English profanity. The order was then given for the Rangers to assault, and with a shout they started up through the fire. Sergeant Stanley Johnson, assistant patrol leader, took charge of the left element and Lieutenant Stonecipher led the right. During the assault rifle grenadiers fired continuously on visible enemy bunkers. The enemy force on the position greatly outnumbered the patrol, and it was soon decided that the fire was impassable. Withdrawing to the base of the hill, the Rangers received an order from the battalion commander to break contact and return.

The Chinese had other ideas about the withdrawal and quickly hemmed in the patrol with intense automatic weapons fire. Lieutenant Stonecipher immediately radioed for artillery support. The rounds soon began falling on the enemy positions and covered the patrol as it started to withdraw. Rounds were called as close as thirty yards to the Rangers. In the light of the exploding shells a group of about 100 enemy was seen trying to work down a finger to envelop the 18-man patrol. Artillery made short work of these enemy tactics.

The Rangers moved back to the comparative safety of the main line of resistance with the report that 25 to 40 estimated enemy casualties had been caused, while only two men from the patrol had light wounds. Another good night's work had been chalked up and was representative of the patrol contacts which occurred on an average of two or three times per night on the Division front. Such actions drew small notice in the news reports, which now and then announced that "the front west of Chorwon was quiet, with only minor patrol contacts being reported."

August and early September passed in such a fashion, with patrols highlighting the activity. On 18 September the 23d Regiment began relieving in the sector, and by the 20th the 9th was completely off line. A month-long reserve period thus began which was to include a variety of operations for all units. The Second Battalion had hardly closed into reserve when it was ordered to occupy part of the 38th's sector to assist the hard-hit "Rock" Regiment. The Second Battalion stayed in its positions, including outpost Porkchop, for six days before returning to reserve.

Meanwhile the First Battalion had convoyed to Kimpo peninsula on the west coast of Korea. They remained in that area for three weeks, providing security for the region and a blocking force for the 1st Marine Division. The Thailand Battalion, Heavy Mortar Company and Headquarters Company moved south on the main supply route to furnish a security force for Camp Casey. Elements of the 3d Infantry Division were relieved in that location.

During the heavy fighting for White Horse Mountain and Arrowhead Ridge, it was decided that the reserve regiment carry out a battalion-size raid in the T-Bone area to divert the enemy's forces. The Second Battalion was chosen for this mission and was relieved in its blocking positions by the First Battalion. The time set for the raid was the night of 10 October. The mission given the Battalion was to pass through the 38th's outpost positions and drive up the axis of the T-Bone.

G Company, leading the attack, moved over the first Chinese held knob and proceeded up the ridge line. Stiffer enemy resistance stopped the attack 500 yards farther and G Company became engaged in hand-to-hand combat with an enemy company. Heavy artillery and mortar fire fell on the raiders and the company was ordered to withdraw. E Company moved up in support. Under continuous friendly artillery cover, the entire raiding battalion was able to return to the MLR. Numerous enemy casualties were counted and it was considered that the mission of diverting the Communist forces was accomplished.

On 22 October, preparations were made to relieve the 38th Infantry in the left half of the Division zone. The sector was extended to the west, taking over responsibility for one battalion front from the 1st ROK Division. To permit the 9th to employ four battalions on line, one battalion of the 38th was attached. The new sector for the 9th included the critical outpost positions on Old Baldy, Porkchop and the T-Bone. Enemy shelling was heaviest on Porkchop during late October, but improved fortifications constructed in the foregoing month made the hill much more defensible than in previous days.

The number of incoming rounds continued to increase on Porkchop during the first week of November. The outpost, held by elements of the Thailand Battalion, received enemy probing attacks almost nightly. At first the probes were of platoon size. These were beaten off by defensive fires in each case. Twice enemy attacks of company size were thwarted, the Chinese attackers and reinforcements suffering heavy casualties.

On the night of 10 November, an enemy battalion attacked Porkchop with intense fire support. The Communists overwhelmed the listening post on the forward slope and pushed up the hill to the trenches of the Thailanders. Bloody hand-to-hand fighting followed, with the rugged Thais resorting to bayonets and then knives. Friendly reinforcements arrived to aid the platoon on the hill, forcing the Chinese to withdraw. Twice more the enemy attacked in the early morning hours. Accurate supporting fires and the stiff defense by the "Little Tigers" kept the Chinese from again reaching the crest.

At dawn a Thailand screening patrol swept the slopes of Porkchop, causing the last enemy troops to flee. One hundred enemy dead were counted. Equipment they carried indicated that the attack was not a raid and was intended to seize the hill. Further unsuccessful attacks were directed on Porkchop the following night before the Chinese gave up their efforts. Thailand defenders continued their heroic fighting, accounting for approximately 800 enemy casualties during the series of attacks.

The heaviest fighting in the regimental sector for the remainder of November and December continued to be borne by the Thailand Battalion. The regimental boundary was extended to the southwest in early December, elements of the 9th relieving members of the 1st ROK Division. Occupying these new positions, the Thailanders stood off two sizable Chinese attacks in late December. Heavy supporting fires were employed by the enemy, but in neither case were they able to push the stubborn Thais from the outposts.

The 7th Division's 32d Infantry Regiment began relieving the 9th on 26 December, and by the end of 1952 the relief was complete. In the five months the 2d Division had spent in the sector west of Chorwon, the 9th had been on line four months and could boast of successful defense against every Communist attack. Heavy casualties administered to the enemy throughout the campaign left convincing proof that the Manchu Regiment was capable of defending its outposts in the continued "Second to None" tradition.

23rd Infantry Regiment w/French Battalion

Employment of the 23d Infantry Regiment in the Korean conflict began almost immediately after its landing in Pusan on 5 August 1950. The Regiment's first mission was to clear the main supply route to the northern end of the defensive perimeter. Following this, the 23d occupied positions north of Taegu and jumped off in the United Nations offensive on 16 September. Exploiting their successes, they drove deep into North Korea until the Chinese counterattack on 25 November. For the next few bloody days the regiment acted as rear guard until 1 December while other units of the Division executed a withdrawal.

Back in the south again, the 23d's victories in early 1951 in the Wonju-Twin Tunnels area helped the Allied machine to start rolling northward once again. The Regiment played an important part in the famed "May Massacre" and again was victorious in the hotly-contested fights for Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge. In all of these later battles, the 23d was greatly reinforced by the French Volunteer Battalion, which became attached to the Regiment on 11 December 1950. Their valiant stands throughout the war have played a large part in the success of the 23d Infantry.

Having struggled to the crests of Heartbreak Ridge and literally broken the crack 6th North Korean Division, the 23d was relieved of line duty on 23 October and began the trek to the Kapyong area. A series of after-action conferences brought to the attention of commanders lessons learned in recent combat. These lessons were applied in the training which followed and were directed at both veterans and replacements. After a month of concentrated classes, problems and inspections, it was felt that replacements were properly welded into their units and the Regiment was again combat- ready.

On 23 November the First Battalion had been ordered to Koje-do island, off the south coast of Korea, to guard prisoners of war. They passed to the control of the 2d Logistical Command and did not return until early January, after the remainder of the Regiment had already entered the line.

The move back to battle came in mid-December when the Division relieved the 25th Division on the central front north and west of Kumhwa. Relief in the 23d sector proceeded with only one casualty, but that one was costly. Colonel James Y. Adams, who had been regimental commander since July, was wounded by enemy artillery fire while observing his unit's new positions. His post was filled for a short time by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph I. Gurfein, and on 5 January Colonel George C. Mergens became commander of the 23d.

Patrol actions and defense against enemy probes of squad or platoon size were the main activities of the Regiment in the early part of the winter campaign. Observation and reconnaissance patrols soon showed the intelligence section that the enemy occupied outposts on many key terrain features across the front and was prepared to defend these to the death. On the other hand, the Chinese appeared to be content to let the 2d Division take the initiative for contacts and patrols. Later in the period enemy patrols became more aggresive. Close coordination with the 37th Field Artillery and other supporting weapons enabled the Regiment to inflict heavy casualties on enemy probes and patrols.

During operation "Clam-up" in February, the 23d went all out to simulate a withdrawal. Vehicles assembled to the front and jammed south-bound roads at night with their lights on. A smoke screen during the day further confused the Chinese. At first the enemy took the bait and made deep reconnaissance in full view of the main line of resistance. Some units withheld their fire under trying conditions, the Chinese at one time approaching within 20 yards of friendly positions. Enemy strong points were revealed by the operation but most commanders felt it should have been limited to two or three days.

The latter stages of the winter and the early spring thaws caused considerable damage to defensive positions. To supplement the work of the 2d Engineers, the 23d formed its own engineer unit, using the Anti-tank and Mine platoon and attached Korean Service Corps personnel. Duties performed by these 23d Engineers included maintenance of tools, procuring logs and duckboards for bunkers, salvage and construction of concertina wire. Another new unit formed within the regiment was the Invader Security Force, made up from ROK soldiers attached to the Regiment. The Invader Security Force provided command post guards and fulfilled many other security missions.

The Regiment's role in the winter campaign ended on 29 April when elements of the 7th Division completed the relief. Convoys once again transported the Regiment to the Kapyong vicinity, where training and inspection schedules were immediately set up. It was soon learned that the 23d would be split up and several of the companies would not be present for training. One battalion was needed to furnish guard details in the Sangdong tungsten mining area to the southeast. The Second Battalion was the first to assume this task, until relief by the Third Battalion in early June. One company, furnished by the French Battalion, guarded a Very High Frequency radio station near Kapyong, while still another company was furnishing security for the IX Corps command post.

Strenuous training programs, interspersed with recreation and organized athletics, occupied the time of the remaining elements of the Regiment through May, June and early July. As the summer days grew hotter, units put the finishing touches on training and prepared to take over the left sector of the 45th Division zone, west of Chorwon.

A reconnaissance showed that the sector, then occupied by the 179th Regiment, had been quite active with fire fights and was receiving considerable enemy mortar and artillery fire. Hill 266, or Old Baldy, in the left part of the zone, was an outpost recently captured by the 45th and seemed to be the enemy's principal target. The hill was aptly named, for not a growing thing was standing after the shelling it had taken. Other focal points were hills Eerie and Arsenal, the two outposts the 45th had established on T-Bone Ridge, to the northeast of Baldy. On Old Baldy the 179th Regiment had been employing one platoon in daylight hours and reinforcing it with another at night. A platoon from F Company of the 23d made a successful relief there on the night of 16 July, despite a goodly number of incoming rounds. Other elements of the Second Battalion also moved into position.

On 17 July the shelling on Old Baldy steadily increased. By 2200 it reached a rate higher than anything the Communists had used in many months. Another platoon from F Company moved up the valley to reinforce the outpost from the right but were ambushed en route by Chinese who had infiltrated around the hill. The shelling was still continuing when a battalion of enemy assaulted the outpost, moving forward steadily under their own artillery. The greatly outnumbered men from F Company clung to their positions while back on the main line of resistance plans were made for a counter attack.

E Company was selected to attack shortly after midnight. By the time E Company reached the hill, the crest was in enemy control, but a successful counterattack pushed back the Chinese in the early morning hours. Two successive enemy counterattacks hit Old Baldy that morning and the second was able to wrest control from the hard-hit E and F Companies. The Third Battalion had now been called up from reserve. K Company was ordered to counterattack, with tanks and personnel carriers in support. Their movement to the hill in daylight hours was hampered by a rain of mortar and artillery. A handful of men were able to reach the remaining elements of E and F Companies, but the Chinese tenaciously held on to the crest.

Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Burns, Regimental Executive Officer, was placed in command of a task force formed to attack on the afternoon of the 18th, composed of I, L and B Companies. M Company and a platoon of tanks were in support. This force reached part way up the hill but again terrific enemy barrages caused heavy casualties. Communications were lost and now a rain was beginning to turn the battered hill into a mass of mud. B Company had but 20 men left. After fighting until their ammunition was gone, they withdrew, along with the few remaining men from E, F and K Companies. Elements of three battalions had now been committed in the area. C Company of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion and the 2d Reconnaissance Company were attached to strengthen the embattled Regiment.

With the situation still in doubt on the crest, the remnants of I and L Companies attempted to push to the top. Continuing barrages denied them the crest, but they held on to their positions on the reverse slope. They were relieved the following night by 24 men of K Company who managed to reach the top of Baldy. G Company moved up in reinforcement on 21 July and during that night the hill was reported under control of friendly elements. Incoming shells were again taking a heavy toll and the defenders fought until the last ammunition was expended. Waves of counterattacking Chinese forced most of the men from the hill.

On 22 July the 2d Reconnaissance Company relieved the few men still on Old Baldy. The unit was later driven from the top but stayed in position on the right finger, a part of the hill which had never fallen to the enemy. At this time a heavy rain began which slowed activity considerably. The main thought of the infantrymen became existence in the downpour. Bunkers caved in and those which did remain standing were knee-deep in mud. The slow-up in the action gave the 23d a chance to plan a new counterattack which would drive the Chinese from Old Baldy permanently. In the meantime air strikes and artillery barrages were directed at enemy positions on Baldy and strong points to the north and west.

The fighting had eased in the left part of the Regiment's sector, but on 24 July it picked up tremendously at the other end, where the French Battalion occupied outposts on the T-Bone and a smaller finger nearby. Once again enemy barrages were devastating. Intelligence marveled that the Communists were able to sustain such a rate of fire in spite of the rainy season and the air strikes which were directed on their supply dumps.

The French Battalion's N Company on the 1-Bone and elements of P Company on Uncle and Yoke outposts were all subjected to attacks on the night of 24 July. Well-coordinated fires from supporting artillery and from the adjacent 9th Regiment, coupled with the efficient and gallant stand of the French, kept the enemy off all of the outposts. "Chinks have attacked began which slowed activity considerably. The main thought of the infantrymen became existence in the downpour. Bunkers caved in and those which did remain standing were knee-deep in mud. The slow-up in the action gave the 23d a chance to plan a new counterattack which would drive the Chinese from Old Baldy permanently. In the meantime air strikes and artillery barrages were directed at enemy positions on Baldy and strong points to the north and west.

The fighting had eased in the left part of the Regiment's sector, but on 24 July it picked up tremendously at the other end, where the French Battalion occupied outposts on the T-Bone and a smaller finger nearby. Once again enemy barrages were devastating. Intelligence marveled that the Communists were able to sustain such a rate of fire in spite of the rainy season and the air strikes which were directed on their supply dumps.

The French Battalion's N Company on the 1-Bone and elements of P Company on Uncle and Yoke outposts were all subjected to attacks on the night of 24 July. Well-coordinated fires from supporting artillery and from the adjacent 9th Regiment, coupled with the efficient and gallant stand of the French, kept the enemy off all of the outposts. "Chinks have attacked Nan Company three times, repulsed three times," reported the French commander, Lieutenant Colonel Francois Borreill. The situation grew more precarious later in the night as the enemy infiltrated between the outposts, but heavy supporting fires finally drove off the attackers and inflicted many casualties.

Back in the Old Baldy area, the 23d's First Battalion, now under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William Zimmermann, had been chosen to make the counterattack aimed at putting an end to the see-saw battle for the outpost. Operation "Little Joe," as it was known, was preceded by a week of rehearsal and preparation as the driving rains continued. In support of the First Battalion were the 37th Field Artillery, B Company of the 2d Engineers and elements of Tank and Heavy Mortar Companies. Preparations included reconnaissance flights over the area, extra communications teams and plans for a forward aid station and supply point at the right base of Old Baldy.

A non-illuminated night attack without preparatory fire was decided upon to achieve the greatest possible surprise. A and C Companies left the line of departure in a two-pronged push at 2200 hours on 31 July. Contact was made almost immediately but the companies advanced up the slopes through the rain of small arms and mortar fire. As dawn came on the first day of August, the companies had reached the crest and joined forces. Old Baldy's slopes were swept immediately for enemy pockets of resistance. A counterattack hit the hill shortly thereafter but was driven off and the outpost was once again declared secure.

B Company relieved A on the hill. Two more Chinese attacks the following night were repulsed and with that the enemy seemed to give up the fight for the outpost. On 6 August the Second Battalion reassumed control of Old Baldy. F Company was placed on the hill, thus making the cycle complete. Three full battalions had been used before the stubborn enemy was defeated. Heavy casualties the Regiment had taken were compensated for only by the knowledge that many more of the enemy had fallen. While the Chinese were apparently reorganizing their battered forces, the 23d concentrated on rebuilding the shambles which had once been fortifications. On 6 August, Colonel Joseph Stilwell Jr., son of World War II hero "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, took over command of the Regiment.

No further action except patrol contacts was seen by the 23d in August. On 19 August, the Regiment was relieved by the 38th and moved back into reserve. A training problem again confronted the unit, since many replacements had entered the companies since entry on line.

Combat readiness tests given in September concluded training and showed that the 23d was again ready for action. Relief of the 9th Regiment was carried out in late September. The 23d was now in the right sector, defending the line from behind the T-Bone east to the Yokkok-Chon River. Arrowhead Ridge (Hill 281), isolated from friendly lines by the Yokkok-Chon, was the most critical terrain feature and received the heaviest enemy fire after the relief.

Patrol contacts increased, as did the number of enemy seen moving to the north of the Regiment. All indications pointed toward an impending Chinese attack, probably in the Arrowhead Ridge area. Intelligence determined that the Chinese would flood the river to hinder friendly reinforcement of Arrowhead. The French Battalion took positions in the westernmost portion of the Regiment's zone, with N Company on Arrowhead and two outposts to the north. Defensive fires were coordinated and checked. Elements of the Third Battalion were placed in blocking positions in case of penetration in the French or adjacent 9th ROK Division sectors.

Hostile artillery, tank and mortar fire reached a tremendous rate on 6 October, hitting all parts of the line but concentrated on Arrowhead Ridge. Chinese attacks of varying sizes hit many points of the line on that night. The Second Battalion received probes but the main efforts of the enemy were against Arrowhead Ridge, where the 337th Chinese Regiment struck and ROK-held White Horse Mountain, where elements of two Communist divisions were employed.

The swarms of Chinese attackers, though hit hard by artillery and air strikes, overran the N Company outposts and assaulted the positions on Arrowhead Ridge. Company after company of enemy was committed against Arrowhead and positions of the other French companies to the east. Close-in fighting and continuous defensive barrages pushed off every Chinese assault. Attacks continued against the embattled French until 10 October. Elements of the Third Battalion reinforced French hill positions and the remainder of the Battalion occupied blocking positions. The 23d's casualties were heavy, but did not approach the number of enemy dead and wounded. Hundreds of dead Chinese were counted around the French positions. Total enemy casualties in the Arrowhead action were estimated at more than 1,500.

Meanwhile, across the divisional boundary to the east, the 9th ROK Division was fighting a seven-day battle for possession of White Horse. Elements of the 23d occupied blocking positions to halt a possible breakthrough on the boundary. Supporting fires of the 23d were also of great aid to the ROK's. At one time eight enemy companies were observed in front of French positions massing for an attack on White Horse and were heavily hit by 2d Division artillery units.

The successful defense of Arrowhead Ridge and surrounding territory represented victory over the largest Communist force to engage the 2d Division during 1952. For their heroism the French Battalion won the Korean Presidential Unit Citation, presented personally by Syngman Rhee on 1 December.

The 38th Chinese Communist Army, badly mauled by the 23d and the 9th ROK's, eased its pressure after the October battles. Except for several patrol actions in the vicinity of the Alligator Jaws and the banks of the Yokkok-Chon, the 23d sat out the remainder of October and most of November with light action.

Relief by the 38th came on 25 November, the 23d moving back in time to enjoy Thanksgiving in reserve. With the exception of the First Battalion, which remained attached to the 9th Infantry, the Regiment stayed in reserve positions for the month of December, until the 2d Division was relieved in the Chorwon sector. Late in the month the Regiment was alerted for a move to Koje-do, where they would assume the former security mission of the 38th. Training and rehabilitation were carried on throughout the month, with the aim of maintaining the Regiment's efficiency on a level "Second to None."

38th Infantry Regiment w/Netherlands Detachment

Combat duty in Korea for the 38th Infantry “Rock of the Marne" Regiment began soon after docking in Pusan on 19 August 1950. The 38th took up positions along the Naktong River defensive line. In the United Nations offensive the following month, the Regiment forced a river crossing and expanded its bridgehead to the town of Chogye. A record-smashing sprint followed in the succeeding days. The Regiment drove 23 miles in one day to capture Kochang and two days later raced 73 miles northward to Chonju. Advances continued by great strides until Chinese entry into the war in November 1950.

Pushed back into South Korea with the rest of the Eighth Army, the 38th helped defend the area around Wonju. In May the Regiment distinguished itself against hordes of enemy by holding its ground near the Soyang River. The 38th saw continuous action in the summer offensive, pushing back the Communists at Fool's Mountain, Kim-Il-Sung Ridge, Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge. Fighting alongside the 38th in Korea was the attached battalion-size Netherlands Detachment. This group of hard-bitten volunteers won great respect every time they entered combat.

Relieved from the line on 19 October, the “Rock of the Marne" Regiment moved into a Corps reserve role in the area west of the Hwachon reservoir. First attention was turned to improving the area as a blocking position for the central front. Bunkers, fields of fire and final protective lines were of primary consideration. Individual and unit training were also carried on in November and early December. Schedules set up by the units included squad, platoon and company tactics, bunker construction, map and compass reading, demolitions, live firing and cold weather indoctrination.

The 38th Regiment returned to the line on 20 December, relieving the Turkish Armed Forces Command, a brigade-size unit attached to the 25th U. S. Division. Location of the Regiment was the left sector of the 2d Division’s defensive line, west of Kumhwa. Enemy outposts included the nearby hills known as Star Hill,Silver Star Hill and Monk’s Hood Hill, among others. His main line of resistance was on the higher ground to the north, around the Hill 717 complex.

Action during the winter campaign for the 38th consisted almost solely of patrol contacts, the truce talks having held up any further offensives. An outstandingly successful raiding patrol was carried out on Silver Star Hill by the Netherlands Detachment on 4 January. The aggressive raiders pushed the Chinese off the outpost, destroyed the fortifications there and killed or wounded more than 50 enemy before returning to the lines. Only seven casualties were suffered by the raiders. Defensive construction carried on throughout the winter by the 38th stressed in particular the addition of homemade napalm charges to tactical wire barriers along the MLR.

February’s operation “Clam-up” proved valuable to the 38th by disclosing that the enemy was building up his outpost on Star Hill. The operation was closely followed up by a large-scale raid on this hill, this time by B Company of the Netherlands Battalion. The raid was preceded by a day of deadly air strikes and was closely supported by artillery and heavy weapons. The raiding company, moving up the hill at a run, force doff the defenders, destroyed positions and returned to friendly lines. Meanwhile fire fights and supporting fires cost the enemy 230 killed and wounded. Two more raids in March were directed against Monk’s Hood Hill and Hill 472. These were less spectacular than the Star Hill operation but also caused damage to the enemy outpost line.

On 23 March, command of the 38th Regiment passed from Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Rowny to Lieutenant Colonel William F. Kernan.

March and early April passed with continued light action but with the Regiment wearying of four consecutive months of line duty on the snow-covered hills and frozen rice paddies. On 16 April came promise of a change of scene. The entire 38th was alerted for a move to Koje-do island, to perform prison guard duties at the United Nations prisoner-of-war camp there.

The long trip, by truck, rail and ship, commenced on 17 April. By 22 April the unit arrived at its destination and was attached to the 2d Logistical Command. Military Police were in charge of the island’s security.Duties given to the 38th involved guarding compounds, prisoner work details and troop installations.

The camp consisted of 17 occupied compounds with a population of approximately 80,000 prisoners-of-war and civilian internees. Because of the large number of prisoners and the limited space, control had been inadequate. Inside certain compounds were Communist organizations which had been plotting mass demonstrations, riots and eventual escape.Prisoners were equipped with many types of homemade weapons: spears, knives, flails and gasoline bombs.

The climax to the prisoners’ efforts was the capture of the camp commander on 7 May. Immediately the 38th Regiment was displaced around Compound 76 as a display of force and was prepared to enter upon order. An ultimatum was given the prisoners to release the camp commander. After 78 hours the captured commander was freed, but the prisoners continued their belligerence.

A program of propaganda and demonstrations was continued by the internees. When an order to remove signs and flags was disobeyed in certain compounds, the Regiment was given the task of removing them forcibly. On 14 May, General Boatner, formerly of the 2d Division, took command of the camp and immediately launched a program to reorganize the operation of the prisoner camp. Old enclosures were made stronger, new guard towers were emplaced and plans for new 500-man compounds were readied.Work details for construction of the new enclosures came from the 38th Regiment.

The new compounds were completed in short order, but the job of relocating the prisoners presented problems. Insurgent occupants of Compound 76 refused to move peaceably to the new area. The infantry was ordered to move them with force, if necessary. Behind tear gas and fixed bayonets, soldiers from the 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment succeeded in subduing the fiercely resisting prisoners. The 38th assisted in clearing Compound 76 and later emptied the other enclosures. Behind them the prisoners left grim evidence of the “kangaroo courts” they had held. Prisoners who were suspected of being anti-Communist had been tortured and slaughtered.

With all the prisoners relocated, the 38th had gained complete control of the island which a short time before had been virtually in the hands of the men within the barbed wire enclosures. The efficient job done by the 38th and Third Battalion of the 9th, under the leadership of General Boatner, will be duly entered in the records alongside the many combat victories of the units.

Notice came in early July that the 38th would shortly join the rest of the 2d Division in the move to the new front west of Chorwon. Units were transported to their new assembly areas by three means. LST’s carried the troops and equipment around the Korean coast to the port of Inchon. From there a rail move was made to the rail head at Yonchon, and trucks completed the journey by carrying the units to their areas. The Regiment was slated to be in Corps reserve initially while the 9th and 23rd occupied the line.

Immediate trouble in the Old Baldy area of the 23d’s sector caused the 38th to be alerted almost as soon as they had arrived. The Third Battalion was moved to a forward assembly area while commanders and their staffs looked over the situation and planned a counterattack. Commitment of the 38th was called off,however, at the last minute. The Third Battalion returned to their reserve positions and joined the remainder of the Regiment in a training schedule for the rest of July and the first half of August.

On 20 August the Regiment relieved the hard-hit 23d and commenced improving the defensive positions. Immediately a siege of heavy rainstorms, repeating the drenchings of late July, hit the entire front. Again fighting gave way to a struggle for existence on the slippery, land sliding hills. In the First Battalion area, sixty percent of the bunkers became uninhabitable. To the rear, washouts of bridges and roads created many supply problems. The reserve battalion stopped training and worked alongside the Engineers to reconstruct the supply routes.

Defensive improvements and aggressive patrolling went on for the first half of September. The fateful day of 18 September opened with the following disposition of units: Netherlands Detachment occupying the right third of the regimental sector, the First Battalion in the center and the Third Battalion on the left, with K Company entrenched on the Old Baldy outpost. The Second Battalion was in reserve. Enemy artillery and mortar fire had been falling in the area sporadically, but on the 18th it picked up, focusing on the outposts on Old Baldy and Pork Chop, to the northeast of Baldy. The rate of incoming fire increased as the day went on. At 1850 hours it seemed as though every tank, recoil less weapon, artillery piece and mortar that the Communists owned had opened up. Shells too numerous to count rattled into the outposts. It was apparent that the enemy was preparing to strike. At 1900 he did strike, in two places simultaneously.

One company of Chinese hit the small Pork Chop outpost, which was occupied by a platoon of B Company.The attackers seemed to move up the hill among their own artillery shells. As the enemy reached the trenches, a fierce fire fight ensued with the numerically superior Chinese overrunning the positions and sweeping over the crest of the hill. With almost as much speed as in the attack, they turned and swept back in the opposite direction, picked up their many casualties and moved off the hill. Friendly artillery and machine gun fire was called in on the positions and few of the enemy escaped unhurt.

Radio contact was maintained throughout the fire fight on Pork Chop. It was reported that one officer and five men remained of the B Company platoon and that the Chinese had moved away from the hill.Reinforcements were immediately sent by the First Battalion. It appeared that this action was a diversionary raid.

On Old Baldy a battalion of enemy swarmed into the K Company positions in the same lightning-like fashion. Eyewitness accounts told of the enemy soldiers marching forward mechanically through their own fire, seemingly doped and oblivious to the shelling. The enemy had taken advantage of the twilight and a friendly smoke screen to the front, moving an entire battalion almost to the base of the hill unobserved.

K Company’s defenders called in artillery and machine gun fire on the crest of Old Baldy. Small groups of men from K Company were able to hold parts of the hill, but control was soon in the hands of the enemy,who was able to overrun the crest. The Chinese had also set up an ambush on the eastern approach to the hill to prevent immediate reinforcement.

Elements of L Company were sent to Old Baldy the same night to determine the situation on the crest,since communications were out with K Company. They advanced up the slope but intense enemy fire in the early morning hours of 19 September forced them to withdraw. Also on the night of 18 September, E Company was called up from reserve to occupy blocking positions in the valley to the east of Old Baldy.

Several changes were made the next day to reassign sectors and release units for counterattack. G Company took over L Company’s positions and at 1200 hours on 19 September, elements of E, K and L Companies hit Old Baldy in a tank-supported counterattack. The push reached the crest of the hill, but intense enemy fire inflicted heavy casualties and forced a withdrawal. The hold the 38th retained on the outpost consisted of five bunkers on the left slope. On the evening of the 19th, C Company of the 2d Engineers and the 2d Reconnaissance Company were both attached to the 38th, relieving E and. G Companies, respectively.

This action left the Second Battalion as a unit once again. Commanded by Major H. B. Greer, the unit returned to reserve and made plans for a night attack on Old Baldy, slated for 20 September. A platoon from I Company moved up the slope of Old Baldy on the morning of the 20th to reinforce the five friendly-held bunkers. The remaining elements of L Company replaced the Engineers in the blocking positions.

The Second Battalion crossed the line of departure for its night attack at 2045 hours on 20 September. There was no artillery preparation. F Company on the right and G Company on the left led the approach. E Company followed, and H Company’s machine gunners moved up with the forward elements. Heavy enemy fire hit the attackers in the approach but they pressed on slowly to the base of Old Baldy. F Company attack was stopped by particularly intense fire on the right slopes of the hill and E Company moved up in reinforcement. The three companies continued their progress throughout the night and the last remaining enemy were routed from the hill by early morning. Artillery fire called in on the retreating Chinese accounted for many casualties.

In one bunker on the hilltop, the Second Battalion found an officer and three men from K Company who had survived three nights and two days while the enemy was on the hill. Despite numerous wounds, continuous shelling and Chinese who had at intervals sprayed the bunker with burp-gun fire, the four lived and were speedily evacuated.

Behind the wave of assaulting infantrymen, other troops followed carrying the new metal prefabricated assault bunkers for hurried emplacement on the hill. All efforts were directed after the successful seizure of the outpost to make it a fortress not likely to fall a third time to the enemy. Engineers worked full time building a road for wheeled vehicles to the crest of Old Baldy so that supplies could be brought up more efficiently than the previous track trail had allowed.

To relieve the hard-hit Second and Third Battalions, the 9th Infantry contributed its Second Battalion to man the center sector and the 38th’s First Battalion took over Old Baldy and the surrounding area shortly after the capture of the outpost. The battalion of the 9th remained on line for six days before returning to its parent unit. The 2d Reconnaissance Company also left the sector and the 38th Regiment, now commanded by Colonel Archibald W. Stuart, was again manning its entire line. The Regiment began a program of fortifying the outposts with all available equipment and personnel. The units on Old Baldy, Pork Chop and the T-Bone were supplemented by Engineers, Korean Service Corps labor and work details from the reserve battalion.

During the first part of October, the 38th was given the mission of supporting the attack on the T-Bone with every available weapon in the Regiment. Coordination was established between all fire support elements and the 9th Regiment attackers. Considerable resistance encountered in the last phase of the operation required intense fire by all the 38th’s weapons. The wall of steel placed on the enemy by artillery,mortars and tanks enabled the raiding battalion to withdraw safely to the MLR.

With the exception of the First Battalion, which became attached to the relieving 9th Regiment, the 38th relinquished its sector and moved into reserve on 25 October. The Regiment remained there for a month,training and preparing to take over the right sector from the 23d. This relief was accomplished late in November as frosty weather began to hit the battle front. Equipped with the latest in winter gear, the 38th took over the line. Though most of the men were getting their first taste of winter warfare, it was the third Korean winter for the Regiment.

Early December passed quietly, and it appeared that the 38th might be relieved before any significant action took place. This, however, was forgotten when a large-scale attack was forecasted in the T-Bone area by intelligence. The attack materialized on 23 December, in battalion size, accompanied by a total of 2600 rounds of incoming artillery and mortar.

Just prior to midnight, hordes of Chinese charged up the slopes of Arsenal outpost, manned by B Company.The proximity of Arsenal to Chinese lines aided the enemy to achieve surprise, but the efficient defenders quickly organized and engaged the Chinese in fierce hand-to-hand fighting. A number of enemy swarmed into some of the outpost’s trenches. Supporting fires were called in and reserve units were alerted for reinforcement. B Company soon had the situation in hand and cleared the hill, killing or capturing all of the enemy who had reached the position. Counted Chinese dead on the hill numbered 117, while total enemy casualty figures for the action were listed as 650. Losses for the 38th were extremely slight.

This successful stand was the last action for the 38th. Elements of the 7th Division began relieving the Regiment on 26 December and a move was begun to bivouac areas in Corps reserve. “Rock of the Marne” men looked back on their record for the past year and gave assurance that the Regiment would continue to uphold the “Second to None” reputation.

2nd Division Artillery

As the 2d Division ended its summer?fall offensive of 1951, Division Artillery still was composed of five battalions: The 503d Field Artillery was a 155 howitzer unit; the 15th, 37th and 38th Field Artillery Battalions manned 105 howitzers; and the 82d was a self propelled antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battalion.

All of the battalions except the 15th passed to the control of IX Corps when the Division moved into reserve. The 15th for a short time supported the 24th Division and on 31 October assumed direct support of the 7th Infantry Regiment, then attacked to the 25th Division. The main role assigned to the remainder of Division Artillery by IX Corps was support of the 6th ROK Division on the east central front. On 7 November, the 503d Field Artillery, the familiar "Nickel?Oh?Trey" of past 2d Division campaigns, was consolidated with the 12th Field Artillery. The Battalion retained the designation of the latter unit and remained as the Division's 155 howitzer unit.

Considerable action was seen in the 6th ROK sector during the month of November. First, the Chinese hit the United Nations line with a series of attacks. This was followed by a general limited objective offensive on the part of the ROK's to straighten the main line of resistance and eliminate enemy pockets. During this action 2d Division Artillery units fired an average of 4,000 rounds per day and contributed greatly to the success of the operation. Chinese counterattacks which subsequently tried to regain the lost ground were also held off with the aid of heavy artillery barrages. A total of 8,000 enemy casualties were estimated to have been caused by artillery during this month of heavy action.

Replacements who arrived during this period to fill the ranks of Div Arty were often found to be lacking in artillery techpiques, but a concentrated training program carried on through the winter soon integrated the new men into their units. In December Army Field Forces firing tests were administered to the battalions.

Mid?December saw the 2d Division leaving X Corps for the first time in a year and joining Div Arty in IX Corps. The artillery battalions relieved their counterparts in the 25th Division and took over support missions on 18 December. One battalion remained from the 25th Div Arty to provide direct supportfor the 14th Infantry Regiment, which became attached to the 2d Division.

Aggressive patrols and raids by the Division infantrymen were supported by the artillery to provide the major action in the early stages of the winter. Ammunition expenditures were limited a large part of the time, but with certain notable exceptions. The first of these was an "attack by fire," participated in by all artillery units between 8 and 11 January. In coordination with the Air Force, "time on target" concentrations were fired on known targets both in daytime and darkness. This operation caused heavy damage and casualties to the enemy and was repeated from time to time during the stay on the Kumhwa line.

To increase range capabilities, two batteries of light howitzers and one battery of medium howitzers displaced forward daily during the winter. This permitted organic weapons of the Division to take deep targets under fire, including the enemy supply center of Pyonggang. Other weapons moved forward included 155-mm self-propelled guns and eight-inch howitzers borrowed from Corps artillery. These precision weapons were used in the bunker-busting program, firing destruction missions on enemy fortifications.

All firing was curtailed during the period of 10-15 February when operation "Clam-up" was conducted. Ammunition was stockpiled during this period, while ground and air observers kept close watch on Chinese construction and movement. As the operation ended, Division Artillery opened up with heavy concentrations on the new targets which had been located.

Harassing and interdiction fires and the bunker-busting operation were pursued relentlessly through the remainder of the winter. Often it was observed on aerial photographs that enemy bunkers destroyed during the day were rebuilt by the Chinese the following night. A scheme of hitting these locations in hours of darkness after the destruction missions were fired accounted for heavy losses among enemy work parties.

The 2d Division prepared to be relieved in mid-April, but Division Artillery, following the principle that artillery is never held in reserve, prepared to render support to a new sector of the front. The 38th Field Artillery was the first battalion to be relieved, returning to X Corps control in the Punch Bowl region of the eastern front. On 26 April the remainder of Division Artillery was relieved by 7th Division units. This time a move was ordered to the sector of the 9th ROK Division near Chorwon. Taking up positions southeast, south and southwest of the city, 2d Division Artillery assumed direct support of the 9th ROK Division.

The largest action of the spring and summer campaign with the ROK's was a regimental-size attack in the center of the sector on 22 June. The 15th Field Artillery Battalion was in direct support of the attacking regiment and the 37th Field Artillery also fired support for this operation. Nearly 10,000 rounds were fired in counterbattery and close support missions. Twentyeight air strikes were flown in preparation for the attack. The ROK unit assaulted Chinese positions for a full day but was then ordered to withdraw. Training of Korean artillerymen was also carried on by Ed Division Artillery during the early summer months. Forward observers of the 15th Field Artillery were taught to give fire missions in Korean to assist in this instruction.

An example of increasing ground-air coordination was a mission fired on 4 July. Fourteen rounds of hostile harassing fire fell in an area 3,000 yards behind the front lines. A crater analysis team immediately obtained a groove azimuth to the source of the fire. The Fire Direction Center plotted the azimuth but was unable to obtain a definite location by intersection. The readings were passed on to the Photo Interpretation section, which examined new photographs and discovered some rebuilt firing positions along the groove azimuth. An air observer was immediately notified and directed a precision mission which destroyed two enemy gun positions and silenced the firing.

Relief of the neighboring 45th Division Artillery by 2d Division Artillery began on 15 July and was complete by the 20th. The firing batteries were hardly in position when requests began to stream in for fire to ward off the Chinese attacks on Old Baldy. Forward observer teams suffered several casualties in the ensuing action and communications were also badly hurt by enemy fire. Nevertheless, the 37th Field Artillery, in direct support, and the other Div Arty units fired more than 40,000 rounds during the latter part of July. The crest of Old Baldy changed hands several times in this period before it was captured by the 23d Regiment on the night of the 31st.

During this period two more enemy attacks on the French outposts on the T-Bone necessitated heavy artillery support. The French Battalion commander credited the accuracy and timeliness of the artillery with breaking up both attacks before they reached the outposts.

Most artillery fire during the recapture of Old Baldy was directed against enemy mortars and artillery. A large portion of the hostile fire was originating in the adjacent ad Division sector. Close coordination was made with 3d Div Arty on countermortar and counterbattery fire and succeeded in eliminating a large share of the rounds which had been hitting the attacking 23d Regiment. Enemy counterattacks during the next day and night were plastered with fragmentation from Variable-Time fuse shells. With the aid of illuminating rounds, the infantry was able to beat off these counterattacks.

Artillery and mortar capabilities of the Chinese had obviously increased greatly during the last year of stalemate. The rate of fire employed by the enemy in the Old Baldy action exceeded anything seen in Korea for nearly a year. Attention of the artillery was turned to silencing and destroying the enemy weapons. The countermortar and counterbattery program included shell reports, "sound and flash" sensing, infantry counter-fire platoons and countermortar radar.

Once again the incoming fire grew heavy on 18 September and the enemy attacked Old Baldy and Porkchop outposts. Both the 37th and 38th Field Artillery Battalions fired at a continuous rate in this action. Contact was lost with the forward observer on Old Baldy but adjacent observers and liaison officers succeeded in controlling illuminating and VT fire when the Chinese overran the hills. The enemy clung to Old Baldy for two days in spite of a steady rain of shells. The 38th Regiment succeeded in retaking it on 20 September, with 2d Division, 3d Division and I Corps Artillery firing a coordinated support plan. The Chinese suffered heavy casualties as artillery barrages pounded their withdrawal.

Accurate prediction of the Chinese attack on Arrowhead Ridge in early October enabled Division Artillery to plan and register a complete pattern of defensive fires. Although forward observation was hampered by enemy smoke, planned barrages and TOT's were fired continuously on the night of 6 October and contributed to the decisive defeat of the enemy. Nearly 20,000 rounds were fired that night, setting up a steel screen in front of Arrowhead Ridge and preventing all but a few small groups of enemy from reaching the hilltop.

Intensive counterbattery and countermortar missions were also fired during the Arrowhead battle. Air strikes and airobserved artillery during the next few days were directed on a number of profitable targets of enemy personnel in the open. On 8 October an assembly of one thousand Chinese troops was observed to the north and was virtually annihilated by a "Fire for Effect" by all of Division Artillery and two Corps artillery battalions.

Support was given during this time to the 9th ROK Division in their fight for White Horse Mountain, to the east of the Ed Division boundary. Time after time enemy groups were blasted as they assembled for attacks on this key terrain feature. Major General Kim Chong O. Commanding General of the 9th ROK's, said in a letter to the 2d Division, "Many times the success or failure of our attack and defense hung in balance and I relied heavily on your artillery to turn the tide in our favor. I feel confident that without your support this victory would not be ours today. The cooperation and efficient operation of your organization is unexcelled in my experience."

All in all, 2d Division Artillery fired 114,941 rounds in defense of the two hills. Included in this was a large volume fired in support of the diversionary raid on the T-Bone on 10 October by the 9th Infantry's Second Battalion. Enemy casualties for the period numbered nearly 3,000. The planned fires in defense of Arrowhead proved so successful that similar patterns were set up for Old Baldy, Porkchop and the other hill outposts on the Division front.

An opportunity to use these prearranged fires came during the Chinese attacks on Porkchop in early November. Defensive barrages were fired throughout the night of 10-11 November, accounting for a large share of the 600 casualties suffered by the Communists during that attack. Activity was light for the rest of November. The summer-fall campaign ended with Div Arty remaining in the same positions that they had occupied four and one-half months. Concentrations throughout the sector were well registered. 2d Division Artillery had on many occasions demonstrated that it could strike any enemy force with a volume and accuracy "Second to None."

72nd Tank Battalion

Operating continuously over terrain which experts had termed useless for armored warfare, the tanks, guns and men of the 72d Tank Battalion have fought side by side with the infantry through every phase of the Korean War. The Battalion crossed the ocean with its parent unit, the 2d Infantry Division, and with the Second it has seen most of its action. However, in the course of the war, the 72d has also operated in support of many other Eighth Army units, including I, IX, and X Corps, several Republic of Korea divisions and the British Brigade.

The bloodiest fighting for the 72d Tank Battalion took place in the.first year of war as the opposing armies raced up and down the peninsula. The final 2d Division offensive, in the Heartbreak Ridge campaign, was supported by deep armored thrusts up the Mundung-ni valley which blasted deep into the enemy lines. Following the fall offensive, the Battalion moved to the vicinity of Kapyong, South Korea, for its longest period of reserve since the start of the war. Training of replacements and rehabilitation of equipment were the primary concern. Weapons training, tank gunnery, communications, maintenance and cold weather preparations were the chief subjects.

On 13 December the Battalion moved to the central front near Kumhwa to take part in the second winter campaign with the 2d Division. The primary mission of the tankers throughout the winter was to provide a strong counterattack force which would remain in reserve. In addition, winter allowed armored raids which other seasons did not permit. Frozen rice paddies were discovered to provide excellent flotation for tank movement.

A series of raids up to four miles into Chinese territory was begun by a force from C Company on 24 December. The tactics were repeated several times during the next three months, with excellent results. Bunkers, houses, gun positions and supply points deep behind the enemy MLR were destroyed each time the tankers ventured out. The only tanks lost in these operations were those which encountered mines, and they were later retrieved.

The other main function of the 72d during the winter was training in coordination with the infantry on combined tactics subjects. Nearly every infantry unit in the Ed Division participated with the reserve elements of-the 72d in these Tank Infantry problems. In addition, A Company operated for a period with the Ed ROK Division and trained twenty-five ROK companies in the same subjects.

The parent 2d Division again moved into reserve in April, but this time the 72d was ordered to the eastern front to support the 8th ROK Division. The Battalion, along with the attached 38th Regimental Tank Company, passed to X Corps control. The mission given the Battalion and its attachments in the 8th ROK sector was both training and line support. Tank-Infantry problems were again run with Korean infantrymen, who proved to be eager and receptive students.

The tanks which supported the MLR during this spring and early summer campaign fired a large amount of ammunition with good results. North Korean units rather than Chinese manned this portion of the enemy's front. Their installations were repeatedly damaged and destroyed by the fires of the 72d Tank Battalion. Testimony from North Korean prisoners supported the belief that the tank fire was hurting enemy morale. Infiltrating tank-destroyer teams were sent out by the Communists but none ever succeeded in reaching the positions of the 72d.

During the spring a few M-46 medium tanks, equipped with 90-mm guns, were received by the 72d Tank Battalion. These new tanks were sent to support the line and used their heavy guns with good results. However, the lighter M-4 tanks, with 76-mm guns, were the standard equipment of the Battalion
throughout the war and were found to be quite maneuverable over the hilly terrain.

In early July the 38th Tank Company was detached from the Battalion and returned to the 2d. Later in the month, the rest of the 72d, minus C Company, joined the Division in its new area west of Chorwon. Enemy action was increasing with a number of limited objective attacks across the entire front. The 72d Tank Battalion was initially held in reserve to provide a strong force for counterattack against possible Chinese armored thrusts or offensives.

A Company was moved to the line in late July in the sector of the 23d Infantry and was employed in support of the successful recapture and defense of Old Baldy. B Company took over the role of direct support of the right regiment on 20 August. Two companies remained on line for the next two months and gave the regiments direct fire support despite the resupply and mobility problems presented by the August rains. C Company relieved A Company in early September and was in support of the 38th Infantry during the second fight for Old Baldy. More than 700 rounds were fired by C Company's 76-mm guns when the 38th successfully retook the outpost.

An armored mortar vehicle devised by Headquarters and Service Company was employed in the right sector during the Arrowhead Ridge action. Used by the Reconnaissance Platoon, the weapon was an 81-mm mortar mounted solidly in an M-39 armored personnel carrier. The innovation provided a mortar which had both a stable base and cross-country mobility. The successful defense of Arrowhead was also supported by the line tanks of B Company, while the entire Battalion prepared plans to stop a possible full-scale enemy offensive.

Corps orders on 10 October called for the tanks of the 72d to leave the 2d Division line and take over support of the 1st ROK Division, to the west. Twenty-three tanks were placed on line in the ROK sector and fired support fires for patrols and for battles on several disputed outposts in that region. The 72d stayed in these positions until early November when they were relieved and returned to a division reserve role in the 2d Division zone. Thus they ended their actions for the summer-fall campaign. The past year had seen the tanks in relatively static campaigns, but with their weapons proving formidable even in the difficult Korean terrain.

2nd Engineer Combat Battalion

Engineer problems inherent in operations over rugged and varied terrain have been met and solved by the 2d Division's 2d Engineer Combat Battalion in every phase of the war in Korea. Roads have been carved where before there were only footpaths over the steep-faced hills. Bridges and culverts were built to withstand the flooded conditions of the Korean rainy seasons. In short, whenever the Division has needed a construction job, the 2d Engineers have accomplished it efficiently in spite of tremendous obstacles.

Normal employment of the Engineer Battalion when the Division was on line established one company in direct support of each line regiment, with the other elements of the Battalion in general support. Each line company took responsibility for the roads, bridges and other construction in its area, while the general support elements handled construction in rear areas and the many extra jobs which were given the Combat Engineers.

When the Division occupied a reserve position, the Combat Engineers continued their maintenance and construction tasks in the sector as well as carrying on training and preparations for line duty. During the reserve period following the 2d Division's capture of Heartbreak Ridge, the Engineers took over road responsibility for fifty miles of roads in the Kapyong area. Other jobs performed in this period were construction of nine bridges and continuous maintenance of two airstrips. The Engineers also developed a cableway to facilitate supplying positions on inaccessible hills.

Movement to the line at Kumhwa saw the Engineers take over nearly 100 miles of roads. A, B and C Companies assumed direct engineer support of the regiments, maintaining construction in their respective areas, improving roads, building bridges and surveying both friendly and enemy minefields. D Company remained in general support. Operations for D Company included construction of semi-permanent buildings and tropical shells in bivouac areas, purifying and dispensing water at the Division's water points and establishment of a logging camp to provide logs for bunker construction on the front lines.

The 2d Engineer Combat Battalion returned to the vicinity of Kapyong with the Division in April. Here, as in the latter stages of the winter campaign, the spring thaws presented difficulty in keeping the road net trafficable. The Battalion immediately began clearing roads of slides and improving the surfaces. The Engineers also used the reserve period to good advantage by conducting classes for the Battalion on engineer and general subjects. An Engineer noncommissioned officer school was conducted, emphasizing leadership as well as engineer methods.

Returning to the line west of Chorwon in July, the 2d Engineers began the summer-fall campaign in support of the 2d Division. The succeeding months afforded the Combat Engineers a chance to play one of their most important parts in the war. Besides being attacked on outposts by the Chinese, the Division in July and August was besieged by a period of heavy rains which bogged down every type of operation. The already poor roads in the area were reduced to mud tracks. All but the strongest bridges were washed out by flooding streams. Culverts were too small to handle the flow of water.

The Engineers began their almost impossible task of repairing the roads and bridges on a 24-hour schedule. Steel treadways were turned out in mass production fashion by the Bridge Platoon of Headquarters and Service Company to be erected by the line companies. Other tasks performed by the 2d Engineers included issuance of 25,000 maps of the new area and distributing more than three million gallons of purified water per month during the summer heat.

Damage done to front line fortifications by the rains and enemy shelling showed the infantry that there was a need for a large number of sturdy bunker-type fighting positions which would withstand both the elements and the enemy. To meet this requirement, D Company of the 2d Engineers designed and began mass production of a prefabricated log bunker. A sawmill was opened which cut and notched logs to facilitate rapid construction in "log cabin" fashion. The logs were grouped in sets and loaded on Quartermaster trucks for transport to the front lines. From July through October D Company processed 41,379 logs in the sawmill and turned out 736 complete prefabricated bunkers. The bunker program soon became known as Operation "Abe Lincoln" and was hailed by infantry units as an excellent augmentation to defensive fortifications. Several other units throughout the Eighth Army took note of the operation and instituted similar programs in other parts of Korea.

C Company of the 2dEngineer Combat Battalion was committed twice as infantry in the Division's struggle for the Old Baldy outpost. After the 38th Regiment successfully regained the hill in late September, Engineers were sent forward and attached to the units on outposts across the line to carry on a concentrated effort to make the hills heavily entrenched fortresses. Under enemy mortar and artillery fire during most of their time on the outposts, the 2d Engineers laid tactical wire, minefields, napalm and booby traps on Old Baldy, T-Bone and Arrowhead Ridge. A large share of their work was done during hours of darkness. The success of their construction was proved when the massive Chinese assault on Arrowhead in October was broken up without loss of the hill.

The infantry also expressed a desire for a supplementary type of bunker which could be carried and constructed more easily than the "Abe Lincoln" log bunkers. D Company met this need by designing a new attack bunker. Prefabricated from welded barbed wire pickets, it provided overhead cover and could be assembled in 30 minutes by troops occupying new positions. Many of these attack bunkers were carried up on Old Baldy by the attacking elements of the 38th Infantry and were rapidly emplaced. They served their purpose well, protecting the troops until logs for stronger positions could be trucked to the outpost.

Enemy action slowed after the attack on Arrowhead Ridge and the Engineers continued their efforts toward improving supply routes. Operation of a rock crusher in the forward area provided gravel for surfacing and draining roads. Roads for wheeled vehicles were constructed to outposts where previously all resupply had to be done by tracked "weasels" and personnel carriers. The fall campaign for the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion was ended with units concentrating on construction of semi-permanent shelters and preparation of installations for the coming winter.

2nd Medical Battalion

The mission of the 2d Medical Battalion during the past year's operations was twofold in nature: First, to act as a clearing station for sick and wounded destined for hospitals in rear areas; and second, to provide medical care for less serious cases retained at organic installations. Accomplishment of these functions was handled chiefly by Ambulance Company and Clearing Company, while administration was carried out by Headquarters Company.

Normal operation for Ambulance Company utilized one Ambulance Platoon in direct support of each regiment on line. Ambulances operated from collecting stations of Regimental Medical Companies, carrying casualties back to the clearing station for treatment or evacuation. In some cases ambulances were used at Battalion Aid Station level to assist in evacuation of casualties to Regimental Collecting Stations. This procedure insured a-more comfortable ride to the rear for the wounded and also permitted the regimental litter jeeps to be used in bringing casualties from the front. In some instances, when casualty rates were high, an ambulance relay point was established to divide the load between the ambulances and litter jeeps.

Evacuation of seriously sick and wounded soldiers to hospitals in the rear was accomplished by helicopter, ambulance and rail. Seriously wounded battle casualties were normally picked up at Regimental Collecting Stations by helicopter and rushed to Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals located not far to the rear. Rail-busses were also used for this purpose. Patients suffering from serious illnesses, such as hemorrhagic fever, were also flown out by helicopters to evacuation hospitals farther south. Hospital trains provided the primary means of evacuation for less critical cases.

Operation of the 2d Medical Battalion's hospital installation was the job of Clearing Company. This unit's personnel provided treatment for both battle and non-battle casualties throughout the winter and summer-fall campaigns. In the latter part of the period a number of competent surgical personnel were added to the hospital staff and permitted more complete treatment to be given to wounded than was before available. The period a patient could be held was increased to two weeks. Many cases which earlier required evacuation were held at Clearing Company. This enabled the 2d Medical Battalion to return to duty the maximum number of soldiers, helping to keep the Division at its peak fighting strength. Statistics showed that the number of patients in Clearing Company wards more than doubled with the increase in medical personnel and treatment available.

Special units in operation at the 2d Medical Battalion station were the laboratory, pharmacy, optometric, optical and dental sections. The personnel in these sections furnished the only treatment of these specialized types available in the Division.

Soldiers needing consultation in these fields were sent to Clearing Company by unit aid stations. Another type of specialized medical care given by the 2d Medical Battalion was in the field of neuropsychiatry. Surveys showed that light cases of combat fatigue could best be handled on a Division level. A large share of patients examined during the year by 2d Medical Battalion psychiatrists were returned to duty.

Functions of supplying the entire Division with medical supplies and scheduling recreation and special service activities for patients at Clearing Company also came in the scope of the 2d Medical Battalion. All of the activities of the Battalion, as well as those of the Regimental Medical Companies, were supervised by the Division Surgeon.

2nd Signal Company

Responsibility for all communications from Division to subordinate and adjacent units, supply and maintenance of signal equipment and photographic coverage of 2d Division activities was held by the 2d Signal Company. Largest of the separate companies on Division level, the Signal Company included nine sections, each with a different communications task.

Supervising the 2d Signal Company as well as signal policies and operations within the Division was the Division Signal Officer. Handling technical maintenance of all signal equipment, the supply and maintenance section repaired during the last year an average of 1,000 items of equipment each month. A maintenance van with a mobile repair team visited units in the field and greatly improved the condition of equipment.

Tactical, combat and publicity photographs were supplied for the Division by the photographic section. One aerial photographer worked full time for Division intelligence. A series of combat pictures snapped in September 1962 by a 2d Signal Company photographer was judged the best picture story of the year in Korea and won acclaim from Department of the Army.

Carrying on communications functions on a Division level were the message center, telephone, construction, radio and radio relay sections. All incoming and outgoing message traffic, including teletypewriter, radio and messengers, was handled by message centers at Division forward and rear command posts. Message centers processed an average of 3,700 messages per month by the above means. Meanwhile, the telephone section handled an average of 3,800 calls per day on the Division switchboards. The large number of lines to subordinate and other units kept operators busy on a 24-hour basis and made the switchboard room hum like a metropolitan telephone exchange.

Installing cable lines in the Division sectors during both the winter and summer-fall campaigns, the construction section was often employed in maintaining wire during action on the front lines. Regimental and Battalion wire sections were aided by 2d Signal technicians during the attacks on Old Baldy. Approximately 10,000 miles of wire valued at $636,000 was recovered during the year by the construction section in a program aimed at salvaging unused telephone lines.

Radio sets in the command and administrative networks were operated by the radio section, with teams and equipment assigned to each regiment. Radio-teletype networks were maintained between Division and Corps, air support and geographically detached units. Very High Frequency equipment was operated by the radio section.

A continuous policy of on-the-job training was pursued through the year by each section. An eight-week course for radio operators graduated 270 enlisted men as qualified operators during the year. During reserve periods classes were conducted on all phases of signal operations to insure that the 2d Division would continue to have efficient service by communications personnel.

702nd Ordnance Company

Serving as a "jack-of-all-trades" unit for the Ed Division, the Ed Reconnaissance Company was employed during the past year in a number of varying capacities. The mission of reconnaissance being reduced by the stable front-line situation, the Company in addition fulfilled infantry duties on the line and patrols, manned observation posts, transported supplies, evacuated casualties and operated in blocking positions as a mobile reserve.

During the winter campaign in the Kumhwa region, the Ed Reconnaissance Company was primarily in a screening role. Squad-size patrols operated continuously in front of the MLR, frequently penetrating deep into enemy territory. On one occasion two civilians taken prisoner by a 2d Recon patrol proved later to be enemy agents enroute to South Korea on an espionage mission.

The Company was one of the last units to leave the line when the Division was relieved in April. Reconnaissance patrols continued to screen north of the MLR until the 7th Division was well emplaced; then the Company moved to Kapyong for a training period.

A supply task was given the 2d Reconnaissance Company immediately upon entry into the new sector in July. Armored personnel carriers of the Company were pressed into service to supply front line outposts over the rutted and muddy roads. As casualties mounted in the summer action, it was found that these vehicles were exceedingly useful for evacuation of wounded to forward aid stations. At the peak of operation the Company had eleven personnel carriers traversing the treacherous roads to Old Baldy and the T-Bone.

Twice during the battles for Old Baldy the Company was committed as an infantry unit. During July elements of the Company, operating with the 23d Regiment, were positioned on a finger of Old Baldy while the enemy occupied the crest. Again, during September, the 2d Reconnaissance Company was called from reserve to relieve elements of the 38th Regiment on the line. Another task given the Company during the summer fall campaign was operation of Division observation posts overlooking the various portions of the front.

One of the most significant tactical operations of the Company in the summer-fall campaign involved numerous patrols with reconnaissance and combat missions. On many instances patrols ranging in size from four men to platoons penetrated deep into enemy lines and returned with extensive intelligence information about enemy deployment.

The mission of 2d Reconnaissance Company patrols was often extended to include ambush or raiding contact with the enemy. An outstanding example of patrolling success by the Company occurred on the night of 3 October in the vicinity of the Alligator Jaws. Two platoons of enemy were observed returning to Chinese lines after a fire fight with a combat patrol from the

23d Regiment. The column of enemy was a perfect target for the 19-man Ed Recon patrol, which riddled the Chinese with fire and inflicted forty casualties before returning to friendly positions.

On 12 October, the Company was moved from the 2d Division sector to Kimpo peninsula, near the west coast, and operated there until the end of the summer-fall campaign. The unit relieved the 9th Infantry's First Battalion at Kimpo and fulfilled the mission of serving as a mobile reserve for the First Marine Division.

2nd Military Police Company

Apprehending speeding drivers, infiltrators, enemy agents, and controlling stragglers and indigenous personnel is all in a day's work for the 2d Military Police Company.

One of the most difficult jobs for the Military Police is regulating the crossing of the farm line by unauthorized civilians. Each harmless-looking shoeshine boy or Korean farmhand is considered a potential enemy agent and must be cleared before entering the Division sector. Often agents have attempted to cross with forged passes or disguised as soldiers. This task, in addition to patrolling every road in the Division zone, is accomplished by the 2d MP Company.

2d Division Band

The traditional 2d Division Band has been comprised during the past year by a group of 80 versatile and talented musicians. Led during the past year by WOJG's Ray O. McCune and Eugene D. Vacher, the Band has answered calls to perform at all types of military gatherings. In addition, small ensembles were organized and played for many Division units, often accompanying the Special Services Clubmobile to entertain line troops.

The Band's repertoire, including all the familiar army marches, was augmented by new music composed for special occasions by WOJG's McCune and Vacher. The Band's versatility was exemplified when they were called upon to play the Thailand national anthem. No printed music was available, but the problem was solved by the Band composing the music as the melody was being sung by the Thailanders.

The Band also furnished music for such special occasions as USO shows and formed a choir to add spirit to the Christmas season. As in parades and ceremonies throughout the year, the 2d Division Band was on hand to welcome President?elect Eisenhower as the summer?fall campaign came to a close.

2d Division Chemical Section

Efforts of the Chemical section of the 2d Division have been directed toward support of front line troops in matters concerning chemical munitions. This support consisted primarily of furnishing smoke for screening and covering missions, supplying flame by conventional methods and field expedients and training of line personnel in use of chemical weapons.

Three new types of munitions employing napalm were manufactured and issued by the Chemical section during the latter months of the year. The first of these, the bunker bomb, consisted of napalm ignited in a machine gun ammunition box and proved to be effective for destroying enemy fortifications by raiding parties. The X-200 land mine, made from napalm exploded in a five-gallon can, was a valuable addition to the antipersonnel barrier system. The last of these items, the "hush flare," was developed within the 2d Division and was used extensively for battlefield illumination.

Another chemical activity involved servicing and refueling the flame throwers employed on line by the infantry. Both portable and emplaced flame throwers were used extensively in the Division, as well as a number of flame-throwing tanks. In addition, smoke support was supplied to the 2d Division by an attached platoon from the 388th Smoke Generator Company. The job of supervising all these activities and serving as chemical adviser to the Commanding General was that of the Division Chemical Officer.

2d CIC Detachment

During the past year the 2d Counter-Intelligence Corps Detachment fulfilled the mission of prevention and neutralization of enemy intelligence activities within the 2d Infantry Division sector. In addition, the 2d CIC Detachment advised the 2d Division G-2 on all matters pertinent to-the security of the division area.

The early part of the period found the 2d CIC Detachment participating in "Task Force Paik," an operation consisting of an area screening plan and anti-guerrilla operation in various parts of South Korea. Apprehension of numerous guerrillas and general disruption of guerrilla activities in the area resulted. A CIC team was maintained at the division Prisoner of War Enclosure, interrogating and screening all persons apprehended within the division area. In addition, this team screened indigenous employees and maintained control over indigenous identification cards.

To improve liaison and provide regimental commanders and S-2's with a ready source of information on security matters, a CIC team composed of at least one agent and one interpreter was maintained physically with each regiment. Regimental teams performed the same mission as the parent detachment and led to a better understanding by the line soldier of CIC functions.

In addition, the 2d CIC Detachment provided the planning of security measures necessary to insure the safety of dignitaries visiting the 2d Division, and assisted regular security troops in the operation of such security measures. In all the many visits to the Division, not one instance of activity hostile to a visitor was noted.

Special Activities

The job of keeping a Division in fighting trim in the Korean war has brought forth problems never before encountered by an American army. A voluminous and steady flow of replacements has been made necessary by the policy of returning soldiers to their homelands after a prescribed period of overseas duty. Replacements thus must be sufficient to fill vacancies caused not only by combat losses but by rotation as well.

Replacements have streamed into the 2d Division during the past year at an average of approximately 1,800 per month. The rate was governed in part by losses from casualties and rotation. The highest monthly total of 3,000 replacements in July, 1952, dropped to the lowest of 700 in August.

Replacements arriving in the 2d Division, after passing through the numerous depots in the United States, Japan and Korea, were processed at the 2d Replacement Company. Remaining there for an average of two days, the soldiers received clothing and organizational equipment not issued at previous replacement depots. They were then dispatched in groups to the regiments and other subordinate units, according to personnel requirements.

A longer period, usually a week, was spent at regimental level by most replacements. Here regimental personnel conducted training aimed at refreshing replacements in basic subjects and acquainting them with methods of warfare in the Korean conflict. Normally the replacements were then sent individually to subordinate units; however, two unique experiments involving groups of replacements were conducted and warrant mention.

The first of these experiments, conducted during a period when personnel requirements were heavy, grouped the replacements in "packet platoons." Platoon-size groups were trained together at regimental level, staffed with experienced non-commissioned officers and platoon leaders and sent to companies to operate as a unit. A second technique, developed by Department of the Army, assigned replacement soldiers in four-man teams. A control group of men received their basic training together, traveled overseas together in a carrier company and remained as four-man teams through replacement channels down to squad level.

A second source of personnel for the ad Division came from Republic of Korea army channels. Korean soldiers received basic training and were assigned to American units under the KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to United States Army) program. These soldiers were not intended to replace American personnel but to supplement units with additional fire power.

Korean soldiers who had previously served with the 2d Division in the Ivanhoe Security Force were split up under the KATUSA plan and sent to separate units. This group and the ROK replacements who later joined the Division comprised a total of more than 2,200 Koreans attached to various units. The majority of the KATUSA personnel were assigned to Infantry regiments and Division Artillery, holding jobs as riflemen, ammunition bearers, cannoneers and other combat assignments. Units were further supplemented by Korean officers and noncommissioned officers, serving in a supervisory capacity over the KATUSA's.

The attached French and Netherlands Battalions also made widespread use of Korean soldiers. Testimony from commanders of many units showed that KATUSA personnel made able and efficient soldiers and were a valuable addition to the 2d Division.

While this group of soldiers was coming into the Division, a group nearly as large and in considerably higher spirits, was starting the trip home under the rotation program.

Rotatees from the 2d Division started their journey at the Rotation Center, which processed men going home on emergency leave, transfer, hardship discharge, termination of enlistment contract or upon accumulation of the required number of points. More than 35,000 2d Division men have passed through the Rotation Center since the beginning of hostilities in Korea. At this station processing was accomplished hurriedly to start the soldiers on the trip home without delay. Field equipment was collected and soldiers were awarded the Korean Service and United Nations ribbons.

After processing at the Division station, rotatees moved by train to Inchon, where records were checked. Ships waiting at this port started the men on the first leg of their well-earned trip back home.

The 2d Division Rotation Center performed double duty, also processing soldiers enroute to Japan for five-day rest and recuperation leaves. More than 21,000 men from the Division were flown to Japan on R and R during the year. All agreed that the program provided a welcome rest from line duty and was a great boost to morale. At the R and R Center, the soldiers were fed a hot meal and boarded trains for an airfield. Arriving at one of the centers located at Tokyo, Osaka and Kokura, the men were furnished dress uniforms and started on their five day stay in Japan. Many Special Services hotels and recreational facilities were available for R and R personnel.

Helping to maintain morale of the men in Korea, the 2d Division Special Services section worked full time scheduling and providing entertainment of many varieties. One of the chief forms of recreation furnished by the section was motion pictures. Late films distributed by the Far East Motion Picture Service were catalogued by Special Services and passed on to units, both in front and rear areas. Efforts to schedule the best in USO shows for the 2d Division were also made by the Special Services section. Paul Douglas, Mickey Rooney, Jan Sterling, Frances Langford, Eddie Fisher and many others presented shows for the Division during the year. Transportation, housing, stage arrangements and production for the shows were handled by Special Services.

During the pre-Christmas season another service was added. Mobile Exchange busses displaying merchandise visited all line and supporting units, where troops were given an opportunity to order gifts. The orders were filled, gift-wrapped and mailed by Special Services units in Japan. The coffee and doughnut Clubmobile was another Special Services function to boost morale at the front. A new doughnut machine which mixes the ingredients and cooks doughnuts in one operation was procured by the unit during the year.

Without losing sight of its primary role as a fighting machine, the 2d Division during the year was also able to render a remarkable degree of assistance to the citizens of war-torn Korea.

Working in liaison with local Korean governments, the civil affairs section of the 2d Division has provided services for the many thousands of civilians in the Division zone. Besides obtaining civilians for employment in the Division; this section also operated three medical dispensaries which administered to the health and welfare of the area's citizens.

The outstanding civil assistance project of the year was the establishment of the 2d Division Friendship Home, an orphanage for the homeless children of Kapyong. The idea for the orphanage was born in June in a conference between General Fry, 2d Division Commander, and the mayor of Kapyong province. The plan was enthusiastically tackled by members of the Division and a drive was begun to obtain volunteer contributions.

The first group of donations totaled over $7,600. Plans were immediately made for construction of a home at Chongpyong-ni. Further contributions were made each month. In five months the fund reached $37,848.63. A board of governors consisting of four officers and five enlisted men was established to direct orphanage affairs. Construction of the Friendship Home was begun on 20 September by Korean contractors. The building included a combination recreation hall and study, dining hall, kitchen, 24 separate bedrooms, bathrooms, washroom, employees living quarters and a storage room.

On Thanksgiving a group of 2d Division men visited Chongpyong-ni and took part in dedication ceremonies for the Friendship Home. Population of the orphanage totaled 82 Kapyong orphans, ranging in age from two to fifteen years. A supervisory staff consisted of a Korean doctor-dentist, a teacher, two cooks and a handy-man. Further expenditures from the donation fund provided for clothing, building improvements and toys purchased in Japan. Plans were made to add in the future a playground and landscape improvements.

Every cent spent for construction and maintenance of the Friendship Home came from the monthly contributions from the 2d Division. The goal strived for and achieved was establishment of a memorial which would stand long after the Korean war is forgotten as a reminder that the 2d Division's concern for an unfortunate nation's people was materially reflected with a spirit "Second to None."

The above covers 28 November 1951 through 30 November 1952

Distinguished Service Cross for the above time.

2d Lt Barber, Worth H.
I Company, 38th Inf Regt
Pfc Bush, Lavern L.
H Company, 23d Inf Regt
1st Lt Carlson, Dale W.
H Company, 38th Inf Regt
Major Clark, William D.
B Company, 9th Inf Regt
1st Lt Cope, Richard A.
K Company, 9th Inf Regt
Pfc Cooper, Donald D.
B Company, 88th Inf Regt
Capt Daugherty, Robert M.
Hq Co, Second Battalion, 23d Inf Regt
1st Lt Davis, Louis H.
K Company, 9th Inf Regt
1st Lt Dunn, John H.
D Company, 9th Inf Regt
Cpl Flores, Manuel H. Jr.
H Company, 23d Inf Regt
SFC Garcia, Elizio
L Company, 23d Inf Regt
1st Lt Gombos, Nicholas
Hq Co, Second Battalion, 38th Inf Regt
2d Lt High, Cliff R.
G Company, 23d Inf Regt
SFC Holcomb, Rebel L.
A Company, 23d Inf Regt
SFC Holloway, Jimmie
A Btry, 15th Field Artillery Battalion
M/Sgt Jackson, William E.
G Company, 23d Inf Regt
Cpl Knous, Robe* P.
I Company, 23d Inf Regt
Pvt Kuhn, Charles E.
F Company, 23d Inf Regt
Sgt Lederer, Edward R.
L Company, 38th Inf Regt
Ist Lt Lewis, Walter S.
C Company, 23d Inf Regt
M/Sgt Lyle, Ned
F Company, 9th Inf Regt
Sgt Misseri, Louis
French Battalion, 23d Inf Regt
1st Lt Monfore, Peter H.
L Company, 23d Inf Regt
Pfc Moriyama, Fumio
A Company, 38th Inf Regt
Pfc Nakamura, Wataru
38th Inf Regt
1st Lt Owen, James B.
C Company, 38th Inf Regt
1st Lt Palmer, Richard A.
L Company, 23d Inf Regt
Cpl Payne, D. F.
C Company, 38th Inf Regt
Cpl Porter, Raymond S.
F Company, 38th Inf Regt
2d Lt Rhodes, Walter R.
B Btry, 37th Field Artillery Battalion
Pfc Rodgers, Franklin
B Company, 38th Inf Regt
Pfc Roten, Franklin
Med Co, 23d Inf Regt
1st Lt Sakowski, John M.
C Btry, 37th Field Artillery Battalion
Pvt Trenholm, Richard R.
Med Co, 38th Inf Regt
SFC Williams, Stanley R.
E Company, 23d Inf Regt

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