The first days of August found the 2d Division adjusting its positions and preparing defenses along the Kansas Line. Hill 1179, firm in the control of the 2d Division, had eliminated enemy observation of the Kansas Line activities in the east. However, three hills overlooking the western portion of the line—983, 940 and 773 — were now being used by the enemy as observation posts. Patrols from all three regiments, now on line, ranged out to determine the extent of this new threat. Tanks from the 38th Tank Company and "C" Company, 72d, kept up continual concentrations on the forward slopes of the hill to prevent the enemy from constructing bunkers and observing our movements. Meanwhile, the Netherlands Detachment was released from the Division and passed to 8th Army Control for shipment to Pusan where its veteran members were to be rotated and replacements were to be brought in to fill the ranks.
Reports coming from the regimental patrols revealed the enemy planning no offensive action but busily engaged in preparing defenses along the 983-940-773 terrain complex. Greatly increased use of artillery by the enemy covered these preparations and hampered patrol activities of the Division. Not only combat and reconnaissance patrols were harassed by the enemy artillery, but also engineer working parties striving to maintain and improve the road network behind the Kansas Line came under repeated concentrations. Finally, in an attempt to cut down the number of casualties, the Division Engineer was ordered to suspend work within range of the enemy fire on days when mist or rain prevented observation of the suspected enemy artillery positions.
Instructions from 8th Army directed that every effort be made to reduce the number of casualties in the period of the cease-fire negotiations. Offensive operations were to be undertaken only when, in the long run, such operations would ultimately reduce the number of casualties suffered over a given period. Consequently, all operations were conducted with the thought of incurring a minimum number of casualties and friendly artillery was utilized to a maximum.
Extensive rains throughout the first half of August worked a great hardship on the Engineers, especially in regard to bridges and roads which ran parallel to and on a level with the many streams in the area. Only extensive work and maintenance activity served to keep the roads in usable shape.
Information gathered on the enemy defenses on Hills 983-940-773 pointed to an increasing urgency that these heights be captured by friendly forces for they posed a serious threat to the Kansas Line and also served as observation posts from which the enemy called down increasing amounts of artillery fire.
On 12 August, the Division received word that plans for an attack on the enemy hills were being considered. The following day, shortly after midnight, the Division was directed to prepare plans for seizing the hill mass and submit them to X Corps. That same day, a boundary change was received which narrowed the Division front, delegating the portion it had been reduced to the 7th ROK Division.
Late in the afternoon of 14 August, G-3 was notified by X Corps that orders were being cut for the operation to take Hills 983-940-773. The 36th ROK Regiment was attached to the Division for the forthcoming attack.
The operation order from X Corps was received late in the afternoon of the 14th. It directed the 36th ROK Regiment to make the assault. In support of the attack, each of the 2d Division's organic regiments was also given a mission. The 38th Infantry, in addition to maintaining one battalion on 1179 was to occupy two hills northeast of the ROK objectives from which it could support the ROK attack by fire and prevent enemy counter-attack or reinforcements. The 23rd was to launch a diversionary attack on Hill 1059 and send reinforced patrols across the "Punchbowl. The 9th was to organize fire support teams to support the ROK attack. Air and artillery priority was given to the South Koreans.
The night of 15-16 August, twenty-eight close support air sorties were flown in the Division sector. Fighter bombers napalmed, rocketed and strafed enemy installations along the ridge line dominated by the three objectives and one radar-controlled B-26 dropped eight 500 pound bombs to the rear of the three hills. "B" Company, 72d, was attached to the 7th ROK Division and in two weeks fired 3,069 rounds of fire in support of its operations.
And as the Division prepared for this new maneuver, Brig. Gen. George C. Stewart, who had served as assistant division commander since 16 December 1950, left the Division for rotation to the states. Brig Gen. Haydon L. Boatner, chief of staff for the Chinese Army in India during World War II, arrived to fill the newly vacated position.
The attack by the ROK Regiment was set for 18 August and the 2d Division air and artillery were ordered to do their utmost to soften the way for the attackers.
All the supporting fires of, the 2d Division were utilized in the pre-assault softening-up of the ROK objectives on 17 and 18 August. As the fires were lifted, the ROK regiment moved out at 0600 hours and in the initial stages of the attack met only light resistance. Mid-morning, as they advanced up the slopes of 983-940-733, the South Korean troops encountered heavy fire from enemy small arms, automatic weapons and mortars. An estimated two North Korean battalions were entrenched on the hills in well bunkered positions and they hotly resisted the advance. On several occasions, they rose from their holes and battled hand-to-hand with the attackers, using bayonets and grenades.
The fire became so that the ROK attack was stopped in the late afternoon but the South Korean commanded notified the 2d Division he planned a night attack. General Ruffner alerted the 9th Infantry to be ready to move out and hold the hills if the ROK's succeeded in taking them.
The 23rd Infantry, making a diversionary attack in the east, met heavy resistance and, although "G" Company succeeded in securing the heights of Hill 1059, "E" Company was forced to pull back after being subjected to an intense artillery barrage. The 38th Infantry occupied its objectives on the high ground northeast of the ROK objectives and immediately had its fire-support team in action.
The ROK night attack was pressed with determination but both the Second and Third Battalions were stopped within a few hundred yards of their objectives. The assaults were continued doggedly the next day and in face of intense fire the South Koreans inched forward to within 50 meters of the crest of Hill 940 and within 200 meters of the crests of 983 and 773. The 38th Infantry, supporting the ROK's by fire, came under heavy artillery and mortar fire during the period but held its positions.
August 20th witnessed the ROK's hurling themselves up the crests and finally, by 1800 hours, Hill 773 was in their hands. The enemy on the other two peaks were being mauled by the ROK's and the heavy supporting fire from the 38th and the 9th Infantry. A North Korean counter-attack on 773 that night was repulsed.
All the objectives of the ROK regiment were taken on 21 August. Hills 940 and 983 fell under combined assaults from the 36th Regiment and a total of 30 prisoners was taken as well as large stores of ammunition and supplies being captured. Col Rupert D. Graves, 2d Division chief of staff who was serving as Gen. Ruffner's personal representative with the attached ROK Regiment, reported a determined counter-attack by the enemy might succeed for the ROK's were short of food and ammunition. Immediately the 38th Infantry was alerted to send reinforcements.
The night of 21-22 August passed without incident and plans were made to exploit the success of the ROK units by having them continue forward and capture three hills just north of their newly won positions. Designated Objectives "A", "B" and "C", the heights were a continuation of the sharp hill masses which dominated the area north of the Kansas Line.
The attack by the ROK's on their new objectives proceeded slowly for the next two days with the enemy resisting with all his forces and utilizing his artillery to the maximum. And as the South Koreans moved forward, the regiments of the 2d Division all sent out patrols which re- ported light contact. Then, on 24 August, the North Koreans counter-attacked and stopped the ROK drive. At the same time, enemy troops struck at patrols of the 38th and engaged 2d Division elements of Hill 1059 and the surrounding area.
It appeared as though the ROK's would be unable to take all three of their objectives so they were ordered to concentrate on "C", an Unnumbered hill north of the ridge line connecting Hills 940 and 773. The 9th Infantry, meanwhile, moved out and established contact with the 36th ROK Regiment on the southwest slope of 983 and the 38th Infantry did the same near the crest of 773.
The next day, 25 August, was relatively quiet with Division patrols reporting no contact and the ROK's continuing to press against Objective "C" but without success.
The quiet was shattered at 0245 hours, 26 August, as two North Korean battalions hit Hill 983 from the north while other company-sized elements executed an enveloping maneuver the height. The attacks were accompanied by assaults of other North Korean units which successfully installed themselves on the saddle between Hill 940 and Hill 983 from which they put heavy pressure onto the ROK elements on Hill 940. By noon of the 26th, Hill 983 was completely surrounded and by 1430 hours those South Korean troops who had not been killed or wounded were forced to give themselves up. Meanwhile, "F" and "G" Companies of the 38th Infantry were under heavy attack in their positions north of Pia-ri and were forced to withdraw 1,000 meters south of the town where they were joined by "E" Company, sent forward from the Kansas Line for reinforcement.
Immediate plans to retake Hill 983 were made by the Division. The 9th Infantry was given responsibility for securing, occupying and defending the 983-940 hill mass and was directed to launch a counter-attack in conjunction with the remaining elements of the 36th ROK Regiment which still held Hill 940. The 38th Infantry was directed to give fire support to the ROK's who would move westward along the ridge line extending between Hills 940 and 983.
At 2250 hours on the same day, the Second Battalion of the 38th was ordered to move to Hill 773 to bolster' the ROK's who had defended it successfully against several North Korean attacks during the daylight hours. Both the 36th ROK Regiment and the 35th, which had arrived at Tokko-li, were placed under the operational control of the 38th Infantry.
The 9th Infantry launched its attack the morning of 27 August. Fierce fighting throughout the day failed to net any gain and by nightfall, 983 was still secure in enemy hands. That night, Division artillery unleashed the most intense artillery barrage of the war on the slopes of 983 as more than 22,500 rounds were sent screaming into the hillsides during the hours of darkness.
The Division delegated to the 9th Infantry the sole responsibility of retaking Hill 983 and on 28 August, the Third Battalion prepared to pass through the Second Battalion to press the attack. The Second had been badly battered in the previous day's assault. The First Battalion was still in positions on the Kansas Line, securing it against any enemy thrust.
Heavy rains turned the roads and trails leading to the battle area into rivers of mud on the 28th and, as a result, it was not until noon that the Third Battalion was in position to move forward. It had no sooner jumped off, however, than at 1300 hours it met with heavy resistance. "I"and "F" Companies bore the brunt of the fighting during the afternoon and nightfall revealed them still a few hundred meters short of the crest. There, with darkness upon them, they set up a perimeter defense for the night.
A terrific rain, which had fallen intermittently during the day, built up to a virtual flood that night as more than four inches of rain coursed down the hills, filling the gullys and making roaring rivers out of the mountain streams. Bridges over which poured the constant flow of supplies to support the attack were washed out. The Ladue bridge, largest double-span Bailey in the world bridging the Soyang near Division CP, was damaged when a washed out pontoon bridge struck one of the supports and disabled the northern-most span. G-4 hastily arranged to have ammunition, fuel and supplies trucked from Chunchon, reducing the traffic load over the seriously weakened span. The 8229th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital serving the Division was isolated when the pontoon bridge leading to it was washed out and all seriously wounded patients had to be routed to Chunchon.
The bloody fighting on the scarred hills continued during the following day and Division released the First Battalion, 9th Infantry from the Kansas Line to reinforce the other two Battalions who had battered against the enemy positions. Someone, somewhere coined the inevitable GI nickname for the barren battlefield and it was only a matter of time before "Bloody Ridge" was known, not only to the weary, wet and miserable attackers, but to all at home who read the news reports of the gallant struggle.
Plans were drawn-up on 29 August for a new "limited offensive" for all units in the X Corps. Scheduled for 0600 hours, 31 August, it called for an attack to the newly designated "Hays Line." The principle objective of the 2d Division was a north-south hill mass extending 3,000 meters in length in the eastern portion of the Division zone, and dominated by Hill 1243, a rocky, craig-covered peak, honeycombed with enemy bunkers. On the east, the 5th ROK and the 1st Marine Divisions would push out to take the extension of the hill mass which, in their sectors, curved into the east-west ridge which lined the northern rim of the "Punchbowl." In anticipation of the new attack, the Division front was greatly narrowed, excluding the "Punchbowl" from the 2d Division zone.
The attack plan called for the 9th Infantry to assault and seize Hills 940 and 983 then move north and secure the ROK's former Objective "C". The 23rd Infantry would keep one battalion to maintain the Kansas Line and hold two other battalions in reserve for commitment anywhere in the Division zone. The 38th Infantry was given the mission of seizing Hill 1243. All units began immediate preparations for the offensive.
The 9th Infantry renewed its efforts to retake the 940-983 hill mass in the early morning hours of 30 August. And as the First and Second Battalions moved out on the attack, the Third Battalion went forward to relieve ROK Army elements supposedly holding Hill 773. However, as the Third Battalion moved up the slopes of 773 it became engaged with a large enemy force and in the ensuing fire-fight was forced back down the hill. It to its base in Worun-ni, reorganized and stepped off again to try and reach the crest of 773 which had been given-up by the ROK's. And again their efforts failed and nightfall found the entire 'Bloody Ridge" still in enemy hands. The First and Second Battalions had tried to take the western portion of the ridge but fire from 1,000 enemy reinforcements had repulsed their attack. It had been a day of bitter battle with heavy casualties on both sides. Night brought little relief for both sides knew the assaults would be renewed at daybreak.
Eastward, the 38th Infantry under command of Colonel Frank T. Mildren girded itself for a new offensive. And back at Division headquarters, Brig. Gen. Thomas E. DeShazo, commander of 2d Division Artillery prepared to replace Major General Clark. L. Ruffner, the commanding general. General Ruffner, who had come to the Division from X Corps in mid - January, had received orders to a new post in Washington. Destined to depart the first of September, he could look back on more than seven months during which he had piloted his troops through some of the bitterest battles of the Korean War, leading them to their greatest victories climaxed by the overwhelming defeat of the Chinese during the Battle of the Soyang River which won for his Division the Presidential Unit Citation. Even as he prepared to leave, his men were struggling forward, welded into a completely professional, well-trained army which attested to his leadership.
The 9th Infantry had an advance taste of success as August faded into its final days. The First Battalion launched a new assault on Hill 773 in the early hours of 31 August. With "B" and "C" Companies hurling themselves upward against the fire of the entrenched North Korean troops on Hill 773, the crest was over-run at 2130 hours. All available troops in the battalion moved upward and in a matter of minutes the position was organized, a perimeter thrown up and the first of three peaks in "Bloody Ridge" was again ours. It never fell to the enemy again.
The 38th Infantry, having readied itself for days, was prepared to move out against one of the most rugged, inaccessible peaks it had encountered in Korea-Hill 1243. Towering high in the distance, its top shrouded in clouds and mist, the objective was the northernmost crest of a string of hills jutting northeast from Taeu San. Like an arrow, it penetrated into the heart of the enemy defenses but the stepping stones along the shaft were formidable goals in themselves-Hills 892, 1059, 1181 and finally, 1243, called Kachilbong by the Koreans.
The supply problem, alone, was almost insurmountable and only ingenious and full exploitation of every possible method of resupply enabled the attack to be carried out. Personnel from Headquarters and Service Company, the Tank Company (for the terrain precluded use of the regiment's tanks), and the mortar sections were pressed into service as carriers, augmenting and supervising the Korean carriers. Each infantryman carried with him three mortar rounds or a round of 75 mm recoilless ammunition as he toiled up the sheer heights for hours before even reaching the line of departure. The medical company, reinforced by additional personnel, performed miracles of recovery and casualty collection. The signalmen overcame immense difficulties to keep all the advancing elements in contact with headquarters. And to the foot soldier goes credit for an endurance and fortitude which has few records of equal, even in Korea. To all these went the signal to attack at first light on 31 August.
The First Battalion took the lead, moving upward against light resistance until, at 0920, "C" Company, spearheading the advance, became engaged with two enemy companies on the approaches to Hill 992. Immediately "A" Company swung to the side to attempt an enveloping maneuver and "B" Company moved forward to add its support to that of "C". The fighting raged until dusk without appreciable progress and all units broke contact and went into positions for the night.
Next morning, the attackers moved out again. Calling on massed artillery, utilizing every weapon, the attacking elements forced their way for ward. The enemy could not withstand the assault and slowly gave ground as he took casualties which would have sapped the strength of any force. By 1100, the First Battalion had scaled the peak of Hill 1059 and rolled on up the ridge line in pursuit of the withdrawing enemy. By 1900 hours, Hill 1181 was in the hands of the 38th and the entire attacking force swung into a perimeter for the night, more than half-way to their objective at the end of two days of assault.
The 38th followed up its original success on 2 September. From their consolidated positions on Hill 1181, the troops moved up the last long ridge line leading to the objective. Enemy mortar and artillery fire hindered the initial moves and as the men toiled closer to the crest the added fury of small arms and automatic weapons fire joined in the chorus. The Third Battalion, leading the assault, continued struggling forward, digging the defenders out of their holes and annihilating those who tried to resist the advance. The fight raged throughout the day and after dark. Finally, at 2145, the exhausted, shaken but victorious troops cleared the crest. Around them lay the bodies of 152 enemy dead. Behind them lay the tortoruous route over which they had fought for three days. Ahead and on both sides was the enemy. Dog-tired, the men organized the crest for the long night.
The 9th Infantry was far from idle as the 38th thrust deep into the enemy defensive line. After securing Hill 773 on the last day of August, it struck anew at the two remaining peaks on "Bloody Ridge," Hills 983 and 900. Both the heights were bare now. All vegetation had long since withered under the constant pounding of artillery and tank fire. Now only dusty, rock studded, brown silt remained. Trees, twisted and scarred, cries-crossed the steep slopes, obscuring the pock-marked faces of the lower portions of the hills. Here and there dark holes marred the highest reaches, the only evidence of bunkers until the sharp, rattle of the "burp" guns cut loose. Sweating, heart pounding heavy-footed soldiers dragged their throbbing legs up these tortured, vertical hills. Those who succeeded in grasping their way close to the bunkers were greeted by the crump and shower of black smoke, dirt and sharp steel as grenades were tossed down upon them. Dirty, unshaven. miserable they backed down, tried again, circled. climbed, slid, suffered, ran, rolled, crouched and grabbed upward only to meet again the murderous fire, the blast of mortar and whine of bullets and jagged fragments. Minutes seemed like hours, hours like days, and days like one long, terrible, dusty, blood-swirled night-mare. Shiver at night, sweat clogged at day, racked with chills one minute, stewed in their own juices the next.
It was like that for days. The First Battalion tried to reach the top on 1 September but never had a chance. It was the same on the 2nd of September, and the 3rd. Each day locked in struggle and each day stopped short of the crest which meant an end, at least temporarily, to the endless fight. Then came 4 September. Everything was told to hold where it was. Plans for an all-out attack were coming up. Air and artillery spread new destruction and havoc on the slopes of the blood-stained ridge. Constant pounding of shells, bursting of bombs, the "whoomp" of napalm, long roar of rockets and the muffled clatter of aircraft machine guns comprised the preparation for another trip upward on 940 and 983. But there was additional help for the 9th this time. The 23rd Infantry made ready to move around to the west and tackle the ridge line stretching north from 983 to Hill 778; objective "N" was its name. And the 38th Infantry was now in position to offer fire support and block reinforcements from the northeast for on 4 September it moved westward and captured Hills 754 and 660 overlooking the MSR north of Pia-ri. All was in readiness as 4 September faded away.
The climax was almost anti-climax. After the struggle of the
past weeks, the First and Second Battalions of the 9th moved out
on 5 September. Their goal was Hill 940. It was tough going but
not to be compared with the previous, frustrating efforts. At
1400 hours, the troops of the 9th Infantry were on the crest and
the enemy, those that remained, were fleeing to escape the trap.
Hundreds of North Korean dead were strewn on the hill, surrounded
by their ammunition and supplies. Later it was revealed more than
4,000 enemy troops had fallen under the attacks and an additional
7,000 had been badly wounded in the vain attempt to defend the
hill. It had been a fierce battle and the rutted, dirty razor-back
now supporting the exhausted soldiers who had wrested it from
the enemy well-deserved the title "Bloody Ridge."
The supporting attack of the 23rd Infantry proceeded equally as
well as that of the 9th. By 1615, the Second Battalion, advancing
under accurate and devastating fire from "B" and "C"
Companies of the 72d Tank Battalion, had secured Objective "N".
Fifteen minutes later the First Battalion was on the uppermost
height of Hill 618, a knobby lump of land which blocked the northward
curl of the MSR west of "Bloody Ridge" and forced it
to curve to the east.
The 9th Infantry began moving out of the line on 6 September to
reorganize, resupply and integrate replacements after the days
of battle proceeding the fall of Hill 940. The 23rd Infantry moved
up to relieve the 9th, assuming responsibility for its sector.
The 38th Infantry continued organizing defensive positions along
ridge running north from 1179 to 1243.
During the day, the 23rd moved out from Objective "N", sending "E" Company to occupy Hill 785 and "F" Company to Hill 778, two peaks northwest and northeast from Objective "N", respectively. "I" Company repulsed a counter-attack at 2130 by an estimated enemy company from its positions on Hill 618.
The 2d Division zone of responsibility was shifted westward 900 meters on 7 September, the 5th ROK taking over the hard-won ridge line from the 38th Infantry. To better control the Division, the Command Post moved up to a valley north of Yanggu off the eastern tip of the Hwachon Reservoir. Patrols, meanwhile, reported contact with enemy groups on Hill 868, west of Hill 1181, and on Hill 702, the next high ground north of Hill 660 which was in the hands of the 38th Infantry.
Major activity for units of the Division on 8 September was centered in the artillery and the tank battalion. DivArty turned its guns loose to fire in support of an attack by the 5th ROK Division on Hill 1211, next peak northward in the 1179-1243 ridge line. The 72d Tank Battalion furnished fire support for the 7th ROK Division trying to take Hill 883. Neither attack was successful, however, in spite of the fact that they continued for two days running. On 9 September, "B" Company of the 72d fired over 800 rounds direct fire.
Plans for putting the 38th Infantry into reserve were drawn-up on 9 September. Details called for the 9th Infantry to relieve the 23rd in place with the 23rd then shifting eastward, relieving the 38th which would then go into reserve. The move was to be initiated on 13 Sept. Meanwhile, both sides continued probing activity with an unsuccessful attempt by the First and Second Battalion of the 38th to occupy positions on the ridge branching west off Hill 1181.
Evidence of enemy infiltration was revealed the same day as the abortive attempt by the 38th to move out the spur of 1181. Two tanks from the 38th Regimental Rank Company on patrol along the Pia-ri-Worun-ni road were disabled by mines obviously planted by infiltrators.
The 38th launched a heavy assault on Hill 868 the following day which raged for three days. "A" and "G" Companies spearheaded the attack the first day and though they succeeded in moving up the slopes, they were unsuccessful in nearing the crest in any force. On 11 September, "A" and "G" Companies struck at the hill from the northeast while "E" Company swung up from the southwest and by 1830 'E" was within 50 meters of the peak when a tornado of grenades rained down upon it and the company was forced to withdraw temporarily. In a renewed attempt, both "A" and "G" were within five feet of the top when they were stopped and forced to withdraw down the slope and set up a perimeter for the night. The next morning all units moved out once again, this time joined by "F" Company. Finally, by 1500 hours on the 12th the hill was taken and secured.
Meanwhile, the 9th Infantry began the relief of the 23rd, the First Battalion relieving the First Battalion of the 23rd before nightfall on the 10th.
Relief of the 23rd was completed on 11 September with "B" Company, 72d Tank Battalion reverting from the 23rd to the 9th and continuing in its mission of fire support. The 23rd then began relieving elements of the 38th not engaged on Hill 868. This phase of the relief was completed by 1200, 13 September when the hill was secure and the 38th free to go into reserve.
Another peak was snatched from under the noses of the North Koreans on 12 September when "B" Company of the 23rd took Hill 702 with surprising ease. By 1530 the crest was secure.
The firing for "Bloody Ridge" had scarcely died in
the distance when rumblings of a new and equally epic struggle
were heard. With the 2d Division organizing its newly won ground
and jabbing out to find enemy weaknesses to its front, the North
Koreans decided to made a new stand and stop the 2d Division's
grinding offensive. From their rear areas and from the shattered
ranks of the recently defeated defenders of "Bloody Ridge,"
the enemy formed three new battalions which he placed in column
along the new area he chose to hold-the important north"
south ridge dominated by Hill 851 on the north, 931 in the center
and 894 on the south. The long slopes jutting down from 894 curved
southwestward and ended in a series of small hills clustered around
the village of Tutayon on the west MSR. The ridge line was ideally
suited for defense, as was the entire area. The most important
portion of it was that extending from Hill 894 north to Hill 851.
It was to be the scene of bitter fighting for many weeks. Little
did anyone know that in a short time the people of the free world
would be well acquainted with the ragged peaks of "Heartbreak
Ridge."
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