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My GuestbookA strong communist probing attack against both flanks of the Second Division was repulsed on 15 September. The 38th RCT was struck on the right by a full enemy battalion whose attack against the First Battalion was supported by tanks. An enemy company hit at the 9th RCT. Throughout the division zone heavy mortar and artillery fire was received. But the communists gained little ground. This was not their main attack.
H-hour for the 2d Division offensive set for 0700 on 16 September. The division received word it was to have air priority from 0635 until the jump-off time. If any change in these plans were made, the division was assured it would be notified prior to 0400.
At 2040, the night before D-day, word was received that the 1st Marine Division had made a successful amphibious landing at Inchon, the port city for the Korean Capital of Seoul. Accompanied by the 7th U.S. Division and ROK troops, the Marines had begun an "end run" on the invading communist troops. A second front had been opened. When word of this success swept through the ranks of the division, morale soared sky high. Here, at last, was proof that the UN forces were to taste victory. Hopes for a successful attack in the morning mounted hourly as the importance of the Marine landing was realized.
Attack plans for the division were struck a sharp blow at 0630 on D-day. It was then the division was notified that its air priority had been canceled. The commitment that such notification would be issued prior to 0400, if the priority had to be called off, apparently could not be kept. The word was {lashed to division artillery to begin laying down a preliminary barrage, as mortars began to cough out their precious ammunition. An urgent request was sent to higher headquarters for increased artillery ammunition allowances for the attack, even with air support, had been planned with dangerously limited artillery ammunition supplies. The need for increased allowances became urgent. It was too late to change plans for the attack.
At 0700, the first major offensive of the Korean War from the Pusan Perimeter began. Men who had been tasting defeat and suffering heavy losses for weeks moved out, hopeful but wondering if they could succeed. Knowledge that it was a "shoestring" offensive was widespread. Everyone knew how much depended on victory.
The North Korean forces put up fierce resistance to the attacking troops. Holding key terrain features on both flanks of the division, they poured artillery, mortar and machine gun fire on the lower ground. The attacking troops were hindered by slimy roads made seas of mud by recent rains. "A" and "B" Companies of the 2d Engineers were released from division reserve to work on the road in the sectors of the 23rd and 38th RCT's. It had to be done so that ammunition and ration trucks could be passed through. Initially the losses suffered by the division were heavy. More South Korean soldiers were channeled to the fighting units although they were not nearly as effective as American troops.
The 9th RCT met savage resistance in its effort to take Hill 201. The enemy was dug in two-battalion strength and laying down a murderous curtain of fire from within well-fortified bunkers.
The 23rd RCT on the right of the 9th was more successful and succeeded in seizing the commanding terrain although it, too, came under heavy fire from the enemy lodged on Hill 201.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to First Lieutenant Stephen E. Gray, Infantry, a member of Company L, 23rd Infantry, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Changyong on 16 September 1590. As one of the leading elements in the 3rd Battalion, Lieutenant GRAY led the 3rd Platoon of Company L in an attack on enemy defensive positions along the Naktong River. His platoon immediately came under extremely heavy and accurate enemy mortar, machine-gun, and small arms fire. Under direct fire from an enemy machine gun, Lieutenant GRAY led his platoon forward in a charge on the first objective. He destroyed one enemy machine gun and assisted in eliminating a group of sixty enemy soldiers who had the advantage of entrenched positions. Reorganizing his platoon, he prepared to continue the attack toward the second objective which was better defended than the first. In spite of this fact, Lieutenant GRAY, shouting to his platoon to move forward, courageously led the attack. At times prior to the second assault, he directed supporting mortar fire to within twenty-five yards of his own position. Although the binoculars hanging around his neck were hit by shell fragments, he did not hesitate in the face of this intense enemy fire, and the ferocity and daring of his assault along with his platoon routed the enemy from their positions. Upon receiving a third objective, Lieutenant GRAY organized a tank-infantry attack, and again personally led the assault on the objective. The third assault completely demoralized enemy and drove them from their main line of resistance. Lieutenant GRAY's daring and inspiring leadership on this occasion was a major factor in the success of Company L's attempt to reach the Naktong River. His actions accounted for an estimated one hundred enemy dead and wounded, the elimination of three mortars, two fortified machine-gun positions, and one enemy field piece."
To the north, the 38th RCT was able to secure the southern portion of the commanding terrain in its sector including Hill 209 which it took by 0930. It then continued the attack to the west against stiff resistance and captured a small village 2,000 yards east of the Naktong.
The battle continued to rage furiously throughout the first night. On 17 September the first signs of a break appeared. In the central sector of the 23rd RCT the enemy was forced across the Naktong and he abandoned large quantities of arms and ammunition as he pulled out. The division artillery poured barrage after barrage onto these retreating troops as they exposed themselves, inflicting terrific casualties. Before the day was out it was believed that the North Korean 2d Rifle Division had ceased to exist as an organized unit.
But to the south the going continued rough. Hill 201 in the 9th sector remained in enemy hands in spite of all that could be done to dislodge or render them ineffective. This position posed a threat to the division flank for the enemy also retained his bridgehead across the river in this sector as well as in the north.
But plans for the attack continued. The 2d Engineer Combat Battalion sent men forward to reconnoiter for a bridge site in the 23rd sector. At dark, "K" and "L" Companies of the 9th RCT had fought their way to within 200 yards of the crest of 201 and were digging in prior to attacking anew in the morning.
Back in Miryang, nerve-center of the division, the men who had been wounded in previous days were given a treat that none will ever forget. Al Jolson, known and admired by everyone, was giving personal appearance shows for the men in the hospitals. As usual, he was among the first of the "big-name" entertainers to come to the war zone. Little did the men who enjoyed his antics realize that in a few short months he would be dead. Certainly his tremendous effort on their behalf that day belied his ill-health.
Back on the front, by 1400 hours of the 18th, elements of the 38th RCT had completed the first crossing of the Naktong becoming the first U.N. troops to cross the river from the perimeter. Each battalion of the regiment had succeeded in placing four platoons in a bridgehead 2,000 yards deep on the western bank. However a bridge was badly needed over which the equipment so necessary to hold the ground could be transported. By 1700 hours the bridge site had been selected and every foot of bridge in the division was being brought forward.
The 9th RCT to the south was still bitterly locked in the struggle for Hill 201. The enemy, supported by every kind of ground weapon, continued to cling to the crest-while he shoved reinforcements up over the rear approaches. To the south of the 9th RCT, the 2d Reconnaissance Company, which was screening the division's left flank, reported that enemy mine fields were slowing its progress toward Ago but that it was inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.
At midnight of the second day of the attack, "F" Company of the 23rd RCT reported it had fought its way behind Hill 201 and had succeeded in cutting the MAR. over which the enemy had poured supplies and reinforcements. With this help, Hill 201 finally fell to the 9th RCT on 19 September. But the enemy was still far from routed. Probing attacks were reported by the First, Second and Third Battalions of the 38th which clung to the all-important bridgehead across the Naktong. And between the First Battalion of the 38th and the regimental supply trains the infiltrating enemy had succeeded in setting up a roadblock although this was soon reduced.
General Walton H. Walker visited the division sector on the 19th and was strong in his praise for the successful crossing of the river which, he said, not only inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy but forced him to displace his Command Post.
The friendly situation improved greatly on the 20th, the fourth day of the offensive. By 0800 hours the 23rd RCT in the center was able to place three companies across the river and by 1200 hours the 9th in the south had reached the river and was scouting for a bridge site. The enemy resistance east of the Naktong had all but ceased, the last of it beaten off by the 9th RCT assisted by the Second Battalion of the 23rd and the 2d Reconnaissance Company. However a critical shortage of bridging existed throughout the Army area and this shortage seriously hampered units of the division in their efforts to transport their men and equipment to the western banks of the Naktong from which they could follow up their initial successes. However, the engineers were able to complete the bridge in the 38th sector and supplies and equipment began to blow across.
While the bridging equipment was being procured, plans were made for continuing the attack. At 2400 hours on 20 September, the task organization for the offensive west of the Naktong was drawn up.
The 9th RCT under Colonel Charles C. Sloane consisted of the 9th Infantry ( - ); "B" Company, 72 Tank Battalion; "D" Battery, 2d AAA; the 15th FA Battalion, and a platoon from the 2d Reconnaissance Company.
The 23rd R C T. commanded by Colonel Paul W. Freeman, was made up of the 23rd Infantry; "C" Company, 72 Tank Battalion; "B" Battery, 2d AAA; and the 37th FA Battalion.
Colonel George B. Peploe commanded the 38th RCT consisting of the 38th Infantry; "A" Company, 2d Tank Battalion; "C" Battery, 2d AAA; and the 38th FA Battalion ( - ).
The 2d Battalion of the 9th Infantry and the Tank Company of the 9th Infantry were to remain in EUSAK reserve.
With the new task organization revealed, the attack plan was published with H-Hour set for 1200 on the 21st. The 9th RCT ( - ) had the mission of establishing a bridgehead, protecting the Division's left blank and preparing to attack on order. The 38th RCT had a triple role. The First Battalion, which was taken under Division control when it became evident that its mission would separate it by a great distance from its regiment, was to patrol south and east of Hill 409 and the village of Hongkong, both of which were still in enemy hands. The Third Battalion was to guard the bridgehead while the Second Battalion was to spearhead the first attack to the west down the Chogye-Hyopchon road.
The 23rd RCT was to attack from its bridgehead with one Battalion Combat Team reinforced with tanks. Its objective was Sinboni from which it was to launch an attack from the South toward Hyopchon in conjunction with the northerly attack by the Second Battalion of the 38th.
The remainder of the 2d Reconnaissance Company was to stand-by to move through the 9th and 23rd RCT's so it could screen the division advance south of Hyopchon.
The morning of the 21st was spent in preparation for the attack. At 1200 hours the attacking units moved out. The enemy met fire with fire on the entire front. The 9th RCT in the south had particularly bad luck. Using ten amphibious trucks it managed to ferry two platoons across the river under cover of fire from tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft guns, and air strikes. However, the enemy put up stiff resistance and succeeded in damaging nine of the ten river crossing vehicles. As a result, the two platoons already across were recalled, withdrawing under cover of a heavy smoke screen laid down by the 9th's 4.2 mortars.
The battalion combat team, advancing from the 23rd RCT bridgehead in the center of the front moved forward but the advance was slow. To the north in the sector of the 38th RCT, the advance was likewise slow. One of the tanks in the 38th attacking force was destroyed by a mine. Two others were disabled by fire from enemy anti-tank guns.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Corporal Robert Cooper, Infantry, a member of Company L, 23rd Infantry, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Changing on 21 September 1950. His platoon was holding a position on Hill 409 when it was attacked by greatly superior number. He remained in position with his machine gun for a period of 4 hours under constant artillery and mortar fret Finally, despite an enemy banzai charge up the hill, he left the comparative safety of his fox hole and moved his weapon over an open route to an exposed position far down the hill in order to occupy a more favorable firing position. When his machine gun was destroyed and he was wounded by enemy grenades, he continued to fight of} the enemy with his pistol until his ammunition was exhausted. He then took his assistant's rifle and, ordering his helpers to the rear, held off his foes with rifle fire until he was killed by the enemy."
All along the front the 2d Engineers worked desperately to support the advance. The MAR.'s were in need of constant upkeep against the damaging effects of heavy traffic and downpours of rain. Mine-sweeper teams attempted to clear the route of advance. And while one team worked to complete the pontoon bridge, another operated a 50-ton ferry carrying tanks, equipment and supplies across the river.
The second day of the offensive saw a great improvement in the operation. The First and Third Battalions of the 38th were freed from guarding their bridgehead to join the Second Battalion in its attack to Chogye and Hyopchon. The 9th RCT ( -) took over the duties of the two relieved battalions protecting the bridge and its approaches and also screening south of Hill 409 and in the vicinity of Hyonpung.
Throughout the afternoon the enemy continued to offer heavy resistance using tanks and artillery to the maximum. However, by 1800, "K" and "L" Companies of the 23rd had captured Sinbon-ni and "G" Company of the 38th and attached tanks of the 38th secured Chogye. The Third Battalion aided in this attack, having reverted to regimental control. Immediately, "I" Company of the 38th and a platoon from "A" Company, 2d Tank Battalion, thrust out the road northwest from Chogye, burning enemy hiding places and flushing his delaying forces. ,
By the morning of 23 September it became apparent that the enemy covering force had been penetrated and subsequent intelligence revealed that the North Korean 4th and 10 Rifle Divisions were the only effective remaining units. They appeared to be withdrawing north and west of Hyopchon. The Air Force exerted its maximum effort in striking at the withdrawing communist troops and vehicles.
On the 24th, while the Division Advance Command Post moved to Tugong-ni, the 9th attempted to force its way into Hyonpung, the only remaining strong point in the old bridgehead area. However, stubborn resistance prevented the entry. Meanwhile, an armor-tipped column composed of the Second and Third Battalions of the 23rd RCT moved rapidly northwest 15,000 yards and entered Hyopchon at 1030.
The 38th, attacking west from Chogye, beat down stiff resistance and crossed its Second Battalion over the Hwang-gang River just north of Hyopchon to cut-off a force estimated at two enemy battalions which had been flushed from the south by the First Battalion of the 38th and the 23rd Infantry. In a pincers movement the forces cut into the enemy and completed its destruction with the help of exceptionally good air support.
Subsequently, the 38th moved on into Hyopchon and completed the double envelopment which placed that vital road junction town in 2d Division control.
The following day, 25 September, an advance party from Division Headquarters arrived in the newly captured town to make arrangements for billeting the Division CP.
The situation broke even better for the Division on the 26th. The 65th RCT from Puerto Rico arrived, was assigned to the Division and ordered to take over responsibility for all the area formerly held east of the Naktong. In doing so, it relieved the Second Battalion of the 9th RCT and initiated a patrol along the north south MAR. from Changyong to Yongsan to the river crossing in the former 9th RCT sector. By 2400 hours, the 9th RCT was moving up to rejoin the rapidly advancing elements of the division, screening the left flank in the process.
Advances as great as 30,000 yards were being reported by the 38th RCT with the enemy unable to establish a defense in face of the onrushing troops. The 23rd RCT followed up the route of advance, mopping up by-passed North Koreans. And in the skies, the Air Force ranged well ahead of the lead advancing elements, striking the fleeing enemy.
Late in the afternoon of the 26th, the 23rd RCT passed through the 38th and secured the town of Anui. The 38th remained in battered Kochang, establishing outposts on the high ground to the north. The Division CP moved up again, this time to the vicinity of Kochang.
The enemy continued to offer resistance in the South where an attempt by the 9th RCT ( - ) to take Samga was repulsed. Here the communists had dug-in about one and a half miles from the city, utilizing extensive mine fields which hindered efforts to advance.
The night of the 26th, the enemy unleashed a mortar barrage on the positions of the 23rd RCT in Anui.
The following day, 27 September. the 65th RCT patrolling the old Pusan perimeter succeeded in forcing the enemy from Hill 409 and the town of Hyonpung thus eliminating the last Organized resistance east of the Naktong. With the town secured, the 65th moved forward toward Anui to join the other elements of the Division including the Division CP which already had its advance party in the town.
A humorous incident occured in Anui during the early morning hours of 27 September. It was an indication of how rapidly the situation was changing. Headquarters Battery, 37th Field Artillery Battalion, was in a rendezvous position in column in Anui. The rear vehicle in its column was a captured North Korean truck. Two North Korean officers drove to the tail of the column in a Russian jeep, parked and promptly went to sleep thinking their own unit still held the town and oblivious to the presence of the Americans. The sentry awakened them and it was found both were drunk as hoot owls and had been up to the next town north having a big time for themselves while their outfit was being pushed out of Anui by the Indianhead Division.
To the south. while its First and Second Battalions patrolled the roads radiating from the MAR., the 9th RCT sent its Third Battalion in another attack against Samga. On the 28th, Samga was secured and the 9th sent patrols to the south where a link-up was made with patrols working north from the 25th Division sector.
The 23rd, also patrolling from Anui, reported further contact with 25th Division patrols along the Anui-Hanyang Road.
The leading elements of the 38th RCT left Kochang at 0400 hours, 27 September, passed through the 23rd at Anui and by brushing aside road blocks and by-passing the bulk of the enemy forces broke out onto the western plains of Korea and captured Chonju after traveling some 77 miles in ten hours. The complete RCT closed in Chonju in twelve hours but was completely out of gas. Plans were immediately made for further advance to the north on foot if necessary.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Colonel George B. Peploe, Infantry, Commanding Officer, 38th Infantry Regiment, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Sadung, during the period 16 September to 27 September 1950 During this period, when two battalions of his Regiment formed the spearhead of the 2nd Infantry Division's advance toward the Naktong River, Colonel Peploe placed him self with the point of the advance guard and personally directed the assaults against ridges, defiles and passes where the enemy had massed his artillery and heavy weapons for an offensives of his own and was putting up a most stubborn resistance. Unmindful of the intense artillery, mortar and heavy weapons fire, he personally directed the operations of his two battalions and closely coordinated their advance in order to assure a maximum of offensive power. In one instance he led the advance guard and enveloped the enemy flanks. This maneuver enabled the command to continue the offensive with a minimum of losses and drove the enemy across the Naktong River. Two days later, Colonel PEPLOE was again well in front of his troops directing the crossing of the Naktong at a point near Sadung. Colonel PEPLOE proceeded to the river's edge and, with utter disregard for the hostile artillery fire which was falling in the area, personally directed the crossing of patrols to the far side of the river. Keeping the defeated enemy off balance, Colonel PEPLOE pursued them to Hyopchon and then to Kochang, a vital enemy communications center in South Central Korea. Regrouping his Regiment, he renewed the attack on 27 September and broke out the western coastal plain to capture the key city of Chonju with thousands of prisoners and tons of supplies and equipment. In this pursuit, his Regiment fought forward seventy-seven miles in ten hours."
The remaining few days of September were used by the division in extensive patrolling, mop-up operations and consolidation of the ground so recently won. It had been an eventful month and, while the final days found the regiments in relatively stable positions, the drive to the north was to continue with unabated speed in the near future.
The speed of the advance to the areas occupied by the Division at the end of September had severely taxed the supply trains. Practically every item needed to support the troops had to be trucked more than 200 miles from Miryang to Nonsan. The road was unimproved, snaking over the mountains and subject to the constant pounding of the supply trucks. In many stretches it was one-way. A trip from one end to the other took 48 hours. The units operating under the G-4 supervision—702d Ordnance Company, 2d Quartermaster Company and 2d Engineer Combat Battalion—did a magnificent job in operating the rail and truck heads, building bridges and maintaining their vehicles under the most adverse conditions.
Because the extensive area through which the Division had fought necessitated spreading the supporting units far and wide, the small liaison planes and helicopters were called upon to fly round-the-clock schedules on observation missions, evacuation of wounded, and liaison work. Frequent air-drops to isolated units were also delegated to the L-5's.
On 1 October, EUSAK announced that all organized resistance had ceased in South Korea.
Thus, two months to the day after the communists had launched their all-out attack on the weary defenders of the Pusan perimeter, the invaders had been either killed or driven back behind the parallel which was once the boundary between North and South Korea.
The Division CP moved forward again on 1 October, this time to Chonju, the town previously secured by the 38th Infantry after its spectacular 77 mile advance in 10 hours. Four days later the 65th RCT was relieved from its attachment to the Division while the combat units continued patrolling by air and ground.
On 8 October, for the first time since the 2d Division had begun operations in Korea, the total of replacements and returnees exceeded the losses to the Division.
The Division received notice on 10 October it was to receive a breather period. All units of the Indianhead Division were alerted to move into reserve in the area between Suwon and Yongdongpo. In four days the assembly was complete. Long-delayed activities were finally begun. Personnel and weapons were inspected, shortages were revealed and filled, training programs were initiated with emphasis placed on increasing the efficiency of the many South Korean soldiers now in the Division. There were critiques of small-unit actions. Tactical training was begun and supply discipline measures were instituted. In short, for the first time since its alert in early July, the Second Division had an opportunity to 'sit-down' and take stock of itself and its situation. Needless to say, there was much to be done.
If you served with the 2ID during these times or have questions about anything that happen during these times, please leave a message in this guestbook.
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