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TERRAIN SKETCH
"Heartbreak Ridge" is a narrow, rocky, mountain mass
running north and 3 south with HILLS 931, 894, and 851 dominating
the MUNDUNG-NI and SATAE-RI Valleys. The south and east slopes
were extremely steep. From these slopes the "Punchbowl"
and HILL 1179 could be seen in the distance. Both prominent objectives
had already fallen into our hands. Initially heavy vegetation
covered the slopes of Heartbreak Ridge but air strikes and artillery
destroyed all individual concealment. In each valley bordering
the ridge were two important roads and stream beds. The roads
were secondary class routes, but a road capable of moving military
equipment was built in a short time. Also, a twisting, boulder-strewn
stream bed in each valley furnished an approach for tanks. Narrow
gorges and deep defiles presented difficult engineering problems
which were overcome during the engagement. Enemy bunkers guarded
the key ridges of approach. Due to a moderate slope to the west
and north, the enemy supplies were moved up in positions with
a minimum amount of labor.
HEARTBREAK RIDGE
The battle for "Heartbreak Ridge" started on 13 September
with the 9th Infantry launching an attack on Hill 728, west of
the main objective, and giving fire support to the First and Second
Battalions of the 23rd who jumped off onto Hill 931, central peak
of three heights on the ridge line. The 38th Infantry, meanwhile,
had gone into reserve with its relief by the 23rd.
The first day's fighting for Hill 931 brought little success as
the well-entrenched enemy called upon artillery and mortars to
held repel the attackers. His stiff resistance was bolstered on
the 14th as both the 9th and 23rd continued their assaults in
the vicinity of Hill 894. "B" Company of the 72d Tank
Battalion was able to support the 9th from positions on the MSR
to the west and their high-velocity tank fire proved effective
in knocking out the enemy bunkers exposed to the direct fire of
the tank guns.
The Second Battalion of the 9th moved out against 728 and by noon
was on the southeast slope of Hill 894. However, an order came
down directing it to change its original objective and swing northward
to assault Hill 894 from the south while the 23rd Infantry continued
attempts to overcome it from the north. The pincers attack was
pressed all afternoon and by 1700 hours the Second Battalion of
the 9th was within 650 meters of the crest but there it was stopped.
The 23rd, meanwhile, had succeeded in gaining the crest of the
ridge which joined Hills 931 and 851 and at 1900 hours it set
up defenses for the night.
The enemy reacted quickly to the 23rd's gains which succeeded
in blocking the ridge line connecting his garrisons on 851 and
931. Strong probing attacks were flung out as the North Koreans
attempted to reestablish their net-work of entrenchments but the
23rd succeeded in repulsing them all.
The 9th Infantry jumped off again to gain Hill 894 at 0700 hours
on the 15th. Fighting fiercely against determined resistance,
the Manchu regiment gained the crest by 1445 and immediately sent
strong forces down the ridge line south and west from the peak
and northeast toward Hill 931. The forces rushing south secured
the entire ridge line, stopping on an unnumbered hill overlooking
the village of Tutayon near the western MSR. A platoon from "L"
Company of the 9th was unable to overcome strong resistance on
Hill 485, western anchor of the ridge line running southwest of
894.
The troops from the Second Battalion, 9th Infantry who moved north
from Hill 894 dug in on positions 400 meters north of their newly
captured objective.
And while the 9th was successful in securing the southern and
southwestern portion of the important ridge line, the 23rd sent
its Second and Third Battalions in a coordinated attack to take
Hills 931 and 851 while the French Battalion launched an attack
on Hill 841, a peak east across the MSR from the regiment's foothold
on "Heartbreak Ridge". All these efforts met with no
success in spite of close air and artillery support. The enemy
utilized every weapon in his arsenal, fighting with furious determination
in his effort to keep control of the vital ridge.
All limits on artillery ammunition expenditure were lifted by
Eighth Army on 15 September as it offered every support to the
2d Division in its attempts to take "Heartbreak Ridge."
The 23rd Infantry renewed its slamming attacks against 931 and
851 on 16 September but made little gain during the day. Nightfall
saw the tired, chopped ranks of the 23rd again going into perimeter
defenses to protect themselves from the inevitable enemy probes.
The air was thick with the blue smoke of artillery, the peaks
churned into pulverized dust. The ridge had the appearance of
a forest following a devastating fire as only twisted gaunt remains
of trees and shrubs gave evidence of the once heavy underbrush
which had carpeted the sheer slopes before the battle.
The enemy threw light probing attacks against the elements of
the First Battalion, 23rd Infantry shortly after midnight. The
North Korean garrison on 931 was strong although the positions
of the First Battalion, 23rd, astride the ridge running south
from 931 made resupply and reinforcement impossible. The men of
the 23rd readied for a new assault which the probes had signaled.
The anticipated thrust came at 0300 hours. Two enemy companies
struck at "C" Company from the north. Hardly had the
attack begun than an entire North Korean battalion was screaming
down from 931 and "C" Company's positions were penetrated.
At 0730 hours, "A" Company was pushed through the dogged
"C" Company and together the two units hit the wall
of attackers, forcing them back and regaining the lost positions.
The enemy hurled another battalion-sized attack against the First
Battalion at 1300 hours. Immediately a devastating rain of 2d
Division artillery was called in and the big guns thundered in
the rear, their shells plowing gaping holes into the ridge-line.
"A" Company counter-attacked again, pushing north onto
the ridge-line At the same time, the Second and Third Battalions
struck again toward Hill 851, clawing their way through a curtain
of flying mortar to gain positions 1,000 meters from the crest.
By this time, night had fallen and all three battalions dug-in
to hold their gains.
The first faint streaks of dawn were hardly visible 18 September
when the 23rd renewed its efforts on the ridge line. Two enemy
regiments were now defending "Heartbreak" to the death.
No amount of artillery fire could drive them from their bunkers
on the rear slopes where they took refuge until the artillery
lifted and the infantry assault began. It was a question of digging
them out, one at a time. The 23rd attack was met with immediate
resistance, fierce and determined. All day it raged with every
foot forward paid for in human life. By nighttime, the First Battalion
was within 500 meters of 931 when the enemy counterattacked again.
Determined to hold, the 23rd called again on the superb artillery
support and watched as the explosions shook the hill and turned
the North Koreans back. The Second and Third Battalions, after
dueling with the enemy all day, decided on a night attack against
851. Under cover of darkness they moved forward as the artillery
rolled ahead of them. Assaulting the enemy in his foxholes, terrifying
him with flame-throwers, the attackers crawled upward, not to
be denied. Success was theirs at last. Shortly after midnight,
the lead elements crawled to the top, exhausted but in weary high
spirits for Hill 851 was theirs.
But the feeling of accomplishment
was short lived. At 0100, an enemy company struck at "L"
Company on the crest. By 0200, the enemy force had grown to battalion
size and though the valiant troops clung to their hard-won positions
for hours in face of violent attack, daylight found them being
forced off their peak, pulling back under fire cover from the
remainder of the Third Battalion. At 1230 hours, the Second Battalion,
passing through the Third, counter attacked and attempted to retake
Hill 851. Individual, hand-to-hand fights raged all over the crest
as hand grenades exploded, throwing their dirt and steel like
rain along the peak. And as the troops of the 23rd and the North
Koreans grappled, a strong, reinforcing enemy descended and counterattacked
in the early morning hours. "L" Company's ammunition
became exhausted and the enemy surged forward, overrunning four
machine guns. Still the company stood until the entire foot-hold
was overrun. The company commander Lieutenant Pete Monfore stayed
with the last of the defenders until he fell, mortally wounded
among his men.
Meanwhile, in clearing weather that aided both air and artillery
observation, both the First and Third Battalions of the 9th Infantry
and the First Battalion of the 23rd slammed anew at their objectives.
Thirty seven fighter bombers roared out of the sky and covered
the Third Battalion of the 9th as it struck at the 485-728 hill
mass north of Imokchong on the west MSR while the First Battalion
of the 23rd again pushed up the unbelievably steep slopes of 931.
Neither battalion was successful. Mine fields, covered by fire
from both 485 and 728 stopped the Manchu Battalion. The First
Battalion of the 23rd, clawing upward in an inspired attack, fought
to within 300 meters of the crest of Hill 931 but again was stopped.
Again they were forced to pull back, digging-in to await the dawn.
Westward, a patrol from the Third Battalion, 9th Infantry moved
onto Hill 1024 to engage and determine enemy defenses, returning
before nightfall.
The Indianhead Division was in contact with four North Korean
Divisions on 20 September when Major General Robert N. Young arrived
to replace Brigadier General Thomas E. DeShazo due for rotation
to the states - as commanding general. The former assistant division
commander of the 82d Airborne Infantry Division, General Young
took over the helm of the 2d Infantry in the midst of one its
most rugged offensive actions. General DeShazo, with a long and
spectacular record of action in Korea as a super-artilleryman
and strong advocate of extensive use of forward observers bid
farewell to the Division which he had served so well.
The fierce struggle for "Heartbreak
Ridge" continued unabated throughout the day and again the
two enemy regiments resisting the efforts of the 23rd Infantry
were successful in repelling all attacks. The 9th infantry west
of the vital ridge reported all its patrols in contact with the
enemy. "A" Company on 867 was engaged all day before
returning to its base.
Action on the entire Division front was quieter on 21 September
than it had been in weeks with the enemy putting up only a passive
resistance to patrols sent out from the regiments. All units gathered
themselves for new assaults.
Battles flared again on 22 September as the First and Second Battalions
of the 23rd launched another coordinated attack on 931, center
of "Heartbreak Ridge." Fiercest yet of all the assaults,
both battalions were on the crest of the hotly contested height
several times during the day only to be thrown off as the enemy
attacked through his own mortar fire, hurling grenades and directing
streams of machine gun fire forward of his advance. The First
Battalion of the 9th became engaged in this same action and was
unable to break contact although it was headed for an assault
on Hill 728. Finally, plans to take the peak that day were abandoned
and all three battalions took up blocking positions on the ridge
lines extending from 931 in both directions.
The 15th North Korean Regiment crowded a strong counter-attack against the 23rd Infantry during the night supported by heavy mortar concentrations which churned the dirt on all sides of the defenders. Fighting fiercely, the 23rd repulsed the attackers and sent them scurrying back to the protection of their bunkers.
The 23rd and 24th of September developed into a tragic act which helped to give further backing to the label "Heartbreak Ridge." Desperate to end the continual fighting, the First Battalion of the 23rd again forced its way up the slopes of Hill 931. There it grappled with the enemy, cut into his ranks and inflicted severe casualties, all the time moving upward. At 1400, "A" Company found itself within 50 meters of the crest. It called upon every reserve of energy and courage it had and flung itself upward but was battered back. Again and again it tried to make the grade, in spite of mortar, grenade, and bullet it crept and crawled forward only to be shoved down again. A fourth assault met with failure and summoning unbelievable guts the dauntless men moved out again and by sheer dint of courage scaled the peak. 931 had been taken. It was ours. And the First Battalion of the 23rd found it hard to believe but the presence of the men of "A" Company on the peak confirmed the fact which they hardly dared to believe. Hastily setting up a defense, the hand full of men remaining in the First Battalion dug in on the crest, surrounded by the aftermath of battle. The anticipated enemy counter-attack came at 0220 hours on the 24th. Maddened screaming, animal-like the North Koreans charged the positions in mass, hurling grenades out of the night and directing their murderous fire into the bunkers which they had built and knew so well. It was too much for the thinned, battle weary men to resist and at 0330 hours the remaining few were forced from the crest. At 0445, with "A" Company again in the lead, the First Battalion counter-attacked. At 0610 hours, "B" and "C" Companies were engaged with 200 enemy pouring down from 931 and from the northwest, repulsing the enemy efforts to annihilate them. The fighting continued throughout the day until at nightfall the heroic men of the 23rd went into positions for the hours of darkness during which they turned-back countless enemy probes.
The heart-rending story of frustration
was repeated in the sector of the 9th Infantry during the same
two-day period. An attack by the First Battalion to take Hill
1024 met with failure with the attackers going into perimeter
defense 300 meters northeast of the crest. An attempt on 24 September
by the First Battalion of the 9th to take Hill 728, again bypassing
Hill 931, also was repulsed.
.
For eleven days, now, the two regiments had given every ounce
of energy and reserve they possessed to take their objectives.
Time and time again they had met with failure at the hands of
the North Koreans. Each day was like the last-fight, suffer, meet
or escape death, sweat out the nights only to move out each new
day to climb and battle up the endless hills. Victory almost in
hand for a second only to see it swept away again. But like all
war, there was no rest. The objective had to be taken.
And so it was that the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments again moved into battle on the 25th of September. While in the valleys below the trees turned autumn golden and red and leaves littered the ground much as they did back home, on the hills there was only the pock-marked hard and dusty earth littered with steel and blood and the remains of men who had given all they possessed.
One success will often keep men going long after the time they could be expected to drop. And so when the First Battalion of the 9th Infantry met with success that day on Hill 1024, the news was a stimulant to all. Lead by "A" Company attacking from 800 meters below the peak, the lead elements of the Battalion were on the crest at 1145 hours. And moving up amid resistance from a heavy enemy mortar barrage, the rest of the Battalion was on the hill by 1500 hours and four hours later was tied in with ROK units on the left.
The French Battalion relieved the Second Battalion of the 23rd over on the ridge line south of Hill 851. The Second Battalion then moved down into an assembly area at Imdong-ni, well south of Worrun-ni- and well out of contact with the enemy. There its tired remnants were to gather themselves together, be resupplied, reorganized and readied for new commitment.
The Ivanhoe Security Force took over surveillance of the Kansas Line on 25 September and the 38th Infantry prepared to move forward for future action. Poor visibility hindered all actions.
The next day, 26 September, the French tried their luck against Hill 931 and found it no better than had the rest of the regiment. The First and Third Battalions remained in position, kept close into their meager holes by continuous bar. rages of enemy artillery, mortar, automatic weapons and small arms fire.
The 9th Infantry consolidated its positions on Hill 1024, sending a patrol from "A" Company 300 meters north to flush and kill 45 enemy troops in bunkers on the ridge line. The 38th Infantry sent patrols to the vicinity of Hills 1052 and 851 without contact.
The enemy made up for the relatively quiet day as darkness enveloped the rocky hills for the night. On Hill 1024, the First Battalion of the 9th Infantry contained strong enemy counter attacks while the Second Battalion repulsed equally strong attacks against its positions on Hill 582.
Morning of 27 September brought welcome relief to the First Battalion of the 23rd when it was pulled out of line, relieved by the refitted Second. Gladly the men came down from the hills into Worrun-ni where they, too, were given the opportunity to rest, bathe, get fresh clothing and resupply.
And the 38th Infantry became engaged on the 27th for the first time since its return from reserve. The First Battalion encountered enemy on the slopes of 1052 and a platoon from "M" Company became the center of attention for the entire Division when it inadvertently made a "wrong turn."
Moving up to furnish fire support to the Second Battalion in its attack on 1052, the platoon was headed for Hill 868. The platoon had left its company area at 0500. Its instruction were to turn up a trail just beyond a certain tank which was blocking along the road. Unfortunately there was more than one tank in blocking position and it was at the wrong tank that the platoon made its turn. It walked into enemy infested territory until it reached a small footbridge 800 meters west of Satae-ri. At 0900, it became bitterly engaged with an enemy force deployed in bunkers on Hill 656, just north of Satae-ri. Word went back to Division and a rescue force was hastily assembled and sent forward. The units making up the force were mute evidence that everyone in the vicinity had been called upon for help. There was a platoon from "X" Company, French Battalion; two squads from "C" Company, 38th Infantry; a platoon from the Tank Company, 38th Infantry; and a platoon from the Tank Company, 23rd Infantry.
After several hours of hard fighting in the midst of the enemy infested area, the rescue force succeeded in extricating the embattled platoon and making its way back to friendly lines at 1300 hours. There was some question as to who was the most surprised at the maneuver, the North Koreans or the "M" Company platoon.
The enemy made a concerted effort to recapture Hill 1024 from the 9th Infantry on 28 September. Thirteen separate counter-attacks were pushed against the First Battalion but all were turned back with heavy losses. Immediately afterward, a narrowing of the Division front placed the peak in the zone of the 7th ROK Division and at 1300 hours, ROK elements relieved the First Battalion of its responsibility for holding the crest. The Battalion then withdrew to an assembly position 5,000 meters south of the lines.
Ground activity elsewhere in the Division sector on the 28th was relatively light compared to previous days but clearing weather permitted a record number of air sorties. Under control of Division FSCC, 128 fighter aircraft were employed in the Division sector with excellent results. The planes were particularly effective ranging beyond the limits of artillery fire, destroying enemy gun positions, supply and assembly points.
Activity on 29 September was confined mainly to the 9th Infantry as the First Battalion, supported by fire from "B" Company of the 72d Tank Battalion and Division Artillery, moved out to make another attempt on Hill 867.
Lady luck favored the North Koreans on this day. Fog, ground mist and rain throughout the day greatly reduced the effectiveness of artillery support. No air support was available at all.
Initial contact was light as the lead elements closed to within 150 meters of the objective. But upon reaching this point, a hail of exceptionally intense mortar and artillery fire pinned the troops down. The concentration continued until 1725 hours when it suddenly lifted and the enemy launched a fierce counter attack. By 1800 hours, the 9th wet ordered to break contact and return to its original positions.
The First Battalion, 23rd Infantry, relieved the Third Battalion on position during the day with the Third returning to Worrun-ni. The remainder of the regiment remained in place, organizing its positions as did the 38th.
All combat units of the Division were in contact with the enemy during the last day of September. In spite of every attempt by the Division to oust the entrenched North Koreans from their mountain strongholds, the fading September sun set on Heartbreak Ridge, Hill 1052, 867 and 728 and revealed them still in enemy hands. But the rock-like defenses for the North Koreans had been costly. Excluding air strike casualties, 7,256 enemy troops were killed during the month; 9,878 were wounded and more than 600 communists were herded into UN prison camps. With the air-inflicted casualties included, the enemy dead and wounded in September came to more than 20,000, a total the North Koreans could ill-afford to absorb.
Division casualties, though light
by comparison, were the heaviest in months. In spite of the hopes
for a truce, the war continued to rage at a heart-rending pace.
A plan for ending the seemingly endless struggles on the hills
on and near "Heartbreak Ridge" was set forth at a staff
briefing on 1 October by General Young.
Anxious to bring the operations in the mountains north of Yanggu to a successful conclusion, he directed the laying of plans for an all-out assault. Heretofore, the regiments had jumped-off on their own objectives one at a time. Consequently, the defending North Koreans were able to concentrate their fire support weapons, especially mortars, on the single attacking element of the 2d Division. Added to the determined defensive attitude of the communists and the ideal defensive terrain, this had been enough to repulse almost every effort of the 2d Division in the preceding weeks unless we were willing to pay more than a reasonable price in casualties.
The plan put forth by General Young envisioned all regiments attacking simultaneously on the Division front with a strong tank-infantry attack up the Mungdung-ni valley on the west coupled with an armored task force foray up the Saete-ri valley in the east. Purpose of these armored ventures was to break behind the enemy lines, disrupt his defenses and inflict the greatest number of casualties.
The advantages of the operation were three. fold. First, the enemy would be forced to disperse his mortar fire over a wider front thus reducing the volume of fire he could place on any one particular area. Second, a line established on the salient terrain features designated as objectives for the attack would require fewer troops to secure than the jagged front now maintained. Third, a considerable saving of manpower would be realized by withdrawing and placing into reserve the units holding the hills which were dominated by the objectives of the proposed operation.
Citing the idea behind the three-regiment attack, the General emphasized the importance of the tank-infantry spearheads up the Mungdung-ni and Saete-ri valleys. Such an operation would not only put the forces into positions from which they could disrupt the enemy de tenses from the rear and inflict heavy casualties but also would relieve a great deal of pressure on the Indianhead regiments making the assaults on the hills.
Target date for the attack was 5 October 1951; H-hour, 2100.
Plans to provide the immense logistical support required of such an operation were immediately drawn-up by G-4. Every available truck was pressed into service and by 1800 hours, 5 October, more than 45,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, 10,000 rations, and 20,000 gallons of gas were stockpiled in supply dumps in the valley of the west MSR.
As the trucks hauled load after load of supplies, the regiments moved into positions from which they could advance on the offensive when the word was given. Operation Order 37 setting up the attack plan was published on 2 October. The 9th Infantry was given the mission of attacking and securing Hills 867 and 1005. dominating the ridge line north of Hill 1024 to the west. The 23rd Infantry was to secure Hill 931 on "Heartbreak" and the ridge line running west from that peak. It was also to be prepared to assist the 38th Infantry in taking Hill 728 and Objective "C", an unnumbered ridge line which jutted south from Hill 851. The 38th Infantry, in the center of the Division sector, was to assault Objective "C" and Hill 485, a small hill south of Tutayon on the west MSR. The 38th was also to provide infantry support to the 72d Tank Battalion which was to be prepared to make an armored thrust into Mungdung-ni. The 2d Engineer Battalion was to exert its maximum effort on the valley road below Mundung-ni, attaching "C" and "D" Companies to the 38th Infantry, "A" to the 9th and "B" to the 23rd. One platoon of "D" Company of the Engineers was to support the tank thrust up the valley.
The tank-infantry task force to operate in the east valley of the Division sector was commanded by Major Kenneth R. Sturman of the 23rd Infantry. This force subsequently bore his name. Raiding thrusts were initiated into the enemy lines on 3 October and were conducted daily for the remainder of the period during which the Division operated in the area north of Yanggu. Composed of the 23rd Infantry Tank Company, 2d Reconnaissance Company and the Combat Company of the Ivanhoe Security Force, the task force proved to be highly successful in knocking out enemy emplacements, inflicting casualties and diverting a portion of the enemy strength from the western half of the Division front. It complemented the stronger tank force operating in the Mundung-ni valley to the east.
By 1800 hours of 4 October, all units of the Division were in position for the attack scheduled for 2100 hours the following day. One fortunate break occurred during the early hours of the 4th when a patrol from "F" Company of the 38th Infantry reported Hill 485 unoccupied. The remaining elements of "F" Company immediately moved onto the hill, securing it and thus placing one of their objectives in their pocket before the main assault had begun.
The tempo of 2d Division air and artillery support picked-up during the daylight hours of 4 October as the enemy continued to throw in harassing mortar and artillery fire on friendly positions. Small enemy probing attacks were repulsed during the night.
The first indication of the reappearance of the Chinese Communist Forces into the X Corps zone came from prisoner of war reports on 5 September, the day the offensive of the Division was scheduled to get underway. One POW picked up by the Division reported a Chinese reconnaissance party on Hill 931. Later in the day, X Corps intelligence officers relayed a message from the 8th ROK Division that two civilians had been picked up in its sector who admitted being CCF agents. These reports were the first of CCF troops so far eastward since their disastrous May offensive.
At 2100 hours, 5 October, "Operation Touchdown" moved out with all regiments on line. In the 9th Infantry sector in the west, the First and Third Battalions moved toward Hill 867 as the Second Battalion remained in reserve. By nightfall, after a day without enemy contact, the two attacking battalions were secure on the high ground south and east of their objective and prepared to make their main assault the next day.
The Second Battalion of the 23rd Infantry moved from its positions on Hill 894 and under enemy mortar fire advanced toward the ridge line jutting west from Hill 931, the battered crest which had been wrestled momentarily from the enemy on the 23rd of September. By 0300 hours on 6 October, the Second Battalion turned into the southernmost knob of the 931 Hill mass and immediately became engaged with elements of an enemy battalion which stubbornly resisted the attack. After a brief but sharp fire-fight, the enemy withdrew from the hill and the Second Battalion moved onto the peak. By 0630 hours, it had tied in with the French Battalion and the hill was secure as a result of the outstandingly successful night attack.
Over in the sector of the 38th Infantry, the First Battalion, less "B" Company which remained on Hill 778, moved out toward Hill 728 overlooking the west MSR. Only light opposition was encountered and the objective was taken with little trouble. "A" Company then extended north and east and tied in with elements of the 23rd Infantry on the ridge line west from Hill 894.
Down in the valley which lead. out into the heart of the enemy defensive garrisons, the 2d Engineers began the tremendous task of making a passable route for the tanks to advance north to Mundung-ni. Apparently the enemy had anticipated such a maneuver and had mined and cratered the road more heavily than any the Division had previously encountered. Tremendous boulders blocked the mountain stream paralleling the road, making the use of that normally passable avenue out of the question. Enemy mortar and automatic weapons fire poured into the area, seriously hampering but failing to stop the engineer effort. "B" and "C" Companies of the tank battalion stood by, firing in support of the attack on the hills overlooking the road and awaiting the opportunity to break through the obstacles which the engineers were clearing.
The 38th Infantry was given three new objectives on the 7th of October. They were Hills 905, 974 and 841, all in the central sector of the Division zone, and they comprised the next ridge line north of that under attack by the 9th Infantry. A fourth hill, 605, was also assigned to the 38th Infantry. It was on the left of the MSR about 1,800 meters southwest of Mundung-ni.
South of the newly assigned ridge
line objectives of the 38th Infantry, the Third Battalion of the
9th moved onto Hill 867 against little opposition and made immediate
plans to continue its advance the next day to the unnumbered hill
between 867 and 1005. The Second Battalion, sweeping through the
8th ROK Division zone on the west, succeeded in cutting the ridge
line between Hills 867 and 1005. It then set out to the northwest
toward Hill 1005. Initial resistance was light but it increased
with every move upward. The advance continued throughout the 7th
and 8th and the morning of the 9th found the Second Battalion
near its goal
but held up by a death-stand resistance by the North Koreans.
Fixing bayonets, the lead elements rushed forward and routed the
enemy, digging the individual soldiers from their caves and by
late afternoon the hill was secure.
The First Battalion of the 9th, during the actions of the Second and Third Battalions, had begun a move up the valley and on 8 October was occupying the high ground northeast of Hill 867 with a platoon on Hill 666. Plans were made to pass the First Battalion through the Second on Hill 1005 and then continue the attack to the northwest against the next peak, Hill 1040. Early on 10 October, the First Battalion made its move and against moderate resistance inched up the slopes. The enemy, unable to mount his usual last-stand defensive actions after his defeat on 1005, was overcome by 1610 hours and the 9th Infantry was then in full possession of the 867-1005-1040 ridge line, sometimes spoken of as the Kum Il Sung ridge.
With the important Kum Il Sung ridge held by the 9th, the situation was ripe to launch the 38th in its assault on the next northerly line of crests dominated by Hills 606, 905 and 974. The way was also clear to move onto Hill 605.
Hill 636, the gateway to the ridge objectives of the 38th, was stubbornly defended by the enemy and the initial attempt by the Second Battalion to wrest it from the enemy failed. Another attempt was made immediately and although the crest was occupied by nightfall on 9 October, the enemy clung to his foothold and battled the troops into the hours of darkness before relinquishing his positions. The following morning, moving out from 636, the Second Battalion headed for Hill 905 and the high ground to the north east. Again the going was extremely rugged and the enemy resisted every foot of the way. A strong North Korean counterattack forced the battalion to hold-up its advance on the afternoon of the 10th but as soon as it died down the attackers moved out again. Finally, the Second Battalion battled its way to the top of 905 on the 11th and there pulled into a perimeter for the night.
Back in the valley, the Third Battalion of the 38th was moving north to launch an attack on Hill 605 which, if successful, would place it closer to Mundung-ni than any major friendly element had yet been.
Further south, the engineers toiled day and night, blasting through the blockaded roadway which prevented the tanks from thrusting into Mundung-ni itself. Enemy mortar continued to fall into the hive of activity in an effort to prevent a breakthrough.
The Third Battalion of the 38th continued to slog forward up the valley in face of enemy mortar and artillery fire. After two days of dogged advance supported by fire from the 38th Regimental Tank Company, the Third was able to move onto Hill 605 and secure it against counterattack. The Netherlands Detachment tied in on the left and "L" Company tied in with the 72d Tank Battalion on the right. "L" was to remain attached to the tank battalion for the duration of the operation.
The situation in the western valley proceeded in heartening manner while in the east, the 23rd Infantry continued its bitter three week battle for Hill 851, the northernmost objective on "Heartbreak Ridge." With Task Force Sturman making repeated slashes into the enemy lines near Satae-ri, the remainder of the 23rd fought the North Koreans who seemed destined to remain in their deep, protective bunkers forever. On 7 October, the First Battalion prepared to attack the hill once more from the south while the Second Battalion moved northwest from newly won Hill 931 to tie-in with the 38th Infantry which was securing the left flank of the 23rd. The Third Battalion, in conjunction with the moves of the other two units, began an attempt to cut the ridge line jutting west from 851. The attempt proved successful as the infantrymen managed to fight their way to a point on the ridge line only 1,000 meters west of the crest. Determined to follow-up their advantage, both the First and Third Battalions inched their way nearer their long-sought objective on the 8th. The enemy fought back furiously, utilizing every weapon he possessed. But the attackers managed to make substantial progress in spite of the resistance and by nightfall they were in a position to dig-in to await morning and a renewal of the attack.
Task Force Sturman made its greatest effort to date on 9 October, ranging deep behind the enemy lines and pouring its high velocity fire into the bunkers on 851 and seriously hindering the enemy's efforts to make repairs.
The Second Battalion of the 23rd was diverted from its attentions to Hill 931 on 10 October when it was ordered to seize a new objective Hill 520, the end knob of a long ridge line running west from 931. The battalion moved swiftly down the crest of the spur, flinging aside the defenders, and by 1800 hours was secure on the objective, digging-in at the same time as the Third Battalion of the 38th secured Hill 605.
The Second Battalion of the 23rd tied-in
on its left with the 72d Tank Battalion in the valley below, completing
a defensive line across the high ground separating the two valleys
in the Division zone. Thus, the high ground on both sides of the
Mundung-ni valley was secure from the positions of the 23rd and
38th Regiments southward. The stage was set for the armored thrust
into the town itself.
The chief obstacles to the armored penetration had been the natural
and man-made barriers in the defiles north of Imokchong. Since
the start of "Operation Touchdown," "D" Company
of the 2d Engineers had been blasting for mines, filling craters,
grading the rocky road carved from the hillside, building by-passes
and diverting streams in an effort to clear the way for the tanks.
Thirty three tons of high explosives had been used in the operation.
Finally, after laboring day and night, the defile was clear enough
for tank passage. The commanding general ordered the waiting armor
to be prepared to move out at first light on 10 October.
The long planned tank-spearhead rolled north through the newly constructed gateway into enemy territory at 0630, 10 October. "B" Company of the 72d Tank Battalion led the raid with "L" Company, 38th Infantry aboard to give added weight to the punch. A platoon from "D" Company, 2d Engineers, accompanied the group to give its assistance in clearing obstacles along the route.
The armored fist burst through the enemy positions and deep into the valley which served as his supply route. Mundung-ni was entered and bypassed as the lead elements of the tank force advanced 1,200 meters north of the town to place fire on the hills. One section turned west into the valley fronting Hill 841 and was able to strike at the reverse slopes of the enemy hills.
Eastward in the Satae-ri valley, Task Force Sturman made another surge north and wrought similar havoc on the disorganized enemy. The two tank assault groups forging up the twin valleys found the enemy unprepared and hundreds of casualties were inflicted before the communist troops could find cover from the ranging fire.
Meanwhile, the commanding general ordered the 38th Infantry to hold up its advance once it reached Hill 905. Purpose of this was to avoid placing the 38th in a position exposed to possible enemy attack from three sides. Thus, the left flank of the Division was to be, for the moment, along a line connecting Hills 1040 on the south, 905 in the center of the flank, and 605 at the top side. From there the front extended east across the MSR along a line generally 1,000 meters south of Mundung-ni. Once the 8th ROK Division on the left flank of the 38th Infantry pulled onto line, then plans were to be made to be made to move out to take Hill 974 and 841.
Indications of an entrance of Chinese Communist Forces into the 2d Division zone had been increasing during the preceding few days operations. Finally, on 10 October, a patrol from "G" Company, 38th Infantry, captured a prisoner who was identified as being from the 204th CCF Division. Interrogation officers drew from him information that the CCF was planning a counter attack against the 2d Division within two days after the relief was complete.
The capture of the Chinese soldier formed the last piece necessary to complete the order of battle picture along the Division front. It was now evident that the 68th CCF Army had relieved the V North Korean Corps with the limiting point for the CCF and NK forces the northward projection of the Mundung-ni Road. Thus, the 2d Division faced CCF troops on its left front and North Korean on its right.
The relief of NK troops by those of China was conclusive and decisive evidence of the staggering casualties suffered by the North Koreans in the operations along "Bloody" and "Heartbreak" ridges.
The night of 10-11 October was quiet except for a heavy clash by a Division patrol which ran into an enemy battalion in the vicinity of Hill 851. During the hours of darkness, the First Battalion of the 38th moved up from reserve into an assembly area in the vicinity of Kongdong.
The 23rd Infantry had spent all day of the 10th in another attempt to take Hill 851. This enemy stronghold continued to be defended with every weapon and man the North Koreans could muster and the determined assaults by the 23rd were again repulsed.
Fighting flared anew on 11 October as the Second Battalion of the 38th struck out toward Hill 905 from its positions on Hill 636. The First Battalion, moving up from Kongdong, was following behind prepared to exploit whatever success the Second Battalion achieved. Forging upward against moderate resistance, the Second Battalion secured Hill 905 and the First Battalion passed through and took the high ground between the newly won objective and Hill 974 to the north.
That night, "B" of the 38th secured the high ground between the two hills and "A" and "C" pulled back onto 905.
Plans for extending the holdings of the 38th Infantry were inaugurated on 12 October with a boundary shift to the west which placed Hill ]220 in the Division sector. The Division commander directed the 38th to prepare to take to take Hill 1220 after the 9th Infantry moved up to secure the terrain adjacent to the west MSR, freeing the 38th for the operation. The 23rd Infantry was directed to make a new assault to wrest Hill 851 from the North Koreans. The 72d Tank Battalion reverted from the 38th to the 9th Infantry and was to continue its daily thrusts into Mundung-ni.
At 1300 hours on the 12th, the First Battalion of the 38th moved out against light enemy resistance and in two hours had secured Hill 974, thus placing it in a position for its later attack on 1220. The 9th Infantry organized on its newly occupied positions and the 23rd made preparations for hitting 851 the following day.
Both Task Force Sturman and the 72d Tank Battalion made new forays into the enemy lines on the 12th and again inflicted heavy casualties and wrought extensive damage to the enemy rear areas. One platoon moved up the deep westward draw to a point almost directly north of Hill 841 and slammed its effective, high velocity fire into the Chinese bunkers on the reverse slopes of that enemy-held height.
The tanks of Task Force Sturman again concentrated on Hill 851 where the enemy had resisted every effort of the 23rd Infantry to reach the crest.
As nightfall descended on the rugged peaks, the 23rd Infantry launched a night attack on Hill 851. The North Koreans threw arcs of fire down the slopes, adding hand grenades as the attackers pressed upward. The battle raged throughout the night and at 0530, the First and French Battalions summoned their last reserves of strength and launched a final assault on the crest. Digging upward in face of murderous enemy fire, they managed to throw the defenders from their peak and by 0630 they were in possession of the long-sought crest. For more than a month, the 23rd Infantry had battered against the enemy on this northernmost height of "Heartbreak Ridge." Once it had been in their hands for a few hours until a powerful counterattack forced them back. Now it was again in their possession and this time it was theirs to keep.
Reconnaissance of 'Heartbreak Ridge" after its capture revealed why it had been so hard to take. Hill 931 itself was the center peak of three that were within small arms range of each other. While continuing to hold it the enemy could put down well aimed and observed fire on the neighboring two peaks. But what added even more to its strength for the North Korean defenders was the fact that its slope on the eastern side facing the 2d Division troops was rocky and almost perpendicular for the last 250 to 300 yards. Ascent by foot troops was necessarily slow. On the reverse or western side, the slope was less steep and was of dirt. Into this slope, the enemy had dug his many bunkers of such strength as to resist even a direct hit from our 105 mm howitzers. These bunkers, only twenty five to thirty five yards from the topographical crest of the hill, were numerous enough to provide complete protection to some 400 to 500 men. During artillery or air bombardments, the enemy troops would leave their entrenchments and communications trenches on the crest for the protection of their strong bunkers. Yet, when the artillery or air attacks were lifted, they had ample time to return to their positions before our troops could scale the last very steep and rocky 200 to 300 yards on the attacking side.
"Heartbreak Ridge" had fallen but westward, the First Battalion of the 38th was unable to take Hill 1220 despite the slugging fire support from the regimental tanks in the valley to the north. The attackers dug-in for the night while the Netherlands Detachment, relieved by the 9th Infantry, moved up behind to make the assault the next morning.
The Dutch troops moved out at first light against Hill 841, the peak flanking 974 to the north, and against moderate resistance they were an the crest by 1430 hours. Simultaneously, the First Battalion made another lunge up to Hill 1220 with fire from all the supporting weapons in the regiment. By 1430 hours, the assault elements were within 250 meters of the crest but further efforts to advance upward were repulsed and the battalion dug-in for the night. The Third Battalion had moved up during the attack and at dusk tied in with the First Battalion on the ridge line leading to 1220.
The first light of dawn was just appearing in the skies on 15 October when the Third Battalion of the 38th Infantry passed through the blocking positions of the First Battalion and moved out to take Hill 1220. Moderate resistance was encountered but by pressing their attack under cover of heavy artillery fire support the attackers were on their objective by mid afternoon and soon afterward the newly won hill was secure.
The fall of Hill 1220 brought the Indianhead Division abreast of a new line of defense. Stretching from that peak in the west, it arched eastward across the now quiet peaks of "Heartbreak Ridge", Hill 1243, and thence into the northern rim of the "Punchbowl".
The struggle to secure this new line had been one of the most vicious offensive actions the 2d Division had ever undertaken. The deeds which brought it to a close constituted a shining chapter in the history of the United States Army.
The days following the end of "Operation Touchdown" were relatively quiet. Task Force Sherman continued its end runs into enemy territory as did the 72d Tank Battalion but the main purpose of these strikes was to divert the enemy from the relief of the Division which was begun on 20 October. Elements of the 7th U.S. Division were already in the 2d Division area even as "Heartbreak" was falling. By 22 October they were entrenched in the old positions of the 2d Division and the men wearing the Indianhead patch were headed southward in trucks for a well-earned and much-needed period of reserve after 103 days of continuous combat.
The period just completed was truly one of heartaches as well as of Heartbreaks, but even more for the communists than us. The V North Korean Corps had been destroyed and replaced by the 24th CCF Army. The II North Korean Corps had also been decimated. On "Heartbreak Ridge" the 23rd Infantry had captured prisoners from six communist regiments. And all of this was taking place during the period when the truce talks had been suspended. Soon after these successes by the 2d Division, the communists agreed to resume the truce talks.
The sacrifices could not have been
in vain if they were the moving factor in convincing the communists
that their military defeat in battle was inevitable.
The autumn leaves were falling from the trees in the valleys north
of Chunchon and Kapyong when the convoys bearing the 2d Division
rolled to a stop. Tents were pitched, stoves were lit against
the new cold, and plans were made for rugged training to bring
the Division once again to its peak of combat efficiency.
South in Pusan and southwest at Enchain, heavily loaded ships arrived daily bringing new men to fill the ranks of the 2d Division. Waiting to occupy the berths on these now outbound vessels were the men who had earned ten times over the right to return to their homelands.
No one could say what the future had in store. The winds from North Korea brought the first bite of winter and also the sounds of continued battle. The frost which covered the ground in the early morning failed to hide the scars of war. Only the men around the conference tables and those who guided them could make the final decisions. But the men who trained from dawn to dusk and on into the night were preparing to give pointed evidence to the negotiators that whatever the future held, the 2d United States Infantry Division was ready.
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