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There is little opportunity in wartime for any combat outfit to rest, no matter how great the need. This was particularly true in the early stages of the Korean War when every unit was doing the work of two while not having the personnel or equipment which would enable it, under normal circumstances, to carry out routine duties. And so it was that on 16 October, two days after closing into its assembly area, the Second Infantry Division received another mis sign. The "Second to None" was to be the first to enter the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. To do the job, Task Force Indianhead was born.
The key note of the Task Force was speed. The order which spawned it was published on 16 October. The following day at 1000 hours the elements which composed it were assembled at Chuoe-Myon where the 2d Reconnaissance Company was bivouaced.
Lt. Col. Ralph L. Foster, G-2 of the Second Division, commanded "Indianhead." From the 38th Infantry there was "K" Company with seven officers. From the 72d Tank Battalion came five M-26 tanks, one M-4 tank, a half track and seven 2 1/2 ton trucks. The 2d Reconnaissance Company had sent two M-24 light tanks and a hall track. The 2d Engineer Combat Battalion added a demolition squad of one officer and 14 enlisted men. The medics were represented by one doctor and two aid-men. A section from the 82d AAA included one M-16 and one M-19 The 2d Military Police Company was represented; there were CIC agents and interpreters. The entire group was motorized and carried with it basic loads of ammunition and fuel to complete the force.
Task Force Indianhead departed from its assembly area late in the afternoon of 17 Octo her. Separated into three serials it moved rapidly north and by 1830 hours of the next day two of the serials were in Sariwon and the other in Sinmak. On the 19th, the lead elements rolled into the former capital of North Korea. The honor of being the first American soldier to enter the city went to Sergeant M. V. Parker of the 2d Military Police Company.
Throughout its trip the Task Force had encountered no trouble but on the banks of the Taedong River, which flows through Pyongyang, the first hitch in the plans to take the entire city developed whenever it was found that there was no river crossing suitable for the heavy motorized equipment. However, the attached signal group began sending messages back to Division Headquarters on the findings of the Task Force up to that point. The next morning a small group from the force crossed the river in assault boats. Later, the jeeps crossed over on a railroad bridge and the tanks found a suitable crossing at a point further up the river. By nightfall, the force was in possession of the entire city including two communist radio stations.
The members of the force met no opposition and were able to concentrate on the collection and recording of material found in the capital By the 25th of October, with all of its activities completed, the task force was dissolved and the units returned to their parent organizations.
In the meantime, the 9th RCT had been reconstituted and was assigned to I Corps effective on 17 October. On the 18th it moved to Singye and was ordered to move forward and secure the airfields in the vicini'ty of Pyongyang and to patrol all roads in the vicinity.
On 20 October, the 23rd RCT was also reconstituted and ordered to move-out the next day to the vicinity of Haeju to relieve elements of the 24th Division. And so the elements of the 2d Division became scattered once more. On the 25th of October the 9th RCT and Task Force Indianhead returned to the Division and, in turn, the Division went into I Corps reserve with responsibility for area between Seoul and Pyongyang. In addition, it initiated the famous "Red Ball" express and soon had over 300 trucks hauling every imaginable type of supply and equipment over the Seoul-Pyongyang highway.
During the same period the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team was attached to the Division and ordered to secure the airfields east of Pyongyang. The 9th RCT occupied Pyongyang itself and patrolled the roads. The 23rd RCT remained in Haeju and patrolled to the north while the 38th RCT, division artillery and the 72d Tank Battalion remained in the Seoul area. The 2d Engineers had moved north to Sariwon where they worked up and down the MSR maintaining the roads.
As October drew to a close, an intelligence report from Eusak revealed that the I and II ROK Corps operating in the north were meeting opposition from elements of the Chinese Communist Forces. On 31 October, the Division periodic intelligence report revealed that 316,000 Chinese troops were massed at the Manchurian border. This constituted a force of 44 divisions organized into 12 armies. The intentions of this massive army were not yet known but the 2d Division, on instructions from higher headquarters, proceeded with plans for continuing its forward displacement.
As the month of November begana month which was to be one of the blackest in the history of the Indianhead Divisionreports from the front occupied by the I and II ROK Corps became increasingly alarming. In some sectors the South Korean troops were undertaking withdrawals which endangered the right flank of the Eighth Army so on 1 November EUSAK ordered the 2d Division to move immediately to the vicinity of Sunchon. When the order was received, the Division was scattered from Pyongyang to south of Seoul. More than 300 of its trucks were engaged in transporting supplies on the "Red Ball" express. As a result, the move was difficult to undertake and it was necessary to shuttle trucks back and forth, bringing up a unit at a time. Nevertheless, the First Battalion of the 9th Infantry arrived at Sunchon late in the afternoon of 1 November and was ordered to establish blocking positions far to the northeast in the vicinity of Tokchon, an important road net center. Then, at 1800 hours, an order was received attaching the 2d Division to I Corps and the remainder of the 9th Infantry, which was already rolling into Sunchon, was given the new mission of patrolling northward toward Kunu-ri. The Division's misison was security of the rear areas, and blocking to the east. The 1st Cavalry Division and the II ROK Corps behind whose fronts the Division was deploying were then under heavy pressure from North Korean and CCF Forces.
The 2d Reconnaissance Company, which was to play an important role in the coming days, was ordered to Pyongyang in preparation for further moves northward. The remainder of the Division was then moving toward Sunchon.
On 2 November, air observers reported large numbers of enemy troops moving toward Tokchon and from the Tokchon area the First Battalion of the 9th reported its "A" and "B" Companies under heavy small arms fire. Because the terrain at Tokchon was not suitable for defense by only one battalion, the First Battalion was ordered to positions south of Kunu-ri moving by way of Suchon.
The Second Battalion of the 9th was already in blocking positions on the Taedong River at Samso-ri, almost midway between Kunu-ri and Sunchon. And a patrol from "K" Company had succeeded in contacting elements of a 1st Cavalry Division patrol at Kunu-ri.
The Division was ordered to occupy, organize and defend in depth at all costs the I Corps area north and east of Anju, protecting the Corps right flank.
The following day, 3 November, the 38th RCT arrived in the Samso-ri area. The First and Second Battalions of the 9th had then established a strong defensive perimeter in the Kunun vicinity with the Third Battalion of the 9th on its way north to join them.
To protect the Division's area from enemy groups which might filter down from the north, the 2d Reconnaissance Company with "L" Company of the 23d Infantry attached set-up a road block at Pukchang-ni which was north east of Sunchon and almost two thirds of the distance to Tokchon. The following day this force was augumented by the arrival of the Reconnais. sance Platoon from the 72d Tank Battalion. And on that same day, 4 November, while on a screening patrol, the 2d Recon engaged a force of 200 enemy, killed 20 and dispersed the remainder. It then went on to set-up another road block slightly south of Pukchang-ni.
While the 2d Recon with its attached elements was conducting sweeping patrols to the north east, the 9th and 38th Infantry Regiments were establishing positions to the rear of the 7th ROK Division roughly along the Chongchon River line. Latcral contact was made on the left with elements of the 5th RCT and on the right with the ROK's.
A prisoner of war picked up on 4 November reported 50,000 Chinese Communist Force (CCF) troops had crossed the Yalu into Korea.
On 5 November, the 2d Division was shifted from the I to the IX Corps with the 9th RCT being attached to the 1st Cavalry Division. Intelligence reports now listed eight North Korean Division plus large, unidentified combat units of the CCF concentrating opposite the IX Corps front on a line between Tokchong and Yongwon.
Upon transfer of the Division to IX Corps, the 38th RCT was reconstituted with the 38th Infantry, 38th FA Bn, "C" Company of the 2d Engineers, and 'C" Battery of the 82 AAA. It was immediately sent to the Pukchang-ni area, held by the 2d Recon, where it set-up positions. The First Battalion went further east and established blocking positions at Yongdong-ni. Thus, the 38th RCT controlled two towns south of Tokchon. These, with Tokchon, formed a triangle in which advance elements of large enemy forces were known to be assembling. The 2d Reconnaissance Company found ample evidence of their presence when its position was fired on by mortar and small arms in the Tokchon vicinity late in the afternoon of 5 November.
The following day was quiet. On the main front the enemy continued small scale attacks against the II ROK Corps. Elements of all three regiments of the 112th CCF Division had been identified there. The 8th ROK Division, attacking north from the blocking positions of the 38th, was unable to take Tokchon.
By the 7th of November, the 38th RCT had established its three battalions along the base line of the triangle formed by Tokchon, Puckchang-ni and Yongdong-ni. Its mission was to block to the north and east, conduct aggressive patrols and contact and maintain liaison with the ROK's. The 23d Infantry had a similar mission and was patrolling south east of Sunchon along the road to Yongdok. One patrol, upon reaching that town, discovered 16 railroad cars with fuel and ammunition. Searching further it uncovered several mines which contained munitions and machine tools for making Russian-type weapons. The supplies and material not needed by ROK units were destroyed. Another patrol from the 23d Infantry attempted to contact elements of the X U.S. Corps, which had landed on the east coast, but was unsuccess" ful although it went several miles east of Yangdok.
Meanwhile, the North Korean forces were jabbing at the positions of the 23d and 38th and all patrols reported contact. An "E" Company patrol from the 38th was ambushed at Taum-ni on 8 November and only 5 of the 18 members escaped. An armored patrol was sent into the area and recovered 9 wounded and 4 dead. All had been stripped, beaten, bayonnetted and left to die.
" Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Second Lieutenant R. M. Rhotenberry, Infantry, a member of Company H. 38th Infantry, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Yongdong-ni between 6 and 7 November 1950. On the night of 6 and 7 November 1950, a machine-gun section of Company H. commanded by Lieutenant RHOTENBERRY, was attached to Company G of the regiment to furnish supporting fire in holding positions on high ground where the company was deployed. When a concealed enemy machine gun opened fire on the left flank of the company with such accuracy that several machine gunners and nearby riflemen were wounded, his men became demoralized, abandoned their weapons and ran for cover. Displaying outstanding courage, Lieutenant RHOTENBERRY moved through the hail of enemy fire. rounded up his men and returned them to their positions. Observing an abandoned light machine gun dying close by, he moved the gun and ammunition to a point from which he could direct intense fire on the enemy positions. The heavy volume of fire delivered by him, together with the fire of his section, silenced the hostile fire and forced the enemy to withdraw. Shifting his fire to the opposite flank which was heavily engaged, he assisted in repulsing the attack on the right flank of the company. After the initial attack was repulsed and while the lead platoon was being reorganized, a heavy concentration of mortar fire struck the position, killing the infantry platoon leader and causing several other casualties. Lieutenant RHOTENBERRY unhesitatingly assumed command of the platoon and, organizing both the platoon and machine gun section, personally directed them in renewed action, forcing the enemy to retreat with h eavy losses".
On the same day the I&R platoon from the 38th ran through an ambush without casualties. The Third Battalion of the 38th, following the platoon wiped the enemy out. And in the sector of the 23d Infantry, a patrol discovered a freight train stalled in a tunnel which yielded a rich prizefour T-34 tanks, two box cars of ammunition and two tank cars half full of gasoline.
The following days were taken up with patrolling by all units, patrols which swept wide and deep into suspected enemy buildup areas. Little was found. Some enemy fire was received, an occasional small fire fight took place, but no large enemy groups were found despite repeated and,insistant civilian reports of roving bands of North Koreans and Chinese.
A 38th Infantry contact patrol journeying far to the east on 10 November failed to meet a similar patrol from X Corps but a liaison plane reported spotting the X Corps units. At the same time, the 38th began assembling in Pukchang-ni to be available to aid the ROK's in case of a major attack which was anticipated.
East of Pukchang-ni, the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 72d Tank Battalion, operating as an attached force to the 2d Reconnaissance Company, made what is believed to be the first fire contact with a CCF unit made by a unit of the 2d Division. Conducting a sweeping patrol, the friendly force encountered a reinforced enemy platoon apparently screening a larger body of troops. A fire fight flared briefly before the enemy broke contact after suffering an estimated 20 casualties. Two prisoners were taken by the Recon Platoon and one turned out to be a CCF commissioned officer whose excellent equipment, arms and supply indicated much to the P.W. interrogation officer.
Cold weather set-in in earnest about 10 November and it found many troops without winter clothing. That which had been issued went to front-line troops but there was not nearly enough to go around. The result was cold, misery, frostbite and very severe hardship.
The 9th RCT, attached to the 1 st Cavalry Division, was ordered to capture the city of Pugwon and the high ground west of the Chongchon River on 11 November. It moved out the following day and moved into the toughest battle in had faced since its fight for Hill 201 down on the Naktong River. The fighting raged for three days with Pugwon falling late on the 14th with the 9th then crossing the river and attacking north and west where it established contact with other friendly elements attacking north.
Days passed with more and more patrolling and less and less contact. Some civilians reported the enemy was withdrawing. But one ominous fact stood out in those uncertain days the ROK's were still unable to take the city of Tokchon although reports that it had been captured only to be lost again filtered down down through the ranks. And Tokchon was a vital key to control of the road network behind the front lines.
A disturbing report-came from the 2d Reconnaissance Company on 16 Novembera band of 200 enemy, possibly Chinese, had been contacted southeast of Songchon, a town well to the rear of the Division CP at Su chon. And from the 9th Infantry, over in the I Corps sector, came a report that they were being heavily opposed by elements of the CCF.
The 2d Reconnaissance Company was the only Division unit in IX Corps to contact the enemy on 17 November. It killed two, captured one and dispersed ten in a running fight. The ROK's were again reported fighting in the streets of Tokchon in another attempt to take the town.
Plans for the attack which would end the war were put into motion on 18 November. The Division command post moved forward to a point one mile north east of Kunu-ri. As the move took- place, motor and foot patrols reported little enemy contact. But the next day the 23d reported its patrols had made contact in the vicinity of Songchon and Kapyong-ni far to the south.
More and more reports of enemy units in the rear snow-balled into Division on the 20th of November. An entire North Korean Division was reported assembling in Hoechang. And well south and east an unorganized enemy group of over 12,000 was reported. A prisoner reported that 1,000 CCF troops were in Hoechang; the ROK's reported contact with three Chinese regiments south of Yongwon on the Division's right. And on the same day a patrol from "K" Company of the 23d was ambushed, losing two trucks, three jeeps, one M-16, two 81 mm mortars and two 75 mm recoilless rifles.
But, on orders, the Division continued preparation for attack. The 9th RCT reverted to the Division on 21 November and once again the Indianhead Division had all its units under its control.
The operations order for the coming offensive was issued 20 November. The organization and attack plans were as follows:
9th RCT composed of the 9th Infantry Regiment; "D" Battery, 82d AAA; "C" Company, 2d Cml Mtr Bn; and "A" Company, 2d Engineers to attack in zone.
38th RCT composed of the 38th Infantry Regiment; 38th FA Bn; "A" Battery, 503d FA Bn; Ammo Sec. Srv Btry, 503d FA Bn; "C" Battery, 82d AAA; "C" Company, 2d Engineers; and the 2d Cml Mtr Bn ( - ) to relieve elements of the II ROK Corps in the 2d Division zone, attack in zone and protect the right flank.
Supporting the 9th RCT was the 15th FA Bn whose fires were reinforced by those of the 37th FA Bn while the 503d FA Bn ( - ) was in general support. One platoon of the 82d AAA ( - ) was assigned for protection of the Army ASP in Kunu-ri and two sections of "B" Battery were providing air and ground support for the head" quarters of IX Corps, 2d Division and 2d Division Artillery.
Division reserve consisted of the 2d Reconnaissance Company, 72d Tank Battalion, and the 23rd Infantry ( - ) which was located in the vicinity to the north of Kunu-ri. "A" Company, 23rd Infantry was assigned to the IX Corps as command post guard.
On 22 November, the 23rd RCT was disbanded with its units returning to their parent organizations. The 9th RCT completed its return from IX Corps and prepared to jump-off on the scheduled attack. All other units of the Division were closed into their new positions.
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