The area in which the operation was carried on is similar to a
stone spearhead. Its point lies west of SAEMAL and the base along
the SILLIM-NI east-west road. Very rocky, narrow, sharp ridge
lines and spurs jutting east and west are characteristic of this
sector. The area is nearly devoid of a road network. It is bounded
on the north by the HAANHUNG-NI east-west road, and on the south
by the SILLIM-NI east-west road. These roads are typical Korean
roads, narrow, graded soil, and surfaced with gravel. All were
weathered and eroded. The terrain ranged in elevation from five
hundred to one thousand two hundred eighty eight meters and was
characterized by several corridors running north and south between
the two roads.
The attack north to HAANHUNG-NI was conducted up these narrow,
precipitous, ice filled streams and ravines. Undergrowth, trees,
and snow gave excellent cover to the enemy positions. Supply problems
were increased due to ice and hard packed snow. Track vehicles
and human pack trains were the only means of supply and evacuation.
OPERATION KILLER-OPERATION RIPPER
.
The Korean War entered a new phase with the launching of Operation
Killer. The enemy had been decisively defeated by the 2d Division
in his attempt to drive through the center of the United Nations
line. A staggering number of casualties had been inflicted on
his armies. But even with the defeat. large numbers of enemy troops
still held strong positions deep in the east central mountains
of Korea. some penetrating to within seven miles of the important
rail terminal at Chechon. Strong elements of the 10th North Korean
Division were operating as guerrilla bands as far south as Andong,
posing a serious threat to the east flank of X Corps and Eighth
Army.
"Operation Killer" envisaged a double envelopment of
the enemy units in the Central front. The 1st Marine Division
was to advance along the Wonju-Hongchon axis. The 7th Infantry
Division, advancing north and west, was to link up with the 1st
Marines along the Hongchon-Ogumal axis. The 2d Infantry Division
together with the 3d ROK Division, in the center, was to advance
north through rough, mountainous terrain between the major routes
of withdrawal, exerting continuous pressure on the enemy and preventing
an orderly withdrawal. The ultimate objective of the operation
was the destruction of the greatest number of enemy at the smallest
possible cost in men and equipment.
The sector assigned to the 2d Division present ed enormous problems.
The terrain was studded with mountains; it contained no reliable
supply route and the few trails which did exist had been reduced
to muddy quagmires by recent rains and thaw. Mud a foot deep in
many places completely stopped vehicular movement. Bridges washed-out
and rushing streams made crossings difficult. The cold, wet weather
made any travel a miserable, sliding, slogging experience. The
services were forced to wrestle with new problems created by a
total lack of adequate routes of supply. Air drops were difficult
and, at times, impossible to arrange.
The 2d Division jumped-off on "Operation Killer" on
22 February. The initial advance w as slow, not so much due to
resistance as to terrain. However, by 1700 hours both the 9th
and 38th had reached the Chuchon River where swift waters and
a lack of bridges delayed crossing. The engineers constructed
a foot bridge for immediate use of the 9th and, in the 23d zone
of advance, tanks of the regimental tank company were used to
ferry people to the north bank.
Both units buttoned up for the night and prepared to continue
forward in the morning.
The 9th Infantry ran into moderate resistance on 23 February but
with all three battalions teaming up, an enemy force of 2,000
was routed, dispersed to the north, leaving their dead and wounded
behind. The 23rd continued to slog out limited gains in the east.
Back at Chechon the 38th Infantry, with the exception of "I"
Company which was guarding supply trains from the south. was well
into an intensive training program that was to continue for the
rest of the month.
The Division became increasingly concerned with the almost insurmountable
logistical problems which hampered its activities. The combined
factors of weather, terrain and lack of supply routes finally
prompted a request to X Corps for relief. The appeal asked for
(1) Native bearers to establish a carrier supply network, (2)
sufficient air drops to keep forward elements supplied, or (3)
a halt in the advance of the Division until the necessary road
network could be built. Corps replied that air drops could not
be arranged but that bearers would be provided. In any case the
attack was to continue.
Lengthy advances were recorded on 24 February although the 9th
again encountered moderate resistance as did the 23rd. Liaison
planes were used to supply the regiments deep in the rugged mountains,
and the 3d Bn of the 23d detached a company to move to the rear
and pack rations forward.
An enemy radio message intercepted by the First Battalion, 23d
Infantry at 1400 hours on 25 February indicated the communist
troops were critically short of ammunition and were planning to
withdraw northward. The Division immediately set about to take
advantage of the situation with both the 9th and 23rd moving out
to set up blocking positions. Purpose of the moves was to deny
the use of the east-west Hoengsong-Pangnimni road to the enemy.
The Second Battalion of the 23d, with the 37th FA Bn attached,
moved east into the 7th Division zone on 26 February in preparation
for an attack on the following day on Ungyo-ri, an important town
on the Hoengsong-Pangnimni road. The 9th Infantry, after securing
Haanhung-ni, west of Ungyo-ri, sent a battalion eastward along
the road in anticipation of an enemy withdrawal from Ungyo-ri
when the Second Battalion of the 23d launched its assault.
The 9th held its positions on 27 February; the First Battalion
of the 23d established additional blocking positions around Ungyo-ri,
and the Second Battalion of the 23rd jumped-off on its attack
from the east and immediately tangled with an estimated enemy
company dug-in around
the objective. The fight continued throughout the day with all
units buttoning-up for the night.
The First Battalion of the 23rd attacked Ungyo-ri early on the
28th of February and managed to secure the town although "A"
Company was temporarily pinned down under intense fire. Air strikes
and artillery were placed on the enemy positions and "A"
was able to pull out of danger.
The evening of this last day of February found the 2d Division
in positions astride the Hoengsong-Pangnimni road in its sector
and preparing to continue its advance to Phase Line Arizona which
paralleled the road roughly 7,000 meters to the north. Ahead of
the Division were strong elements of the 17th and 18th CCF Divisions
and lesser elements of the III and V North Korean Corps which
were retreating slowly to the north in the face of the grinding
X Corps offensive. Intelligence reports indicated the foe intended
to delay the advance as much as possible while he prepared fixed
defenses north of the 38th parallel.
The Division pressed forward the first days of March in an attempt
to secure all the Arizona line. It was slow, rugged fighting,
one ridge at a time.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Master Sergeant
James J. Jovenall, Infantry, a member of Company G, 9th Infantry
Regiment, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Yongnangi
on 4 March 1951. On that date, Company G was given the mission
of assaulting a commanding terrain feature held by a well entrenched
and determined hostile force. Three attempts were made to secure
the objective, but each time the heavy volume of enemy fire forced
the friendly forces to withdraw. In the fourth assault, Sergeant
JOVENALL led his machine-gun squad across the fire-swept terrain
and emplaced his weapons in an exposed position in order to bring
effective fire to bear on the enemy forces. Despite the intense
and accurate fire concentrated on him by the enemy, Sergeant JOVENALL
fearlessly directed fire on the hostile emplacements. During this
action, an enemy grenade landed near one of the machine-gun emplace
meets. Without hesitation, Sergeant JOVENALL hurled himself across
the gunner and assistant gunner to protect them from shrapnel.
Although painfully wounded, Sergeant JOVENALL refused medical
treatment until the hill was secured."
Meanwhile, a new offensive was being planned, "Operation
Ripper," designed to carry UN forces to the 38th Parallel.
Similar to "Operation Killer." it aimed at maximum destruction
of enemy personnel and equipment with mini" mum friendly
casualties. To establish the units in the X Corps in the most
advantageous positions for the coming operation, a shift in sectors
was ordered by Corps. An operations order, implementing the shift,
sent the 38th Infantry into Corps reserve and called for the rest
of the Division to move to the west and assume responsibility
for the 3rd ROK Division sector. The positions vacated by the
2d Division would be filled by the 5th ROK Division.
After several delays, the shift was completed on 6 March although
the Second Battalion of the 23rd RCT was temporarily attached
to the 7th Division until it could secure the Arizona line in
its sector.
The westward movement of the Division front necessitated a change
in the location of the Division Command post so on 5 March it
displaced to Tudok which, although outside the Division zone,
was the only suitable location for maximum control and communications.
The left flank was hinged in the vicinity of Hongchon-ni. All
units prepared to jump-off on "Ripper" with the first
objective being the town of Adding-ni.
The days which followed were to be some of the most grueling the
Division would face in Korea. It wasn't the character of the opposition
so much, although at times throughout the month it was fanatic
and as strong as any ever faced. It was the terrain, coupled with
alternate spring thaws, rains and days of sub-zero freezes which
hampered every activity and wrought unprecedented burdens on every
unit and operation. The Division commander characterized it as
some of the most easily defensible terrain in Korea, ideally suited
to the enemy delaying tactics. Its acquisition, he commented,
was undoubtedly one of the secondary aims of the January-February
offensives on the Chinese forces.
"Operation Ripper" got under way for the 2d Division
on 7 March from its positions on the Arizona line. Ahead of it
lay other lines which, during the course of the month, would become
bywords to everyone in the Indianhead Division. Familiar names,
they were, too. Names like Phoenix, Albany, Reno, Idaho, Texas
and Maine. Names that rang of home but in the rugged mountains
of Korea represented only "one damn hill after another."
Initial resistance to "Ripper" varied from light to
heavy. Abreast, the 9th and 23rd RCT's ground forward, the 9th
concentrating on the trail to Adding-ni while the 23rd assaulted
an important hill mass about a mile west of Sanggung-ni. Stress
was placed on lateral liaison with defense in depth. The narrow
Division front made possible the massing of artillery fires and
this advantage was called upon time and again to pound delaying
groups of enemy.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Sergeant
Houston D. Snowden, Army Medical Service, a member of Medical
Company, 9th Infantry Regiment, for action against the enemy in
the vicinity of Chigu-ri on 7 March 1951. On 7 March 1951, Sergeant
SNOWDEN, a medical aidman, was attached to a rifle company which
was advancing over mountainous terrain in an attempt to contact
the enemy. As the company was making its way over the mountains,
an enemy mortar barrage pinned down the leading platoon, inflicting
heavy casualties. Without hesitation, Sergeant SNOWDEN made his
way through the intense fire to reach his wounded comrades. While
administering first aid, he was painfully wounded by mortar fragments
but continued to treat the wounded. When the enemy barrage lifted,
Sergeant SNOWDEN observed three wounded riflemen whom he had not
noticed before and was moving forward to assist them when the
concealed enemy opened fire on him with small arms and automatic
weapons. Heedless of the hostile fire, he continued on to the
wounded men and was administering aid when the enemy again delivered
a barrage of mortar fire on the friendly positions. Shouting a
warning to other members of the platoon, Sergeant SNOWDEN flung
his body over the man he was bandaging. As he was shielding his
wounded comrade an enemy mortar burst nearby and he was wounded
for the second time. Although bleeding profusely, he continued
to ad minister to the wounded. When he had ascertained that all
of his wounded comrades had been properly cared for and safely
evacuated, he proceeded to the aid station where his own wounds
were treated. Then, although weakened from loss of blood, Sergeant
SNOWDEN returned to the company and continued on the mission."
The 2d Reconnaissance Company screened the left flank of the 23rd
to guard against bypassed and infiltrating enemy groups. "B"
Company of the 72d Tank Battalion lent the weight of its guns
to those of the 23d Tank Company in support of the 23d RCT's dogged
attack. The 10th of March saw more climbing, digging the enemy
out of one hill only to find him entrenched on the next, the North
Korean troops holding on till the last minute and then falling
back to more prepared positions.
The 38th Infantry returned to Division control on 10 March and
sent its first battalion forward to reconnoiter the area of the
23rd Infantry.
A slight break in resistance occurred on the 11th when the enemy
fell back more rapidly than previously, heading for Adding-ni.
Both the assaulting regiments pursued closely, taking advantage
of every opportunity while the 23rd made plans to send an armor-infantry
patrol into Adding-ni itself.
And amidst the scrapping which characterized the action on 11
March came grand and welcome word-the Army was going to begin
a rotation program. The news spread like a prairie fire throughout
the Division. The Marines and Navy had already announced their
own rotation plans and now the word was out that the Army, too,
was planning ahead. It was destined to be a long time before sizable
groups were to leave but the mere announcement sent morale soaring.
Enemy mines became more and more a problem in the following days
as mine casualties mounted rapidly. Booby-traps, too, hindered
efforts to move forward and nature, itself, seemed to join with
the enemy in dreaming up road wrecking weather which confronted
the engineers with almost insurmountable problems in keeping even
the very vital supply routes open.
The 38th Infantry moved forward on 12 March in preparation to
relieve the 23rd RCT. The units attached to the 23rd37th FA Bn;
"B" Battery, 82d AAA; "B" Company, 2d Engrs;
and "B" Company, 72d Tk Bnwere notified they would revert
to the 38th Infantry when it assumed responsibility for the 23rd's
sector.
Relief of the 23rd took place on 13 March and the regiment moved
back to set up blocking positions in the vicinity of Saemal. The
38th moved forward through Yudong-ni and halted on the Albany
line prepared to move out to its next objective, the Reno line.
The order directing the advance was published on the 13th and
at 0800 hours on the 14th the troops moved out. meanwhile, heavy
traffic on the trails leading to the 9th and 38th sectors turned
them to ribbons of mud in which lay undiscovered mines which plagued
vehicular movement. Engineers work- around the clock with all
uncommitted line units furnishing additional labor in an attempt
to keep traffic rolling.
The drive to the Reno line was completed against only moderate
resistance by 14 March and plans for moving to the Idaho line
were made, To bolster the 9th RCT, "C" Company of the
72d Tank Battalion was attached while "A" Company replaced
"B" Company of the 72d in the 38th sector.
The push to the Idaho Line involved traversing a rugged, well
defended pass on the Yudong-ni-Pungam-ni Road. Intelligence reports
indicated the enemy would make a strong stand before falling back
from the critical terrain feature for it was the last natural
barrier to Pungam-ni and once it fell the way would be open for
unrestricted advance.
The Third Battalion of the 38th was to lead off in the attack
up the pass with the Second Battalion following, sweeping laterally
beyond the immediate ridges overlooking the rutted trail which
served as the road through the pass. For the operation, the Third
Battalion received as additional attachments "C" Company
of the 2d Engineers and a psychological warfare team.
The attack to the Idaho line jumped off at 0730 hours with "L"
Company on the immediate left and "K" on the immediate
right of the road. The advance began easily but at 0815 the lead
elements came under small arms fire. As the morning dragged on,
the volume of fire increased and added to it was heavy and accurate
mortar fire. The tank column, moving up the road, was delayed
by mines and the engineer mine-sweepers, attempting to clear the
road were forced back again and again as well entrenched snipers
inflicted heavy casualties. Up on the hill, the elements of the
Third Battalion faced a storm of fire from the well-entrenched
enemy who seemed determined to hold the pass. Hill 570, a key
terrain feature to the pass, was laced with concealed bunkers
from which the enemy had unrestricted observation and fields of
fire. Artillery and air were called in and "E" Company
moved up behind the walking artillery barrage to join "L"
Company in its assault on 570. "F" Company to the right
of "K" on the east side of the road, moved forward to
take another key hill, 719. "K" in the meantime, was
digging the enemy out with bayonets, moving doggedly forward from
bunker to bunker.
The terrain on the right of the road was secured, finally, but
on the left where "F" and "L" battered against
the enemy there was only difficult and slow progress. To assist,
the 37th and
OPERATION KILLEROPERATION RIPPER 38th FA Bns laid down volley
after volley of mixed HE, WP and VT artillery onto the hills.
Nevertheless, the effort failed and all units adjusted their positions
and buttoned up for the night.
A new attack plan was drawn up during the night and passed down
to the units. The Second Battalion would assault with all its
units down the left of the road and the Third Battalion would
take the right. At 0730, the attack was launched, both battalions
moving forward. The expected resistance had melted away during
the night, only small forces clung to the positions and by mid-morning
the pass was secure. The 9th Infantry, moving up behind because
the narrow Division front was suitable for only regimental occupation,
prepared to secure the recently won ground. The 38th assembled
and moved forward, following up the advantage. "K" Company
mounted the tanks of the RCT and together they rolled forward
into Pungam-ni where, after receiving a few scattered long-range
rounds, they secured the town and set up a perimeter for the night.
The Division consolidated its positions on 17 March while intelligence
officers reported the continuing evidence of withdrawal of CCF
and NK units to defense line north of the 38th parallel.
Sixteen Americans who had been Chinese prisoners were recovered
by a patrol from "G" Company, 38th Infantry on 17 March.
Four, who were seriously wounded, were evacuated by helicopter.
The remaining were interrogated by intelligence officers before
evacuation. All had been captured during the CCF advance on Hoengsong
the previous month and were part of a group of 800 prisoners who
were being marched northward. During a daytime stopover in a small
village a bombing attack wounded several of the men including
the 16 found by "G" Company and they were told they
would be left behind. Letters furnished them by their captors
directed other CCF and NK units not to molest them in any way.
The letters proved effective for in the following days, several
enemy groups questioned them but after reading the letters left
them alone. The men remained in the house until found by the "G"
Company patrol.
After securing the Idaho Line positions, the Division inaugurate
extensive patrols to maintain contact with the withdrawing enemy.
The 9th RCT sent patrols to the Texas line for several days and
then jumped-off to occupy defensive positions on the line the
morning of 20 March. Light resistance was encountered and by evening
the line was secure in the hands of the 9th.
Colonel Thomas E. DeShazo, former artillery officer for IX Corps,
was assigned to the 2d Division on 20 March, replacing Brigadier
General Loyal M. Haynes who received a new assignment in Japan.
. General Haynes had served the Division as artillery commander
since' its arrival in Korea.
The remainder of March saw the Division increase its patrol activities
to the maximum, moving forward to occupy the Maine and finally
the Cairo line paralleling a lateral road which intersected the
Hongchon-Yanggu road at its midpoint. By far the most significant
events of the closing days of March were the extreme efforts required
to keep the Division supplied over the areas of mud which served
as supply routes. Every conceivable type of transport was pressed
into service. Stringent traffic regulations under the assistant
division commander's personal supervision were further tightened
as the Division barely surmounted the most terrific logistical
problem it had encountered since arrival in Korea.
The Division command post, which had been following the advance
of the line units during the month, displaced to Salleyon on 27
March. The 38th Infantry, on the Cairo line, continued to send
patrols out while the other units trained, patrolled and repaired
roads. "Operation Ripper" came to a close on 28 March
with the Division 30 miles north of the initial jump-off line.
It was a battle-wise, victorious Division which had wrecked the
remaining elements of the North Korean Divisions screening the
withdrawal of the CCF. For the first time since its arrival in
Korea, it was nearing authorized strength. Confidently it prepared
for whatever the future might hold.