During the daylight hours of 24 November, air observers reported large masses of enemy troops assembling forward of the Division front. Prisoners of war were interrogated and reported large Chinese troop units were massing near Uhyon-dong, a town five miles east of the right flank of the 38th RCT and directly north of the ROK II Corps. Our offensive ground forward.
The night of 24-25 November was quiet.
At noon on the 25th, the Division line, which was moving slowly forward against increasingly heavy resistance, extended generally east and west. The 9th Infantry held the left flank with the Third Battalion on the west bank of the Chongchon River. The 38th Infantry was on the right flank and the 23d was moving up behind the lead regiments as reserve.
At 1255, a reported concentration of enemy tanks, troops and anti-aircraft weapons forward of the friendly lines was hit by air and then pounded with the eight-inch howitzers of corps artillery.
As darkness fell on 25 November, the temperature rocketed down into the minus 20's. It was a bitter cold night, pitch black.
Out of the darkness in the final hours of 25 November the Chinese struck. A new war had begun.
The fury of the attack dispelled the hopes among men and officers alike of Christmas at home and an end to battle. Blotting out every other thought was the terrible ordeal which unfolded so quickly, an ordeal of sleepless, frigid nights, confusion, unbelievable slaughter and near disaster. A new chapter in the book of human misery had begun.
Three Chinese regiments made the initial attack against the 2d Division. Two of them struck at the center and right (east) flank of the Division, hitting the 38th Infantry and part of the 23rd. The third CCF regiment slammed against the 9th Infantry on the left (west) flank causing heavy casualties.
The attack in the 9th Infantry sector subsided at daylight on the 26th but the pressure continued against the 38th and the II ROK Corps in the book of on the right of the 38th. To make-up for the heavy losses in the 9th, the First and Second Battalions of the 23d Infantry went into positions on the 9th's right flank and the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion was attached as infantry to the 9th to bolster the Division's left flank along the west bank of Chongchon River. This resulted in the disposition of units from west to east as follows: 9th Infantry, two battalions of the 23d Infantry, and the 38th Infantry. This line, running east-west, was about four miles north of Kujangdong. The 38th Infantry positions were particularly vulnerable due to the lack of a north-south road leading into the sector. The only exit routes available to the 38th Infantry ran southeast through Tokchon, or laterally across the division' front to Kujangdong and then south through Kunu-ri. By early morning on the 26th, the ROK's had withdrawn almost to Pukchang-ni, completely exposing the right flank of the 2d Division and the 38th Infantry. Remnants of the 3rd ROK Regiment closed westward and joined the 38th.
Tokchon fell during mid-morning and it became imperative that the 2d Division line be held north of Kujangdong if the 38th Infantry was to have a route for the withdrawal which now appeared to be a strong possibility.
Just before Tokchon was captured, the liaison team from Division Artillery, which had been attached to the ROK's holding the town, was surrounded. Planes were sent out from the Division immediately and landing on a makeshift strip within the crumbling perimeter lifted out every member of the team from under the very noses of the attacking forces. By 1800 hours, the Chinese were in the center of the city.
Late in the afternoon of 26 November, the enemy resumed his attacks against the 9th Infantry with particular pressure against the Third Battalion to which "A" and "B" Companies of the 2d Engineers were attached as infantry. The Third Battalion had, at this time, sent a small force of tanks and infantry westward to give help to the Second Battalion of the 24th Infantry which had been surrounded for three days. Unable to get help from its own hard-pressed Division, it had appealed to the 9th for aid. The relief force was successful in breaking the encirclement and together with the remnants of the 24th's Battalion withdrew to the 9th Infantry sector. The Second Battalion of the 24th fought with the 9th for two days before returning to its parent unit.
The pressure against the 9th increased steadily and all battalions were forced into limited withdrawals. At 2200 hours, the Chinese overran the command posts of the First and Third Battalions and the Engineer Battalion forcing them to withdraw east of the Chongchon. At 2300 hours, the Chinese shifted the weight of their attack to the Second Battalion and utilizing 3.5 inch rockets and recoiless rises he forced the Second to withdraw south of the Chongchon with heavy losses in personnel and equipment. Many of the men waded the frigid water to escape the onslaught, their clothes turning to ice as they staggered up on the opposite bank.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Corporal James L. Brown, Infantry, a member of Company E, 9th Infantry, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Sinjang on 26 November 1950. On the morning of 26 November 1950 remnants of the Ist and 2nd Battalions of the 9th infantry Regiment were surrounded by the enemy and had been repelling fierce enemy attacks for several hours. Due to heavy fighting many casualties were received; however the wounded men could not be evacuated because of an enemy roadblock along the main supply route one mile south of Company E's positions. Corporal BROWN was personally selected by his company commander to take charge of the casualties of the two besieged battalions, break through the enemy roadblock, and get the wounded men to safety. The roadblock was established in a culvert which crossed under train tracks on the left of the road and continued along a river on the right. Scattered around the culvert were approximately fifteen or twenty of the enemy. Corporal BROWN immediately estimated the situation and directed the walking wounded to lay down a base of fire on the culvert. He then took two men with him and advanced down the railroad tracks pushing a small railroad hand car in front of him. Corporal BROWN began engaging each enemy position as he ran down the tracks, exposing himself many times to enemy grenades and rifle fire, but destroying each position as he went along. When he was close enough, he engaged the main body of the enemy in the culvert, using grenades and ripe fire, and even using his rifle butt and boots when he ran out of ammunition. By destroying this roadblock he made it possible to evacuate the wounded and secured a route for the withdrawal of his company and other units."
A special task force commanded by Lt. Gene Takihashi was encircled late on the 26th while protecting the three 9th Infantry command posts and the river crossing. The next morning Captain Crawford commanding "D" Company, 2d Engineers, led elements of his Company in an attack to recapture the equipment left in the CP positions. He was successful in this mission and also made it possible for Lt Takihashi to break through to the east bank of the river.
The First and Second Battalions of the 23rd, which were on the right flank of the 9th, were struck by the Chinese early at night on 26 November. At 2115, a group of 300 Chinese overran the regimental command post, forcing the two battalions to displace southward 300 yards. The small units fought bitterly until their ammunition was gone or their positions completely overrun.
The 38th Infantry was, in the meantime, beating off wave after wave of the attackers from the north, east and south. Finally, under intense enemy pressure, further aggravated by the collapsed ROK defense on the right flank, limited withdrawals were begun.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Corporal Robert K. Imrie, Infantry, a member of Company F. 38th Infantry, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Yong Bong Dong, on 27 November 1950. On 27 November 1950, the platoon of which Corporal IMRIE was a member was ordered to retake a hill which the enemy had seized during the operations of the previous night. On approaching the crest of the hill, the platoon was subjected to intense machine-gun crossfire and the advance halted. Corporal IMRIE, aware of the possible annihilation of the entire platoon by the deadly machine gun fire, singlehandedly charged the machine gun position on the right flank, completely disregarding his personal safety, and continually fired his automatic weapon until he had neutralized the position. After neutralizing the right flank machine-gun, he was hit by a burst of fire from the machine gun on the left flank and mortally wounded. His gallant and intrepid actions had diverted the enemy machine gun fire from his platoon, thereby saving his comrades from annihilation and enabling them to eliminate the one remaining machine gun position and secure the objective."
On 27 November, Division Operations Order 11 was issued ordering defense of the high ground northwest, northeast and southeast of Kujangdong. To become effective at 0600 on 28 November, it ordered the 9th Infantry into Division reserve with the 72d Tank Battalion ( - ). The line was to be taken over on the left by the 23d Infantry with the following attached units; "A" and "B" Companies, 72d Tank Battalion; "B" Company, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion; 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion and "B" Battery, 82d AAA. The 38th Infantry was to continue holding the right flank of the Division front with the attached 3d ROK Regiment; "C" Company, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion; and "C" Battery, 82d AAA. Supporting the 23d was the 15th FA Bn while the 38th FA Bn supported the 38th. In general support of the Division were the 37th, 503d and 17th FA Bns with the attached 82d AAA ( - ).
Before the operation order became effective, however, all units of the Division were to undergo severe combat. Five Chinese divisions were now being hurled at the 2d. The II ROK Corps was a nonentity on the right of the 38th and the enemy had infiltrated behind the positions of the 38th, making them untenable. It was necessary to pull the entire right flank back to the southwest. At 2300 hours on 27 November, the 38th assumed control of the 3d ROK Regiment and the ROK's were used to extend the endangered flank.
The early minutes of 28 November brought with them a furious attack against the battered First and Second Battalions of the 9th Infantry. By 0115 the First Battalion was forced with withdraw, utilizing transportation of the 23d Regiment. The Second and Third Battalions held their positions but the Third Battalion was overrun. Communication with the line companies was maintained only through the artillery forward observers. "I" Company and "A" and "B" Companies of the 2d Engineers were locked in a desperate slugging match while attempts were being made to tie in with elements of the 23d Infantry moving up on the right of the reeling 9th.
The 23d Infantry, meanwhile, had succeeded in regaining the ground it had lost the night previously when its command post had been overrun. But at 0615 on 28 November, its First Battalion was under Chinese attack with the enemy streaming down the MSR from the north.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Lieutenant Colonel Claire E. Hutchin, Jr, Infantry, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Kujangdong during the period 25 through 30 November 1950. During this period, the Ist Battalion was engaged in a series of defensive actions, counterattacks and withdrawals being conducted against superior enemy forces by the 23d Infantry Regiment. On the morning of 28 November, Company C was forced from its positions by a numerically superior enemy unit, with a resultant loss of equipment and weapons and the company was completely disorganized. Learning that all the company officers and a majority of the senior noncommissioned officer were either killed or wounded in this engagement, Colonel HUTCHIN quickly went to the unit's position, reorganized the remnants of the company and personally led the remaining men in a counter-attack to regain the positions. In the face of extremely heavy enemy small-arms fire, Colonel HUTCHIN personally directed and led this operation, succeeded in recovering the greater part of the lost equipment, and relieved groups of men of Company C who been surrounded when the positions were overrun. That after noon, when the Ist Battalion was designated as rear guard for the 2d Division's withdrawal from Kujangdong. Colonel HUTCHIN personally took command of the rear guard element, consisting of one rifle company and a company of tanks. The pursuing enemy force, estimated at two battalions, pressed hard on the rear of the division's column, which was forced to move slowly due to traffic congestion. Each time the column was forced to halt, the enemy would attack the rear guard from both flanks, using small arms, automatic weapons and grenades. During one of these attacks, Colonel HUTCHIN was painfully wounded in the face by flying shrapnel, but remained in control, brilliantly directing the defensive actions of the rear guard with outstanding success. His aggressive leadership and sound decisions during this action were unquestionably a decisive factor in the ultimately successful withdrawal of the 2d Division."
The 38th Infantry also came under increased attack early on the morning of 28 November. At 0105 hours, a large enemy force had passed through the disorganized ROK's to the north and was attacking the 38th front line positions. All communications were gone with the ROK's. No sooner had the attack begun than the regimental command post and the command post of the Second Battalion were attacked and in both instances the enemy was beaten off. The Regimental CP moved a short distance to the west for the night as enemy mortar fire had begun to fall on the area. At 2300, the CP again came under small arms fire and again moved to the west where it set-up with the CP of the Second Battalion. It was known that the First Battalion had been under constant attack since midnight and at 0400 it was learned the attack was continuing with all companies low on ammunition. "C" Company of the 2d Engineers and "L" of the 38th had been forced to withdraw.
At daylight, the CP again came under small arms fire and displaced for the third time in 19 hours. The situation was rapidly becoming critical.
At 0440, a platoon of tanks from the 38th Regimental Tank Company and a ROK Company had gone forward to break through to the battered First Battalion which was being overwhelmed. The rescue mission was successful after the force had cleared a roadblock in the original location of the regimental CP. Communications were thus reestablished with the First Battalion.
At 0615 hours, the enemy was flowing through the abandoned ROK positions on the right of the 38th and threatening the firing positions of "A" Battery of the 503d FA Battalion. By 1025, the situation was even worse. "A" Company of the 2d Engineers and "L" of the 38th had been overrun. The fate of "B", "C", "F" and "G" Companies was unknown. All communications with Division headquarters were gone.
By noon, it was obvious the Division could never carry through with the plan to defend in the arc north of Kujangdong. At 1300 hours, Operations Order 12 was issued. It called for a defense along a new Main Line of Resistance in an attempt to stop the onrushing hordes of Chinese. The new order permitted a gradual withdrawal of the torn front line into an arc around Kunu-ri. The 23d Infantry with the Second Battalion of the 9th and the 72d Tank Battalion were to cover the withdrawal, holding the vital road junction of Kujangdong. The 9th Infantry ( - ) was to withdraw as quickly as possible and take up defensive positions at Wonni between Kujangdong and Kunu-ri. The battered 38th was to withdraw west and then south to take up positions northeast of Kunu-ri.
The 38th fought its way to Kujang-dong despite heavy pressure to the north and east. There, while the 23d and attached units held off the tide of onrushing enemy, the 38th turned south. This operation placed the entire traffic load on the Kujang-dong-CANARY road and vehicles were literally bumper to bumper. Advance Chinese elements took the tail of the column under fire and only a skillful rear-guard action by the First Battalion of the 23d prevented the enemy from inflicting severe damage to all the units. By 0030 hours, 29 November, "A" and "B" Companies of the 23d were deploying for the fifth time in the rear-guard operation while the entire First Battalion was under intense artillery and mortar fire.
The withdrawal from north of Kujang-dong was a costly success but setting up the new defensive positions presented a brand-new situation. The 9th Infantry took up pos>
The units manning this line 9th, 23d, 3d ROK's, 38th and the Turks bore little resemblance to their previous organizations. Terrific losses in manpower and equipment had been suffered. Confusion existed throughout the ranks but the troops, aware of their precarious situation, lacked no courage and did everything humanly possible to carry out their orders. The situation permitted no breather. As the haggard remains of the units moved exhausted into their new positions they found the enemy already upon them. The frozen ground would have prevented digging-in even had there been time. There was little cover, no concealment.
During the early morning hours of 29 November, the Division command post moved to a new location six miles south of Kunu-ri.
xxxThroughout the morning every unit of the Division was under heavy attack by the numerically superior enemy. At about 1000 hours, the 2d Reconnaissance Company reported an enemy roadblock had been set-up approximately ten miles south of Kunu-ri on the CANARY-Sunchon road, the lifeline of the Division and the only escape route in the Division zone. First estimates placed the strength of the enemy at a reinforced company, At 1240 hours, after the Reconnaissance Company had failed to reduce the block, "C" Company of the 38th Infantry reinforced by tanks from "C" Company of the 72d Tank Battalion were on route to assist the 2d Recon. At 1350 hours, a battery of 155 howitzers from the 503d Field Artillery was directed to support the attack on the roadblock. The 38th sent its trains south by way of Anju and they arrived in Sunchon intact.
The situation with the regiments grew worse as the afternoon lengthened. There were many wounded needing immediate treatment, ammunition was low, supplies scarce, and the combat units were suffering such heavy casualties that their effectiveness decreased with every hour.
Back at the roadblock, frantic efforts to push back the enemy failed. At 1630 hours, Major General Keiser relayed a message for help to IX Corps "Serious roadblock to South. Estimate enemy battalion or more. Air strikes, artillery and infantry company attacks have failed. Road jammed with vehicles prevents movement North or South. Request immediate assistance from the south to relieve situation. Please notify action taken as all infantry elements definitely engaged."
Ten minutes later at 1640 hours, the commanding officer of the 38th Infantry reported his right battalion under attack by the Chinese from the north, northeast, east and south with the Turks unable to hold on his right. At 1655, the 23d Infantry relayed a message to Division headquarters indicating the entire 38th Infantry under attack from the north and northeast and the 3d ROK also under attack. The Turks were giving ground to the east and south. A few minutes passed and the situation in the 38th sector became critical. The Third Battalion was surrounded and attempts were being made to establish a defense on the high ground east of the 38th CP.
The Turks reported at 1700 hours that their elements which had been withdrawing down the road were under attack and their escape route to Kunu-ri was blocked.
The roadblock in the south was still "in" and the enemy force grew stronger., The 23rd and 38th Regiments holding below Kunu-ri were ordered to pull back. The 23rd was to pull back first except for one company which was to guard the bridge over the Kaechon River which flowed just south of Kunu-ri and over which the 38th was required to move.
The Third Battalion of the 23rd barely escaped annihilation as a burning ammunition truck blocked its escape and forced the remnants to move out by foot, leaving the vehicles behind.
The 23rd completed its withdrawal by 0130 hours except for the company guarding the bridge. However, the remnants of the Second and Third Battalions of the 38th had not reached the 38th perimeter held by the First Battalion and the 3rd ROK Regiment so Colonel Peploc, the regimental commander, waited until 0430 when all that was left of the two I Corps. battalions had reached safety and the withdrawal was completed.
Neither of the two regiments would have been able to make their moves had it not been for the exceptionally artillery support on all likely positions and routes the enemy could be using.
The 3rd ROK Regiment was reported not in position after the two regiments had withdrawn. As it was the only organized force of any strength left in the 38th Regiment, its absence caused great consternation for it was to occupy positions south of the Kaechon on the right of the 23rd and as dawn broke there were no friendly troops on the 23rd's right flank. Immediately the remnants of the Second and Third Battalions of the 38th were assembled and prepared to occupy positions on the 23rd's right. South of the mounting confusion, all efforts to break the roadblock met with failure. A crisis faced the 2d Division for annihilation was certain if it stayed in Kunu-ri and the only escape route in its sector was blocked. A request went out to IX Corps for permission to take the Division out of the trap by way of the Kunu-ri Anju-Sinanju Road, still open and offering an escape through the I Corps sector. IX Corps stated it would have to clear the request through I Corps. In the meantime, the shocked and tattered remnants of the 9th Infantry, less the First Battalion, were thrown against the roadblock. The Second and Third Battalions were down to ap-xxx
In the meantime, the shocked and tattered throughout the night together with the 2d Recon, elements of the 72d Tank Battalion and the remains of the 2d Engineers.
During the night of 29-30 November an attack on the 2d Division command post was repulsed.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to First Lieutenant Chew-Mon Lee, Infantry, a member of Company H. 9th Infantry, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Kunu-ri on 30 November 1950. On 30 November 195 fl, Company H was defensively deployed near Kunu-ri when a numerically superior enemy force succeeded in completely surrounding the company and subjecting it to intense small arms, machine-gun and automatic-weapons fire. During the initial phase of this action the company suffered heavy casualties and the company commander was killed. Lieutenant LEE, a platoon leader, immediately assumed command of the company and, with complete disregard for the intense enemy fire, deployed the company in a tight defensive perimeter. Realizing that the loss of the company commander had tended to panic the men, Lieutenant LEE moved from one position to another, encouraging his men and steadying those who were confused and bewildered by the heavy casualties suffered and the intensity of the enemy attack. When accurate sniper fire from a hill about 150 yards d istant began harassing his men, Lieutenant LEE and a small grou p of volunteers attacked the hill and cleared it of enemy opposition. After establishing a small outpost on the hill, he dispatched a messenger through the enemy lines in an attempt to obtain reinforcements. Under his capable leadership the men repulsed several fanatical enemy attack until a friendly tank force broke through to their position. As it became apparent that the tank crews could not identify the friendly forces, Lieutenant LEE attracted the attention of the lead tank crew, then mounted on top of the tank and, headless of the enemy fire, directed return fire on the hostile positions with such accuracy that all enemy reasistance was eliminated ."
The situation was desperate by daylight of the 30th with the pressure increasing on all sides. Conflicting reports filtered in regarding the CANARY-Sinanju road as a possible route of withdrawal.
A final decision w as necessary and the commanding general ordered the Division, less the 23d RCT which was directed to cover the withdrawal, to be ready to move south to Sunchon. The 38th was ordered to go out on trucks or whatever vehicles were remaining.
The haggard remains of the entire Division, except the 23d RCT, were
fighting near the area of the Division command post or already attacking
the roadblock by noon on 30 November, awaiting orders to move out.
Reports from the south indicated the enemy had entrenched at least
a regimental combat team astride the route the Division was to travel.
From the north, the 23rd RCT (23d Inf; "A" Co, 72d Bn; 15th FA Bn) reported
beating off attack after attack of Chinese.
By 1300, heavy sniper fire began to fall into the Division assembly area. At 1330, with the only alternatives being to fight out of the trap or make a vain, last-man stand, the Division was ordered to move out and run the roadblock.
The 2d Engineer Combat Battalion supported by "A" Battery, 503d FA Battalion was fighting on the high ground southwest and south of the assembly area while the units moved onto the road. The lead vehicles had moved less than a mile when heavy enemy fire was received from both sides of the road. It was the start of the most agonizing withdrawal the 2d Infantry Division had ever undergone.
The column creeped along as dusk approached. From every side poured mortar, small arms and automatic weapons fire. Men riding in the few remaining trucks fired their rifles into the hills swarming with Chinese. Countless times burning and disabled vehicles slopped the column until they could be pushed off to the side. The bitter sub-zero cold took its toll of the wounded and the well alike. Tanks, interspersed through the column, knocked out enemy strong points along the flaming, twisting, jam-packed road. Every truck and every jeep crawled with men who had no other means of transportation. The ridges paralleling the road were completely in enemy control and from every angle the Chinese poured fire into the slowly crawling line of vehicles and humanity.
Exploding ammunition trucks effectively blocked the road in several places, forcing the column to halt where the Chinese had set-up machine gun crossfires. The lead elements emerged from the trap after 8,000 meters of heavy fighting but the rear vehicles, bumper to bumper, were subject to continuous fire.
Night and the darkness brought the Chinese close-in with bayonets, small arms and hand grenades. Hand to hand fighting broke out all along the road. The field artillery units were firing point blank off the road into the swarming Reds and every man who could fire a weapon did so until his ammunition was exhausted. The dead toppled off the trucks, the wounded hung on or were held on. The number of vehicles pushed off to the side of the road grew larger The truck loads of wounded endured additional wounds from the close-in fighting. Hundreds who had no transport and who were able to walk, took to the hills in attempts to evade the enemy and make their way to safety. Some were successful, many were not.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Lieutenant Colonel James H. Skeldon, Infantry, Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry, for action aganist the enemy in the vicinity of Sunchon and Kaechon on 29 and 30 November 1950. The 2nd Battalion was under heavy enemy attack and the allied units on the right and left flank had withdrawn. After committing his reserve company and exploiting all available means to stem the enemy attack, Colonel SKELDON ordered the withdrawal of his companies west to the next ridge. Displaying the highest degree of leadership and with complete disregard for personal safety, he personally controlled this operation from the most advantageous positions, although continuously exposed to enemy small-arms and mortar fire. Not satisfied that all his men and equipment had been removed, Colonel SKELDON recrossed a large open area which was being swept by heavy enemy fire and returned to his old command post where he made a personal reconnaissance of the area. He then moved to a nearby battalion command post and assisted another battalion commander in the withdrawal of his troops and tanks. During this move he was painfully wounded in the left shoulder, but refused evacuation. Colonel SKELDON soon discovered that elements of the 38th Infantry and allied troops had been surrounded, also that the road was jammed with vehicles and most of the troops and drivers were located in a ditch along the road. Taking command of the situation, and under the cover of approaching darkness, he ordered the men to high ground along the south side of the road, where he supervised their deployment to assure maximum effectiveness~of their fire power. Later upon regimental order he personally led these men from their encirclement to the regimental perimeter. On 30 November the battalion was ordered to attack and clear a strong enemy roadblock which had halted movement of the 2d Division and other allied units. He personally led this attack and continued to expose himself to intense enemy fire so that he could best control his battalion which was encountering stiff and determined resistance. When the 2nd Battalion was ordered to break through the roadblock and link up with allied units near Sunchon, Colonel SKELDONsuccessfully spearheaded a motorized column that fought through the roadblock under intense enemy fire, thus opening the road for succeeding elements of the division."
While the nightmare of the withdrawal through the roadblock was taking place, the 23d Infantry with the attached tankers from "A" Company of the 72d and artillerymen from the 15th Field were standing alone to stem the tide of Chinese and keep them from overtaking the withdrawing Division. Gradually the units of the RCT assembled into a large bowl to the south of Kunu-ri, fighting the enemy on three sides. With the Air Force bombing, rocketing and strafing the ridges and the artillery firing its last ammo at the highest possible rate of fire, it was possible for the 23d to maintain its effectiveness and control. One time the enemy succeeded in penetrating between the disengaging infantry and the assembly area but was beaten off as the tanks moved onto the high ground and across the bottom of the bowl and poured a curtain of fire into the enemy as he attempted to expand his penetration.
The rear-guard units still had the prospect of running the roadblock ahead of them for they, too, were to use the CANARY-Sunchon exit route. However, as the time approached for the force to move out, a plane circled the assembling vehicles and dropped a message authorizing the use of the CANARY-Sinan ju road and ordering immediate departure.
With remarkable orderliness and precision the columns of trucks were channeled onto the road w ith the RCT commander, Col. Paul L. Freeman, personally directing the flow of units. The tanks were ordered to bring up the rear and as they ground their way up the banks and onto the road bringing up the tail of the column, the Chinese could be seen appearing over the ridges on the opposite side of the area.
The 23d RCT had relatively easy going as it withdrew down the coastal route for the enemy had not yet cut the road. But on both sides, the Air Force kept a protective watch, bombing the ridgelines and firing the forests to provide light and cover for the rear guard.
No story of the withdrawal from Kunu-ri will ever be complete. Records of many of the units were either lost or not kept at all. Many of the men who could tell the story have not returned. There were countless instances of in dividual and unit heroism which will forever go unrecognized but without which many thousands more lives would been lost. No one single unit should be singled out for to do so would be an injustice to the others but special mention must be made of the elements of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion and "A" Battery, 503d who held the hills near the Division CP while other units moved out. Not a man escaped from the northernmost of the two hills. The men of "A" Battery fired their massive 155 guns point blank at the onrushing enemy until they were completely overwhelmed. They stayed to the death so that others might escape.
No account of the withdrawal could ever tell of the suffering endured by the heroic men of the Division. The wounded suffered ten fold. Only those who were there can know of the cold, the hunger, the unutterable misery and heartsickness of defeat.
The losses in men were tragic; the losses in equipment disasterous. More than 5,000 casualties were suffered by the Division in November with 95 per cent of that total inflicted in the last five days of the month. Equipment losses ran from the 95 per cent suffered by the 2d Engineers to lesser rates by other units. Artillery units were particularly hard hit with entire battalions losing all their field pieces and the big majority of their vehicles.
The 2d Division had met the full impact of an overwhelming Chinese force. Although it was battered and forced to fight its way out of a trap it successfully slowed an attack which threatened to destroy the entire Eighth Army. If it had not made the magnificant stand which it did, the lives of tens of thousands of other troops would have been in jeopardy. Even in defeat, the "Indianhead" Division proved to be a rock which held fast, giving other units an opportunity for survival.
Gradually the battered ranks of the 2d Division moved southward, out of contact with the enemy and destined for a period of rest, reorganization and resupply. It's basic organization was intact, and from the remnants of the riddled columns was to emerge an outfit which would make the CCF pay twentyfold for its victory; a Division which was destined to be described as "the most perfect fighting organization in the world", "Second to None".
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