May Massacre

TERRAIN SKETCH

The battle scene was dominated by a long, massive ridge line running generally southwest and northwest. This ridge forms the Eastern rim of the CHUNCHON BASIN. Its towering main peak, KARI-SAN, from a height of 1051 meters looks down on the two road nets which bound it and other hill masses that were of lesser heights. The steep slopes were covered with heavy timber, and undergrowth, and the ridges were barren rock. Both roads were of great importance and they were to be the victor's prize. The enemy controlled one, the CHUNCHON-YANGGU road, while the one running between HONGCHON and HANGYE, lay in our hands. These roads were first class routes, wide, hard surface of earth and gravel, and capable of moving military equipment. Thus, the battle swirled around the heights dominating these routes. To the east, the lonely spire, known as HILL 683, also assumed a great importance. It overlooked, and thus controlled, the two lateral roads converging on PUNGAM-NI. The village and road junction of HANG-YE assumed importance as the apex to the defensive line which finally held the attack, and from which the successful counter-offensive was launched. From this point the lines sloped to the southeast and south-west. The defensive positions to the east had a narrow, rutted dirt road as a lateral means of supply and evacuation. This road ran east from SONGSAN-NI to PUNGAM-NI. Here again the narrow twisting valleys served as the means of advance and supply to the final defensive positions.

The armies of Communist China were far from defeated when they backed-off in the final days of April from the bent, but still-solid defensive lines. of the United Nations forces in the west. Turning away from battle, the endless columns of brown-clad soldiers dog-trotted through the mountains to the north. little knowing where they were headed but thankful to be out of range once more of the crashing of massed artillery. Thousands of their dead lay behind them. concealed in hastily-dug graves scraped out of the slowly warming hillsides of central and west Korea. Two massive enemy groups, the 20th and 27th Armies of the IX CCF Army Group, shifted east-ward from their positions west of Chunchon in the early days of May. Moving like a muddy tide under cover of cloudy skies, three more battered but powerful armies, the 12th, 15th and 60th of the III CCF Army Group, flowed northward from their positions above Seoul. As they flooded into the newly captured country south of Chorwon, their leaders turned them eastward and south once more. Jogging back to battle through the mountains, the weary but obedient soldier could see dusty clouds rising from the highways snaking through the valleys below as trucks of supplies moved forward with him.Political leaders told of great new victories ahead. Warnings to conserve the newly issued rations -- dried corn, fried flour cakes, kaoliang and rice -- were accompanied by stories of great fleets of planes and masses of tanks which would support the forthcoming drive. The great Second Impulse of the Fifth Phase Offensive was soon to begin, the men from the plains of China learned. The old enemy, the US 2d Division, would be destroyed and the ROK Army units on both sides would crumble and the route to the south would be open. The long-promised victory was soon to be realized.

And along the strangely quiet battle front, Eighth Army intelligence Officers pondered the lull and speculated on the sudden disappearance of the still-powerful Chinese masses. Air observers over the front tried to pierce the foggy blanket screening the movements they knew must be taking place below. Occasional glimpses told of many vehicles and troops moving away from the former battle area but then came word of the heavy movement to the east instead of continued movement north.

Destroyed bridges across rivers opposite the X Corps front were being repaired, friendly agents reported. Smoke pots were being fired day and night to produce the screening smoke which kept away the planes of the United Nations. Here and there a prisoner was captured and questioning confirmed the southeastward movement. A communist medical officer. captured far in the west near Seoul. confessed that the 2d US Division, which had disrupted so many former CCF plans, was to be destroyed and the ROK Divisions to the east were to be swept aside in the new offensive.

Each day produced more evidence that the X Corps and the Indianhead Division were the final goal for envelopment by the human rivers which curled east and south through the rugged hills.

And in the sector of the 2d Division, feverish preparations were underway to place the Division in positions from which it could absorb any attack. Two new artillery units, the 96th and 196th FA Battalions, were put in general support of the Division.

Operation plans based on every conceivable type of emergency were drawn-up and distributed throughout the Division.

A special Roger Line was established by the 2d Division 4,000 yards forward of the constantly improving Noname Line, and from it the 38th Infantry sent patrols which met little resistance from enemy groups who seemed prone to turn and flee at the approach of the friendly force.

In a further effect to seek out the enemy, General Ruffner sent the 9th Infantry, less the Third Battalion which was in Division Reserve, to attack forward of the Roger Line. Moving northwestward against no opposition while a force from the 1st Marine Division advanced to the west, the 9th seized and occupied Hill 899, only five miles from Chunchon from which all movement in the town and on the surrounding plain was normally visible. However, the maddening haze reduced visibility and no significant sightings were made.

With the 9th Infantry ( - ) forward of the Roger Line, the Second Battalion of the 38th, which had occupied the Roger Line, withdrew to positions behind the Noname Line and became part of the Division Reserve.

Task Force Zebra, blocking on the northeastern sector of the Noname Line. sent its tanks on patrol far as Ungnam-ni without enemy contact.

Harried intelligence officers at every level of command struggled to piece together the puzzle which faced them. Patrols were sent out and each day met increasingly heavy resistance but each, in turn, confirmed the presence of Chinese troops where before had been only passively defensive North Koreans.

Night photographic reconnaissance planes crossing the X Corps front, flew low over enemy lines and hurried back with their films. The story they revealed was one of heavy traffic where little or none had been before. hastily concealed supply dumps, and the mounting concentrations of Chinese soldiers.

One of these concentrations reported by air observers was in hilly terrain east of Chunchon and as a threat to the forward bases of the 2d Division, was brought under heavy artillery fire and air strikes. "A" Company of the 9th Infantry attacked the enemy-held ridge position on 10 May but an estimated 150 Chinese, deeply entrenched and employing streams of automatic weapons fire forced the company to disengage and return to its base. Another enemy force of 300 was discovered by a patrol in bunkered positions on the hill mass east of Chunchon and near the important East-West lateral road. "G" Company attempted to force an enemy with drawl but, again, fanatic resistance foiled their efforts. And as "G" Company broke contact, it came under long-range fire from another source, a new enemy group on an adjacent hill mass.

By the morning of 11 May, an entire enemy battalion was entrenched on the high ground south of the Soyang River, dominating the north south road leading through Anhyon-ni and denying its use to friendly forces.

The 9th Infantry continued to send out power patrols and in an effort to seize hill 699, an important terrain feature in the hill mass southeast of Chunchon, "E", "F" and "B" Companies were sent forward. "E" and "F" were to attack from the west while "B" moved up from the south. The attack progressed slowly against fierce resistance and, finally, with "E", the closest company, still 1,500 meters from the crest by late afternoon the Division commander ordered the attacking force to return to its base. That night a terrific artillery concentration was laid on the hill and all approaches and in the morning patrols from "G" Company went forward and reported the enemy still on the hill but not in such force as before.

Prisoners taken on 13 May confirmed the Chinese buildup in the Chunchon area.

Patrols from the 38th Infantry made only light contact on the 13th. The regiment, itself, was strengthened by the return of the Second Battalion, released from Division Reserve, and "F" Company, detached from Task Force Zebra.

Task Force Zebra received two added units on the 13th the 3rd Bn, 36th ROK Regiment and the 2d Bn, 23rd Infantry. The ROK unit relieved the Ivanhoe Security Force which went into blocking positions between Task Force Zebra and the 38th Infantry on the Noname Line. Meanwhile, the 9th Infantry pulled its advance patrol base south of the Roger Line.

The Division front on the night of 13 May was manned, from left to right, by the 9th Infantry, 38th Infantry and Task Force Zebra. The 23rd Infantry designated as Corps Reserve, had its French Battalion at Hangye as Division Reserve, prepared to counter-attack anywhere in the Division sector The Second Battalion was with Task Force Zebra, having relieved the French Battalion on 12 May.

Patrols continued throughout the 14th with stiff resistance encountered in the vicinity of Hill 699. Air observers, late in the afternoon of the 14th, reported masses of enemy troops moving southeastward along a trail between Naepyongni and Sapkyo-ri, headed for the 2d Division positions. Immediately the entire 503d FA Battalion, two batteries of the 196th and one battery of the 38th FA Battalion were shifted to cover the area and opened fire with heavy concentrations.

New enemy sightings reported by air observers on the 15th were further confirmation of a Chinese buildup south of Yanggu and large movements through Yuchon-ni, along the south shore of the Hwachon reservoir.

All units were again cautioned that, in event of attack, they were to hold positions at all costs during the hours of darkness. Warnings were issued that any movement during darkness would be considered hostile unless the moving unit were properly identified and front line units had received prior notice of the move.

As every indication pointed to an imminent mass attack, the Division readied itself to meet the onslaught. Division artillery continued to pound the valleys and draws suspected to be assembly points. Tanks from the regimental tank companies and the 72d Tank Battalion were located so they could be employed in indirect fire missions as well as direct. These, together with the other available supporting weapons, brought to 300 the total of artillery pieces which could be brought to bear on the 2d Division front. Ammunition was stockpiled and every precaution was taken to insure a continuous supply of artillery ammunition.

The night of 15-16 May, the Communists launched their preliminary attack against the 5th and 7th ROK Divisions on the 2d Division's right flank. An enemy force, trying to infiltrate between Task Force Zebra and the 38th Regiment, walked directly into the blocking positions of the Ivanhoe Security Force. And, although the determined Chinese pressed their attack until daylight, they were forced to withdraw and were observed moving into the village of Hachon which was immediately subjected to a heavy artillery concentration.

The attack in the ROK sector was launched at 0300 hours on the 16th and continued throughout the day. By 1800 hours, the entire ROK front was under heavy attack and all units were forced from their positions. Withdrawing south of the Inje-Hongchon road, the ROK's laid bare the entire east flank of the 2d Division.

And as this threat developed, contact patrols from the 38th Infantry and Task Force Zebra, reaching out after beating off attacks of the previous night, quickly encountered enemy groups, withdrew and called for artillery to breakup the concentrations they had discovered.

As dusk approached, the tempo of battle sharpened as reports from across the front revealed increasingly numerous heavy clashes and focused attention on the worsening situation to the east where ROK units were falling back.

By nightfall it was apparent the long-expected offensive had begun. Later intelligence reports revealed the full extent of the assault. Four Chinese Armies rolled forward in the 2d Division zone. The 12th aimed to penetrate the ROK positions on the right then turn in behind the Indianhead Division and envelop the right flank. The 15th Chinese Army was to make the frontal assault then split and move onto the flanks while the 60th CCF Army passed through in a column of divisions in a thundering assault designed to hammer the lines against the enveloping 12th Army. The 27th Army was to follow up in the area north of Pungam-ni in conjunction with the 12th. In all, twelve full. strength divisions came screaming out of the night in the initial moves to annihilate the 2d Division. In immediate contact were the 31st, 34th, 35th, 44th, 45th, 181st, 80th, and 81st Divisions. Subsequently, dead from the 29th, 179th, 180th, and 79th were identified in front of the 2d Division lines.

The 38th Infantry stemmed repeated attacks early in the night with the Second Battalion coming under the brunt of the enemy effort together with "A" Company which clung to its positions atop Hill 1051, a main anchor on the Noname Line. Through the darkness, the confident enemy masses broke their endless columns against the positions of the 38th with "E" and "G" Companies fighting to hold their positions. Artillery, crashing into the ground forward of the lines, took a terrific toll of the attackers while other hundreds died in the mine-fields checkered with barbed wire. The groans of the wounded, screams of the attackers and the blast of bugles mingled with the clattering roar of battle as waves of Chinese pushed against the lines.

The Noname Line was secure at 0100 hours on 17 May but was afire throughout the zone of the 38th and Task Force Zebra. The Third Battalion of the 36th ROK Regiment, part of Task Force Zebra, fell back, but hastily organized provisional companies composed of headquarters and engineer troops were thrown into the breech and kept the line intact. Searchlights were turned on to illuminate the battle area and aid the defenders in locating and slaughtering the onrushing Chinese.

By 0230 hours, 17 May, bloody, reckless attacks by the Chinese had overwhelmed the positions of "E" Company of the 38th Infantry and the entire Second Battalion was under extreme pressure and was ordered to pull back. Word was sent to the 9th, also heavily engaged but holding in the face of slightly less-furious attacks on the left, that the withdrawal of the 38th was a planned one and not a cause for undue alarm.

Daylight revealed continued raging battle, the Chinese absorbing staggering losses from rolling barrages of artillery and the coordinated fire of the defenders. The situation was serious in the 38th sector with "A" Company clinging to the crest of Hill 1051 while on all sides the Chinese pressed upward. The French, ordered out of Division Reserve, were sent forward into the 38th area to attempt to close the gap which opened with the withdrawal of the 2d Battalion. Fighting forward, the French made contact with Chinese troops within 3,000 yards of the MSR and immediately pitched in to stop their advance. Up on Hill 1051, "A" Company was finally overcome, blanketed in swarms of Chinese who stormed the surrounded company until there was no hope of the company holding any longer.

"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Sergeant First Class Dellno Home, Infantry, a member of Company a, 38th Infantry Regiment, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Panmegi-ri on 18 May 1951. On 8 May 1951, Company A was deployed in defensive positions near Panmegi-ri when a numerically superior enemy launched an attack against the company positions. As Sergeant HORNE was about to launch a counter-attack with eight men against a high hill held by the enemy, his weapon was shot from his hands. Undaunted though unarmed, Sergeant HORNE gallantly led his men in a daring frontal assault on the hill. His fierce attack took the enemy completely by surprise and they were forced to flee, thereby enabling Company A to establish more favorable positions. A short while later three members of the company were observed to be surrounded by enemy troops on a nearby hill. Sergeant HORNE, with a machine gun that he had acquired, rushed to the assistance of the beleaguered men. Although fully exposed to intense enemy small-arms and automatic-weapons fire, he calmly delivered a steady stream of fire on the enemy, thereby drawing attention from the surrounded men and enabling them to break through the encirclement and rejoin the company."

As Hill 1051 fell, Division artillery, anticipating such a loss, shifted their guns and immediately began pounding the crest. But below, the thick crowds of dusty, determined Chinese flooded through the gap in the line, jogging over the bodies of the hundreds of dead, cut down by the murderous artillery fire.

At 1130 hours, the Corps commander granted an earlier request from Division and released the 23rd Infantry (-1st Bn) from reserve. Immediately it began moving forward into an assembly area two miles north of Hangye on the MSR. Col. Chiles, commander of the 23rd RCT, assumed command of the Task Force Zebra and dispatched his Third Battalion into the east sector of the zone and the French Battalion was ordered to continue to attack to secure the west sector. Assembling on a trail west of Hangye were the First Battalion, 23d Tank Company, Heavy Mortar Company and the Medical Company.

All day the battle raged with increasing pressure on the right flank as the ROK's rattled to the rear leaving a yawning gap in the Army line exposing the 2d Division. Intercepted CCF radio messages indicated every Chinese unit was being directed into the gap near Hill 1051. It became imperative that the gap be plugged or sealed off and General Ruffner ordered the Dutch Battalion to prepare for an attack to close the dangerous hole.

The General, anxious to see the attack by the Dutch first hand, took off in his helicopter and headed for the area. Just prior to 1500, the copter's motor failed and the frail craft plunged earthward, crashing in a rocky crag. By some miracle both General Ruffner and his pilot escaped unhurt except for bruises although the craft was completely demolished. The General's first question was of the progress of the attack. Assured that it had jumped-off at 1515, he returned to his forward command post to continue directing the magnificent stand of his Division.

"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Major General Clark L. Ruffner, United States Army, Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Hangyi and Umyang-ni during the period 16 through 24 May 1951. On 6 May, after an ominous build-up of strength, the Chinese Communist Forces launched a massive offensive against the 2d Infantry Division and two Republic of Korea divisions of the United States X Corps with a force of an estimated 96,000 troops. Although the attack was expected and enormous casualties were inflicted on the enemy, the situation became critical on 18 May when the Republic of Korea forces, overrun by a numerically preponderant enemy force, collapsed and exposed the right flank of the 2d Infantry Division. At this juncture, General RUFFNER personally visited the most forward positions to rally his troops and reorganize the defense of a new line. Through his coolness, efficiency and indifference to danger, he assisted in extricating several units which had been cut off, narrowly escaping death on one occasion when the helicopter in which he was was riding crashed on a mountain peak within sight of the enemy. On 20 and 21 May, General RUFFNER moved his division in a difficult lateral maneuver across the battle front, then personally led a counter-attack against the enemy. As a result of this brilliantly executed counter-attack the hostile forces were routed.after suffering losses 30 times as great as those sustained by the 2d Division. On 24 May, General RUFFNER organized and led a special task force to seize and secure a bridgehead across the Soyang River and sever enemy escape routes to the north. When the troops were stopped by enemy mortar fire, General RUFFNER with complete disregard for his personal safety, drove his jeep near the head of the tank-infantry column over a road that had not been swept for mines and through the area of the hostile mortar fret. This fearless action so inspired the officers and men of the task force that they mounted their vehicles and immediately resumed the advance. By his brave and daring leadership, the objective was secured in minimum time, thus putting a force 12 miles deep into the territory held by the enemy force and severing two of its main avenues of escape to the north."

All limits on artillery ammunition were lifted on the 17th by General Van Fleet as the entire Eighth Army watched the defense put up by the 2d Division against overwhelming odds. More than 137,000 Chinese and 38,000 North Korean troops were being hurled against the front manned by the Indianhead Division and the ROK Divisions on the right. On their success depended the course of the war for it was an all-out effort on the part of the Communists to smash and destroy the 2d Division, thrust through the ROK's and outflank the entire 8th Army line. The ROK's had already fallen back, but the 2d Division holding the shoulder of the penetration was resisting every effort to be thrown back. Already the 3rd US Division, which had been in Army Reserve, was preparing to move into the gap caused by the collapse of the ROK's. It remained for the 2d Division to cling to its ground and await the commitment of the 3rd and the entire situation would be greatly improved.

The 2d Division was doing its job. Fighting coolly, professionally, it lashed at every Chinese column, turning them back at the line with bloody casualties; piling up the dead in front of its positions and refusing to yield in face of tremendous odds. The only serious break in the line was being sealed up with artillery fire as more than 30,000 rounds had been fired in the first 24 hours of the attack. But even this was not enough, the hordes of enemy continued to stream through, overcoming every effort the Dutch could muster to stem the tide.

At 1633 hours the First Battalion of the 23rd was released from Corps reserve and now the entire 23rd was available to its commander. Immediately he shifted more weight to his right, which was also the east flank of the Division, where every effort by the communists to blast behind the Noname positions was beaten off. As nightfall approached, Division artillery reported every available piece firing into the gap in the lines while, overhead, B-26 bombers unleashed tons of bombs to reinforce the rain of death clearing missiles which poured onto the masses of troops streaming through the break.
The Third Battalion of the 9th Infantry was alerted the evening of the 17th to prepare for commitment in the sector of the 38th. The First Battalion of the 23rd, still at Hangye, readied itself for a counter-attack. The 38th fought to hold the shoulders of the gap and continued to inflict maximum casualties on the hordes which poured through below.

By early morning of 18 May, the situation in the sector of the 38th Infantry had become critical with many of the units fighting Chinese on all sides. The First Battalion of the 38th was in particularly dangerous shape with the main enemy penetration between "A" and "B" companies. It was evident that help would have to be provided, so, at first light the Second Battalion of the 9th shifted eastward behind the 38th and attacked northeastward while the Third Battalion of the 9th launched a drive to the north. The purpose was to seal off the enemy who had succeeded in bursting through the lines.

..........MISTAKE.........Page 133 missing and will be added.

The maneuver enabled the 9th to establish a line of blocking positions behind the embattled 38th. "G" Company of the 38th was utilized to hold the center of the line which, when secure, permitted the Division Commander to place the sector of the 38th under control of the 9th Infantry.

By 1030 hours, 18 May, communications were re-established with the First and Second Battalion of the 38th and arrangements were made to air-drop urgently needed supplies to the units that had been cut off. Both battalions had suffered heavy casualties and were extremely short of ammunition and rations.

The eastward shift of the 9th Infantry was made possible by a boundary charge which brought the 1st Marine Regiment into the sector formerly occupied by the 9th. When the Marines closed into the area, the First Battalion of the 9th moved out and went into blocking positions between the already emplaced Second and Third Battalions. This formed a strong defensive line anchored on Hill 442. Instructions went out to the First and Netherlands Battalions of the 38th to break contact and withdraw southward. The Second and Third Battalions were also ordered to break contact and pull back through the newly established positions of the 9th Infantry.

Meanwhile, the 23rd was under attack all along its front with particular pressure on the right flank against "I" Company. An enemy roadblock had been set-up at Yongnae-re by infiltrators and another enemy force had succeeded in infiltrating to Tappung-ni, threatening the entire Division right flank. Aware of the danger this posed, General Ruffner requested permission to modify the right flank of the Noname Line so the 23rd could deny its flank to the enemy who had streamed through the abandoned ROK positions. Corps granted the request and orders went out to Col. Chiles to commence the readjustment.

It was a difficult maneuver for the enemy was established and growing stronger in positions between the 23d's location and the new defensive line hinged below Hangye. Nevertheless, the regiment began immediate movement, the Second Battalion started south along the high ground on the west of the MSR and the Third Battalion along the east. "K" Company. six platoons from "B" and "C" Companies, 72d, and the wheeled vehicles of the regiment moved down the road. The enemy made every effort to stop the maneuver and succeeded in knocking out two tanks near Yongnae-ri, blocking the road for wheeled vehicles. Enemy mortars began shelling the column immediately, disabling a many of these vehicles. The tanks pulled off the road, established a 2,000 yard fire line and took the roadblock under fire. The Second Battalion joined by the men from the stalled wheel column crossed the road and joined the Third Battalion on the east. The battered group then fought a wide sweeping action, circled the roadblock while the tanks occupied the enemy and by 2200 hours had succeeded in withdrawing to their new defensive area. The tanks, after providing covering fire for the foot troops, continued south down the river bed and cleared the trap.

The Second and Third Battalions of the 23rd were joined by the First at Hangye and immediately the regiment set up its new defensive line with the Third Battalion on the left of the road, tied in with the 9th Infantry, and the First and Second Battalions on the right. The French went into blocking positions on the MSR and by midnight the line was secure, the adjustment complete and the enemy thwarted in his efforts to outflank the Division.

About that same time, the Division received word that the 3rd Division was going into positions to the east with the 15th RCT moving up through Pungam-ni.

As there was no reserve available to the 23rd, the Division commander attached the strongest company remaining in the Second Battalion of the 38th to the 23rd as reserve. It was "E" Company, then composed of one officer and 94 enlisted men. The enemy hurled fresh waves of troops at the modified Noname line shortly after midnight on 19 May. The fire of battle raged for 90 minutes with the Third Battalions of both the 9th and 38th bearing the brunt of the assault. Five battalions of artillery kept a stream of high explosive shells in the air, cutting down the attackers as they Hung themselves against the barbed wire, mines and rain of fire poured on by the men of the 2d Division. In one eight minute period, more then 2,000 rounds of artillery were fired in front of one company alone, "K" Company, 38th Infantry.

This suicide attempt to breach the Indianhead positions failed. Although the troops didn't know it at the time, it was the last major attack against that section of the line. The line the men now held was never to be penetrated in force.

Eastward, the 23rd Infantry with "B" Company, 72d, in support, was battling equally as well, blunting repeated attacks against its new position. ROK troops jammed the MSR and hindered resupply efforts, but with the aid of superb air and artillery support the attacks were thrown back and by 1200 the weary troops realized the latest assault was defeated.

Late in the afternoon of 19 May, the pressure eased considerably all along the front. With the Marines firmly entrenched on the left and the 15th RCT moving up on the right, the Division began shifting its line eastward. The 9th Infantry pulled out of line, the gap filled as the Marines extended right and the First Battalion of the 23rd extended left. The Manchu regiment crossed over behind the 23rd and moved into positions on its right, tying-in with the 15th RCT. The 38th Infantry (minus the Netherlands Battalion now serving as reserve for the 23rd in place of "E" Company, 38th) withdrew and went into Corps reserve at Chudong-ni. The Division CP displaced to Yudong-ni to be in a position to control action better in the new sector.

The crisis appeared to have been passed. The thinned but powerful ranks of the 2d Division steadied in their positions. The artillery, which had displaced eastward to maintain positions from which it could continue its support, kept up the terrific rate of firing. It reported an expenditure of more than 44,000 rounds in the previous 24 hour period, a major contributing factor in the successful defense.

The Chinese kept pressure across the front during the night of 19-20 May but it was not nearly as intense as it had been previously. However, the First Battalion of the 9th came under platoon size attack about 0300 hours with the enemy force increasing in power as daylight drew near. While this action took place, the First and Third Battalions of the 23rd gained the high ground overlooking the Naechon River where they could observe large bodies of enemy troops concentrating and moving out to attack. Calling on the ever-ready artillery, the forward observers witnessed such accurate artillery fire that for the first time in the Korean war major forces moving out on the attack were disorganized and repulsed before reaching the lines. Follow-up fire forced the enemy to retreat in disorder before firing a shot at the ground troops.

And while the 23rd watched the butchery of the Chinese in the Naechon Valley, the First Battalion of the 9th was pitched in combat with the force which had attacked it earlier and which had now grown to battalion size. Again the artillery was called upon for fire support and by 1500 hours the combined efforts of the infantry and artillery had repulsed the attackers. The disorderly retreat was turned into a rout as the heroic defenders rose from their holes, moving forward in pursuit as the controlled fire from the big guns in the rear preceded them. The vicious counter-attack continued until dark when, after inflicting tremendous casualties on the enemy, the First Battalion returned to its defense line for the night.

By nightfall both the 9th and 23rd were secure on their line. The 15th RCT, now a part of the 2d Division, was attacking north of Pungamni, digging the enemy troops from their entrenchments on the Division right flank. The resupplied, reorganized Third Battalion of the 38th, meanwhile, moved up from the south and went into reserve positions south of Pungamni where it also served to block any possible wide enveloping movement the enemy might try to launch.

General Ruffner sent a "Well done" to the artillery for its tremendous support of the line troops. To Colonel Thomas E. DeShazo, Division Artillery commander, the General dispatched his compliment, "A magnificent job."

As the Division dug-in for the night, X Corps notified the commanding general that it planned to commit the 187th Airborne RCT in the Division zone on the following day and that plans were being made for a massive counterattack to rock the stunned communist forces back from their gains.

May 21st was a highly successful day. All front-line units, their defenses secure, lashed out in limited attacks at the hesitant, bewildered enemy. "G" Company of the 23rd lead a Second Battalion attack to secure hill positions south of the Naechon. Fixing bayonets, it slashed to the top of the crest killing a counted 300 enemy dead. By nightfall it was secure. "L" Company of the 15th, spearheading to Hill 592 killed a counted 142 enemy in capturing the height. "G" Company of the 9th on patrol to seek out the enemy, repulsed a company-sized attack, killing 25 CCF soldiers in the process.

And while all units reported successes in their sectors, the 38th Infantry left Corps Reserve and moved north to Sokpyokkol on the Division right flank where it went into blocking positions. As it came onto line, its Third and Dutch battalions reverted to its control .

The enemy made an attempt to penetrate through the positions of the 23rd Infantry at 0200 hours on 22 May. But front line troops laid down their prearranged cross fires and the shells from four battalions of artillery crashed down from above, forcing the shattered attackers to pull back. Daylight patrols, ranging 1,000 yards forward, reported no contact.

Patrols also went out at daylight from the 9th Infantry sector and encountered little opposition. The time appeared ripe for the planned counterattack and all units inched forward, securing positions for the expected order to take the offensive.

A hastily-organized assault group, Task Force Yoke, commenced a limited northward drive to keep the enemy forces off-balance while the counter offensive was being racked up. Composed of the 2d Bn, 38th Inf; 72d Tk Bn ( - ); a platoon from the 38th Inf Tank Co; a battery of Division Field Artillery and a tactical air control party, the mobile force moved northwest from Pungam-ni toward Habae-jae.

To the west, along the familiar Hongchon-lnje road, the 187th A/B RCT passed northward through the lines of the 23rd picking up "B" Company of the 72d and securing the high ground around Hangye by nightfall thereby permitting the 23rd to fall back to an assembly area in the vicinity of Hongchon to prepare for its part in the coming counter-offensive.

And as Task Force Yoke and the 187th A/B RCT sent twin-pronged drives short distances northward, the 9th Infantry, operating between the two forces, jumped-off for two objectives Hill 592 and Tappung-ni, former roadblock area. With the First Battalion on the left and the Second Battalion on the right, the Hill was secure by nightfall and the regiment buttoned up for the hours of darkness. The Third Battalion, relieved in its former area, went into blocking positions between the First and Second Battalion. The 38th RCT relieved elements of the 3rd Division on line and established blocking positions north of Pungam-ni.The anticipated order for the counter-offensive was issued at 1900 hours on 22 May. To go into effect the following morning at 0800, it set the capture of Inje as its objective with the mission of cutting-off and slaughtering the 30,000 Chinese who still remained in front of the lines of the 2d Division. Task Force Yoke was dissolved, all its units returning to their parent organizations. The 15th RCT was detached from the 2d Division, reverting to its own 3rd Division where it would form the nucleus for a strong thrust to the east of that planned for the Indianhead Division. The 38th Infantry assumed responsibility for the sector formerly held by the 15th. The 187th A/B RCT was attached to the 2d Division for the pending operation.

The attack order set-up a three phased operation. The 187th RCT was to make the main thrust up the Hongchon Road toward Inje. The 38th supported by "B"' Company, 72d Tk Bn, was to advance northward on the road network paralleling the Inje road to the east. It's route would take it Northeast to Hyon-ni then Northwest to Inje. The 9th Infantry was to sweep the area between the two powerful armored fists until it had secured the high ground overlooking the Hongchon River.

The 2d Division front was comparatively quiet on the night preceding the offensive. The only enemy activity reported was a probing attack of about 50 enemy against the positions of "C" Company, 9th Infantry, which was quickly driven off.

At 0800 hours on 23 May, the 2d Division initiated its aggressive offensive, one of the most remarkable and spectacular of the war. For six days, the Division had fought a determined enemy, giving ground slowly while inflicting casualties estimated at 10,000 for each day of the Chinese offensive. Throughout the period, the Division had maintained its tactical unity and freedom of maneuver. Now it turned and drove against the desperately tired enemy who no longer had the numerical strength or supplies to continue the pressure. The heroic stand of the previous days and the sudden reversal of tactics embodied in the new offensive marked one of the most dramatic achievements of the Korean War.

The attack moved out on schedule against light resistance. Both the 9th and 38th Regiments secured their first-day objectives. The 187th A/B RCT, making the main thrust, battled stiff resistance as it advanced along poor roads, ringed with enemy-dominated peaks.

A bridgehead was secured on the Soyang River on the second day of the attack by a tank-tipped spearhead moving up the main axis. The mobile force was made up of the 2d Bn, 187th; "B" Co, 64th Tk Bn; "B" Co, 72d Tk Bn; "C" Battery, 674th FA Bn; and "A" Company, 127th Engineers. Consolidating its bridgehead, the force prepared a crossing while the 23d Infantry made ready to follow-up the gains by sweeping the same route from the south. Meanwhile, both the 9th and 38th met heavy resistance. The 9th, especially, had difficulty in dislodging a strong delaying force from three large hills which stretched across the route of advance. At one time the Second Battalion took the hill only to be pushed off. However, a counter-attack regained the height and by nightfall it was secure as artillery pounded the fleeing enemy. The First Battalion of the 38th had the heaviest resistance in the regimental sector but by night had secured its objectives.

The night of 24-25 May was quiet except for the ambush of a supply train belonging to the task force holding the bridgehead. Three battalions from the 23rd were ordered to clear the area and at 0710 the Second, Third and French Battalions commenced sweeping northward against heavy resistance which was methodically put-down. By 1500 hours they had contacted the bridgehead force. Both the 9th and 38th, meanwhile, continued battling forward during the day.

"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Private First Class Murray T. Manning, Jr., Infantry, a member of Company I, 9th Infantry Regiment, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Sogong-ni on 25 May 1951 On 25 May 1951, two squads of Company I had the mission of assaulting Hill 800 while the 137 remainder of the company furnished covering fire for the operation. Private MANNING, a member of one of the squads, was in the leading element of the assault when intense enemy fire temporarily halted the advance. With complete disregard for his personal safety, Private MANNING moved up the fire-swept slope until he could bring effective fire on the hostile element holding up the advance. When he had killed six enemy riflemen with accurate fire from his M-1 rifle, the assault was able to continue. Observing the automatic rifleman of his squad fall from exhaustion, Private MANNING rushed to the fallen man, pushed him to a safe position behind a rock, then picked up the automatic rifle and continued advancing up the hill. As the squads reached the hill top, the enemy launched a vicious counter-attack on the friendly forces, forcing them to withdraw. Heedless of the intense enemy fire, Private MANNING led the attack, moving relentlessly forward in the face of withering enemy fire. The aggressive actions of Private MANNING so inspired the men around him that they followed him to the crest of the hill, engaged the numerically superior enemy troops in hand-to-hand combat and forced them to flee in disorder, leaving numerous dead and wounded on the hill."

Patrols sent out the night of 25-26 May found little evidence of enemy activity as it became apparent that the Chinese and the screening North Korean forces were bent on escaping from the trap being closed around them.

On 26 May, the 9th Infantry reverted to Corps reserve, moving back to Hangye. The 23rd commenced relief of the 187th and continued northward in conjunction with a rapid advance by the 38th to the right against slight resistance.

The converging attacks by the two regiments continued on 27 May with the 38th surprising a large enemy force scurrying out of Hyon-ni. The First Battalion rolled into positions overlooking the town and opened fire on the fleeing enemy. Tanks from the regimental tank company and "B" Company, 72d Tk Bn, roared into the milling frantic enemy and the combination was too much. More than 300 enemy were killed and 156 prisoners were taken before the combat team set up its perimeter for the night.

Westward, the 23rd encountered increasingly stiff resistance as the enemy fought to protect the main body of his retreating troops. To give added strength to the 23rd, the Second Battalion of the 9th, operating under corps control, relieved the French battalion at the bridgehead site, enabling it to move forward in support of the rest of the regiment.

The 23rd secured Inje, spearheaded by armor from "C" Company, 72d, in conjunction with the 187th on 28 May while the 38th advanced northwestward to effect a junction with the spearhead. The 23d Infantry sent patrols north of the town to clear the high ground of the enemy troops still holding out.

Intermittent mortar and artillery fire fell on the 23rd Regimental CP on the Inje airstrip during the night of 28-29 May.

The 38th reached the Inje road on 29 May, contacting elements of the 2d Reconnaissances Company and completing the pincers movement which had brought death or capture for hundreds of the enemy. Both regiments spent the final few days of May consolidating their positions, sending out patrols to locate and destroy the enemy and calling down artillery on the fleeing Chinese. The 23d prepared to continue its attack north of Inje.

A final enemy reaction was registered on 1 June when an estimated regiment struck briefly at the troops of the 35th ROK Regiment, attached to the 2d Division, and succeeded in disorganizing them causing them to abandon their defensive positions east of the Soyang bridgehead. The 9th Infantry was ordered to send a battalion into the area and at 1000 hours the Third Battalion commenced its sweep. It returned at 1600, having cleared the area. The other two battalions of the 9th moved into position in the Division area, relieving elements of the 187th A/B RCT still present.

The Division was given one more offensive mission by Corps and then informed that it would go into reserve for a well-earned period of rest, reorganization, training and re-supply. The objectives for the mission were commanding peaks in the rugged hills forward of the Inje-Soyang bridgehead and the moves to take them were initiated early on 2 June. For three days,paced by energetic attacks of all the regiments, the offensive continued and by 5 June all the objectives were secure.

This latest flurry brought to a close the most notable period of the 2d Division's actions in the campaign. It brought forth, for the first time, a powerful counter-attack which followed on the heels of one of the most spectacular defensive stands of the war. It was a counter-attack which not only killed thousands of enemy troops, caught completely off-balance, but proved that the 2d Division could absorb the pounding of overwhelming numbers of enemy forces only to turn and cut them to ribbons. In the twenty day period proceeding the conclusion of the final attack the Indianhead Division had killed more than 65,000 enemy soldiers, the cream of the armies of Red China. Ten enemy divisions had been committed against the 2d Division with soldiers from an additional 2 communist divisions identified among the thousands of dead who littered the battle-field. It was a major defeat for the Chinese and North Korean forces. Their ranks were decimated, entire divisions rendered useless. They had flung themselves in an all-out attempt to annihilate the 2d Division and had failed under the merciless pounding of hundreds of thousands of rounds of artillery, tons of bombs and millions of around of small arms ammunition thrown at them by the determined, steadfast and victorious men of the 2d Infantry Division.

On 5 June, the Division began its movement into reserve in the vicinity of Hongchon and by 11 June the move was complete. The relief from combat was utilized for the needed training and reorganization accompanied by corps command inspections of all the units. It was to be the longest non-combat period enjoyed by the Division since its arrival in Korea and it was the unanimous opinion of all that no division deserved it more.

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