The NAKTONG River defense line was a defensive line set up on the south and east banks of the NAKTONG River. The NAKTONG River varied in width from fifty yards to two hundred yards and depth from waist deep to twelve to fifteen feet deep. The NAKTONG River was not a fast flowing river and it was possible to make log rafts and pole across the river with little difficulty. In the vicinity of HILL 409, the enemy constructed two underwater sand bag fords which were almost impossible to destroy. The defensive positions were located along the near bank of the river on terrain features which averaged slightly over two hundred meters in height. The highest terrain feature on the near bank of the river was HILL 409 and was in enemy hands. Paralleling the defensive positions was the HYONPUNG-CHANGYONG-YONGSAN-MIRYANG road. This was a dirt surface, dry weather road and not originally constructed to carry the loads required at this time. There were only two roads leading from this main road to the river itself. The roads were one way only and because of a great amount of rainfall were often impassable to all traffic. Throughout the sector other roads and trails had been hacked out of the side of the hills, but the first rainfall made them impassable.
Generally, in the center of the division sector, just west of CHANGYONG, was a large lake surrounded by swamp land and rice paddies. there was no definite system of compartments or corridors, but more of a maze of both. As a whole, the sector was one of relatively low rolling hills overlooking the slow moving, relatively narrow, shallow river. The existing road net was barely adequate, but additional one way dry weather roads were easily constructed.
Refugees! A moving sea of humanity poured southeast through
Korea in advance of the invading North Korean armies. Nothing
like it had been seen since the early days of World War II when
the German blitzkrieg rolled across the Lowlands and France. In
Korea they streamed down the roads and over mountain trails. Hordes
of white clothed, steadily plodding peasants saturated the area
of the Second Division as it sought to beat off increasing numbers
of enemy patrols and brace itself for an expected attack. And
intermingled among the displaced farmers and their families were
agents of the communist army. Their mission was to hinder the
desperate UN forces in any way possible sabotage and roadblock,
spy and harass, you name it, they did it.
Although the problem of controlling the refugees fell to every
unit, front and rear, the real burden was upon the shoulders of
the Provost Marshal, the 2d CIC Detachment and the South Korean
Police. A directive was put out warning the refugees to stay clear
of battle areas. Unit commanders were told to shoot any who failed
to heed the order prohibiting movement at night. Screening stations
were established with MPs searching as many of the refugees as
possible. Mine detectors were utilized to expose weapons hidden
in the packs of agents mingling with the crowds of displaced persons.
Assembly points at 15 mile intervals were set-up where the Koreans
were given food and permitted to rest. Every effort was being
made to clear them from the Division zone, moving them by groups
accompanied by South Korean police. Susan-ni, town on the Naktong
River at the Southeastern tip of the Division zone was the point
to which the Koreans were guided. From there they were evacuated
from the Division area of responsibility.
A special force had to be organized, finally, to assume a major
portion of the responsibility for the refugee problem. Major Jack
T. Young, an American officer of Chinese descent with an extensive
knowledge of the ways of Oriental people was put in command. The
force, known as the 2d Division Security Force, was also used
as a raider unit. Major Young also assumed operational control
of the South Korean Police and this force subsequently proved
invaluable in securing information about the enemy as well as
bringing some order out of chaos created by the refugees.
Meanwhile, the enemy continued his buildup and increased the number
of patrols he sent into the Division area for reconnaissance and
to harass the rear.
Members of the Division Band were used as guards to ride the supply
trains from Pusan to the forward areas and protect them from ambush.
On 27 August, the enemy was observed building sandbag bridges
across the Naktong and preparing rafts and wooden barges. Mortar
and artillery fire were called in on these craft but proved ineffective.
In the zone of the 38th Infantry, an unusual operation took place
which did prove effective in destroying many of these river-crossing
craft. Lieutenant Clifford Philipsen and three enlisted men from
"K" Company volunteered to destroy the rafts across
from their area. After extensive planning, the four prepared several
partially filled drums with gasoline and pushed them across the
river. Under cover of a curtain of automatic weapons fire, they
saturated the rafts with the gasoline and set them afire. Although
under constant and heavy enemy automatic weapons and small arms
fire, all the men returned safely to the friendly shore. The entire
volunteer group later received the Silver Star for the action.
The Third Battalion, 23rd Infantry, relieved elements of the 1st
Cavalry on 28 August and was attached to the 38th Infantry. The
following day, the First Battalion of the 23rd reverted to control
of its parent unit and relieved the Third Battalion of the 38th
which went into regimental reserve.
In the meantime, the enemy funneled particularly large troop concentrations
into the area opposite the 9th RCT. Although daily raiding parties
were sent across the river to disrupt this buildup it was realized
that this type of effort was not enough, so a raid in force was
planned. Since the bulk of the raiding party was composed of 9th
Infantry units, the code name given the operation was "Manchu."
(The 9th was nicknamed the "Manchu" regiment during
its participation in subduing the Boxer rebellion in China at
the turn of the century.)
On 31 August, the force was engaged in preparation for the raid.
The units involved were "E" Company of the 9th reinforced
with additional 57 mm recoilless rifles, 60 mm mortars. and demolition
teams. Supporting fire was to come from the 15th FA Bn ( -- ),
a battery of the 38th FA Bn, "A" and "B" Companies
of the 72d Tank Battalion, and "D" Battery of the 82d
AAA. "D" Company of the 2d Engineers was to orient all
the troops participating and to build the bridge over which the
Manchu force was to cross the river.
As darkness fell on the 31st, the tanks moved into position, The
Heavy Weapons support group began to move to the foot of a hill
from which it was to support the river crossing.
Suddenly, at 2100, enemy artillery, which had been falling intermittently
throughout the day, began to increase. At the same time, the 23rd
Infantry reported large groups of North Koreans gathering on the
river banks, carrying torches. Friendly artillery was called and
the groups dispersed but the 38th RCT reported heavy artillery
fire was being received on its right flank. Great numbers of enemy
were observed wading the river in the 9th RCT sector but suddenly
the enemy artillery slackened and the front became quiet. Then
at 2300, the artillery again opened up and heavy mortar fire fell
into all line elements of the Division.
At 2330, the enemy launched a heavy attack along the entire front.
The Manchu Force whose mission was called off but which was still
on its jump off point was surrounded and help was unobtainable
for the Naktong River line had exploded. Extending from the right
flank of the Division where it joined the 1st Cavalry to the left
flank along the river, the enemy poured in savage barrages of
artillery and mortar while waves of troops swam and waded across
the waters.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to First Lieutenant Edward Schmitt, Infantry, Company Commander of Company H, 9th Infantry for action against the enemy in the vicinity of the Naktong-Gang River near Yongsan, during the period 31 August to 3 September 1950. On the night of 31 August the entire front of the 9th Infantry Regiment was heavily attacked by two divisions of the enemy who penetrated the lines of the regiment and surrounded some of its units. Lieutenant SCHMITT assumed command of a group of about 70 men consisting largely of members of "H" and "D" Companies. Fully realizing the critical position of the group, he took charge immediately and organized a perimeter defense. On the morning of 1 September the enemy began the first of many fanatical attacks against the position. All day and all night the attacks continued. One attack after another was repelled. Lieutenant SCHMITT moved from man to man on the perimeter displaying great courage and inspiring leadership. He explained to his men the importance of holding the position, thereby delaying the enemy's advance and allowing the regiment time to regroup and counter-attack. Under his dominant leadership men rose to great heights of bravery and daring. Some left the perimeter to gather weapons and ammunition from enemy dead and to attack and destroy enemy machine guns. On 2 September Lieutenant SCHMITT gained radio contact with his battalion and requested an air drop of water and ammunition. His men were suffering greatly from lack of water and some of them were delirious. Nevertheless, under Lieutenant SCHMITT's leadership they continued to fight off the enemy's continued fanatical attacks and pile up enemy dead in hundreds on the hillside. He was wounded as he supervised the recovery of the air drop, but continued his duties although very weak from thirst, hunger and loss of blood. Lieutenant SCHMITT transmitted his last message on the 3rd of September, informing his commanders of the group's situation and stating that he and his men would fight on no matter what happened. Late on the day of the 3rd of September his radio sustained a direct hit and was destroyed. Still later on the same day, he was mortally wounded as he continued to move among his wounded and dying men." The remnants of his force subsequently made good their escape.
September was to be a month of desperate struggle and overwhelming victory for the United Nations forces. And for the 2d Division, the first dawn of September found every man fighting with his back almost to the sea. The massive communist assault which began in the fading moments of August rolled against the thinly held defense line. The northern sector of the Division front, manned by the 38th RTC with Colonel George B. Peploe in command was the least heavily hit. The "Rock of the Marne" Regiment lived up to its name when it halted the waves of attackers who broke and curled backward. But to the south, the situation was not going as well. The 23rd RCT, Colonel Paul L. Freeman, commanding holding the central sector was depleted by the absence of the Third Battalion which was attached to the 1st Cavalry Division. The 9th RCT, Colonel John G. Hill in command, was responsible for the southern sector or left flank of the Division and was also minus its Third Battalion which was still guarding the vital Pohangdong airstrip. And it was in the zone defended by these two under strength regiments that the enemy concentrated his effort. Against each he hurled a reinforced division with full artillery and armor support. Identified along the entire 2d Division front were elements of the 2d, 4th, 9th and 10th North Korean Rifle Divisions and the 14th and 16th Mechanized Divisions.
The terrific assault was marked by infiltration of enemy units behind our lines. Widely scattered defending companies were cutoff. Command posts were struck and supporting artillery and mortar positions found themselves under attack as the communists bypassed strong points and hit in the rear. By daylight the enemy had established a strong bridgehead on the east side of the Naktong and already he was bringing armor and supplies across.
As the attack progressed the entire Division found itself seriously threatened. By noon on 1 September, the First and Second Battalions of the 9th RCT and the Second Battalion of the 23rd were only fifty percent effective. The First Battalion of the 23rd, also suffering from crippling casualties, had become cut-off from the rest of the friendly units in the vicinity of Hill 209, north of a small lake. Air-dropped supplies kept the valiant group in action but its critical position made it imperative that a relief force be sent
Subsequently, the Third Battalion of the 38th was ordered into the 23rd sector. But as it moved south along the MSR it encountered an enemy force one-half mile from the regimental CP, threatening Division Artillery Headquarters. The battalion commander ordered an immediate attack but was wounded in the first skirmish. Colonel Peploe, 38th regimental commander, took over the attack and proceeded to direct the battalion in clearing the enemy penetration. Completing this, the battalion launched an attack west towards Hill 209 to rescue the still embattled First Battalion of the 23rd.
On 2 September, the Third Battalion of the 38th accompanied by a platoon from the regimental Tank Company under command of Captain Hinton, succeeded in breaking through to the surrounded First Battalion of the 23rd and then proceeded to secure Hill 209.
The rescued battalion returned to its regimental sector but only 600 of the original eleven hundred members were present. The New York Times later wrote of the battle as "The Last Stand of the Six Hundred."
The savage battle raged throughout the day and night of 1-2 September and by 2400 hours on the 1st, the entire Division reserve had been committed including the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion which saw its first action about 2400 hours on 1 September. Time and time again the engineers were to prove as good at combat as they were in engineering activities.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to First Lieutenant Lee E. Beahler, Jr., Corps of Engineers, Commanding Officer, Company D, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Yongsan on 2 September 1950. When an enemy force supported by artillery and armor continued an attack which had already overrun three infantry battalions, the 2d Engineer Battalion was rushed into the line to hold the vital communications center of Yongsan which was the key to the pass leading back to Miryang on the Pusan-Taegu lifeline. With other elements of the battalion fighting as infantry south of the town, Company D was given a "stand or die" mission overlooking Yongsan itself. Deployed without supporting artillery or mortars, the unit beat off two enemy attacks, but at a cost of twelve dead and eighteen wounded including all of the company officers excepting Lieutenant BEAHLER. Assuming command of the battered and shaken unit, Lieutenant BEAHLER, rushed from man to man directing the fire of their small arms, automatic weapons and rocket launchers in such a matter as to regain fire superiority. When the enemy returned to the attack for a third time and actually penetrated into the town with tanks, Lieutenant BEAHLER, fearlessly exposing himself to the heavy fire being directed at him, maneuvered his men to more advantageous positions from which they soon destroyed one of the enemy tanks with a rocket fired at close range. Ranging up and down his line, this Engineer Officer inspired his men to pour a devastating f re upon the advancing North Koreans until the attack was broken up and the enemy driven back. By his superb leadership and aggressive actions throughout the entire day the town was saved and the threat to the whole position was eliminated."
"Task Force Strom" under Major V. E. Strom, Division Special Service Officer, and composed of the Division Band and clerks from Division rear was dug-in on 1 September on-two mountain passes on the MSR where it remained for the next seven days. Roadblocks were set-up by the infiltrating enemy all along the Yongsan-Changyong road. The 8th Army Commander personally visited the division sector and ordered a "stand or die" defense. And the Division stood. But the situation was precarious. Reinforcements were sorely needed, for high casualties had severely depleted the under strength regiments and the swiftness of the enemy advance had disorganized many units. Throughout 2 September the bloody defense continued but in spite of heroic efforts, the enemy succeeded in blunting the lines, throwing in more troops and increasing his murderous barrage of mortar, artillery and tank fire. Sometimes under cover of a white flag the communist forces would advance to the beleaguered positions only to open fire as they closed-in.
As the day wore on, it became necessary to reorganize the entire division in order to maintain control. Two task forces were formed. One, under the command of the Division Artillery Commander, Brigadier General Loyal M. Haynes, was responsible for the northern sector of the Division Zone. It consisted of the remaining elements of the 38th and 23rd Infantry (-3rd Bn), "C" Company of the 72d Tank Battalion, and supporting artillery. The second task force was commanded by Brigadier General Joseph S. Bradley, assistant division commander, and consisted of elements of the 9th Infantry (-3rd Bn), 72d Tank Battalion ( - ), 2d Engineer Combat Battalion, and supporting artillery. Task Force Bradley was responsible for the southern sector of the Division Zone. The 2d Recon Co was to continue to screen the left flank.
While this reorganization was being planned, another enemy tank-infantry team entered Yongsan. An assault force composed of troops from the 9th Infantry, 2d Engineers and "A" Company of the 72d Tank Battalion attacked this penetrating force and drove it out. Another event occurred in on 2 September. September E P Parker and Cpl J C Howard, 2d MP Co, were instructed to quit their posts if the enemy entered Yongsan. When the North Koreans did enter the city the two MPs remained until the last vehicle went out then joined up with the infantry to help hold a nearby hill overlooking the town until a counter-attack begun. They advanced with the infantry and upon entering towns and clearing enemy in vicinity of their posts returned to their job.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Brigadier General Joseph S. Bradley, United States Army, Assistant Division Commander, 2d Infantry Division, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Yongsan on 1 September 1950. On I September 1950, a few hours after the enemy had broken through the lines of the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments... General BRADLEY was ordered by the Commanding General, 2nd Infantry Division, to take command of the scattered units south of the breakthrough and to defend the town of Yongsan and the pass leading back to Miryang at all costs. Hastily gathering disorganized elements of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 9th Infantry, General BRADLEY reorganized them together with the 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion and elements of the 2d Tank Battalion, and under continues and intense hostile fire for three days and nights, beat off repeated enemy attacks. On 2 September, with enemy tanks in the town of Yongsan, General BRADLEY personally took charge of the disorganized Engineer Battalion and placed D Company in position to beat back and destroy the communists in the town. On the next day, a force of eight hundred enemy infantry with tanks and self-propelled guns threatened to come in from the south and overrun the Command Post of the 9th Infantry and the nearby artillery positions from the rear. General BRADLEY again went forward under heavy fire and directed a task force consisting of tanks and engineers against this threat, and with two batteries of 155mm howitzers firing at extreme muzzle elevation, so short was the range, succeeded in driving back the enemy force with heavy casualties. Throughout the period of this desperate, last-ditch defense in which even elements of the Division Band and clerks from the Rear Echelon were put into the line, General BRADLEY was always in front, encouraging individual riflemen to stand fast in spite of enemy penetration to their hanks and rear. On the 4th and 5th of September, with the enemy stopped but still capable of exploiting their success, General BRADLEY rallied his decimated force to make a coordinated counter-attack with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and again leading the forward elements, successfully restored the position. By his extraordinary heroism and outstanding example of valor, General BRADLEY was an inspiration to the entire command and was directly responsible for stopping the enemy attack."
The 1st Marine Brigade was attached to the 2d Division on 2 September to give new impetus to the weary defenders. Immediately plans for a counterattack were made. .
The 9th Infantry ( -- ), "A" Company of the 72d Tank Battalion and "D" Battery of the 82d AAA jumped off on an attack at 0830, 3 September. After securing intermediate objectives designated by Division, this force was passed through by the 1st Marine Brigade. The enemy drive was finally stopped by this savage counterattack and forced back from 1,500 to 2,000 yards.
In the meantime, friendly air was ranging the skies on both sides of the Naktong. Enemy assembly points, supply dumps, troop concentrations, artillery positions and tanks rolling to the front were attacked repeatedly. Bombs, napalm, rockets and machine gun fire rained down on the attackers, seriously hindering their efforts to press the attack and giving the defending troops the measure of support which helped them stem the assault.
As 4 September dawned, the ravaged battlefront was still aflame but the enemy offensive had been blunted. The attack the previous day by Task Force Bradley and the 1st Marine Brigade had played a vital role in stemming the tide although it was costly in casualties. For the first time since the enemy offensive had begun, the North Koreans were forced to employ defensive tactics. Air reported that mines were being laid and defensive positions constructed.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross lo Corporal Clovis R. Taylor, Infantry, a member of Company H. 9th Infantry, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Yongsan during the period 31 August to 7 September 1950. On the night of 31 August the enemy launched an all out attack in overwhelming numbers against the thinly held lines of the 9th Infantry Regiment and was attempting to make a complete breakthrough and take Miryang, the gateway to Pusan. Corporal TAYLOR was a member of a small group of men from Companies H and D, 9th Infantry who, during the initial phase of the enemy attack, were surrounded and cut off by enemy. enemy group formed a small perimeter defense in an attempt to hold this ground and to slow down the general advance of the enemy. The perimeter was constantly subjected to intense enemy small arms, automatic weapons, mortar and artillery fire and the enemy made continuous fanatical attacks against their position in an attempt to dislodge them. On 1 September Corporal TAYLOR was in the midst of every fire fight t and continually encouraged all those present by kits actions and utter contempt for the enemy. He was wounded during one of the attacks but refused medical aid as medical supplies were low and there were others more seriously wounded who needed medical attention. On 2 September Corporal TAYLOR observed a long column of enemy climbing Hill 209 carrying large mortars with them which could be used against the men in the perimeter if set up on Hill 209. Expecting them to stop for rest before they reached the top of the hill he had his machine gun section hold their fire. True to his expectations the enemy column did stop for rest and he directed the fire of his machine gun section so effectively that sixty-seven of the enemy were killed and the mortars destroyed. On 3 September during a particularly vicious enemy attack Corporal TAYLOR, with utter disregard for his own personal safety, stood in a fully exposed position and alone killed twenty- enemy with his rifle. On 4 September it was decided to abandon the perimeter and to leave in small groups and attempt to reach friendly lines. Corporal TAYLOR led six men through enemy territory, engaging in numerous firefights with the enemy, and finally arrived safely with all but two of them."
On 4 September, Capt W. L. Armstrong and Lt W. A. Baugh flew the first "Horsefly" operation in an L17 by leading Air Force fighters in close support of ground troops.
Prisoners who were being captured in increasing numbers revealed a lack of food throughout the communist force. Morale among the North Koreans was low and going lower as a result of the savage defense put up by the 2d Division and the Marines. The terrific artillery and air effort of the friendly forces had taken a high toll of the attackers.
But even with the improved position, the status of the friendly defending forces was far from good. A critical ammunition shortage existed for 57 mm recoilless rifles, 105 mm howitzers, for 60 mm, 81 mm and 4.2 inch mortars, and for 3.5 inch rockets. But in spite of this the two task forces, Haynes and Bradley, continued to attack. The Marines jumped off again at 0800 on the 4th with the other forces following suit at 0830.
A new threat developed in the rear of the attacking forces on 4 September. A group of approximately 300 infiltrators had entrenched themselves on Hill 285 located 800 yards north of the 38th Regimental Command Post. About 200 of these North Korean troops launched an attack on the CP on the 4th. Forming the defensive perimeter were personnel from Headquarters Company, a section of "A" Battery, 2d AAA and a platoon of tanks. The defenders repulsed the attack but the threat posed by the enemy group remaining on the hill had to be eliminated.
Consequently, "G" Company was released from its duties of guarding the Division Artillery Headquarters and ordered to clear the hill. The resulting action was one of the most desperate small unit actions up to this time. Twice the attackers were driven from the crest of the hill but on the third attempt it was captured. One hundred and fifty enemy dead were counted on the overrun position and 150 more were observed fleeing to the north in confusion.
Such attacks were numerous throughout the Division zone for large numbers of enemy troops had succeeded in slipping into the rear of friendly positions.
As the day lengthened, more reports came into the Division Command Post which indicated that perhaps the turning point had been reached. The enemy had been unable to follow up his initial successes. His troops, well organized for the assault, had failed to carry-through. Leadership in the NK forces was poor on the attack and appeared unable to cope successfully with changing situations. And, finally, the attackers appeared to have underestimated the holding; power of the 2d Division.
On the 5th of September the fury of the battle appeared to support the growing belief that the enemy was temporarily beaten off. Mine fields and additional defensive structures were encountered more frequently as the friendly troops advanced. All enemy attacks for the day were contained.
On 5 September, a counter-attack was ordered to drive the enemy back across the Naktong. The task organization for the attack consisted of the 9th If (-3d Bn); 3rd Bn, 23rd If; "A" Co, 2d Tk Bn; "D" Btry, 2d AAA Bn; and the 2d Engr (C) Bn. Task Force Haynes consisting of the 23rd If ( - ), 38th If, and "C" Co, 2d Tk Bn formed the second element of the organization. The 2d Reconnaissance Company was to continue screening the Division left flank.
The fire support for the two forces was to be furnished by the 15th. 37th, 38th and 503rd Field Artillery Battalions, 82 AAA Battalion ( - ), and the 2d Tank Battalion ( - ).
Both forces moved out as scheduled and encountered stiff resistance. Task Force Haynes repulsed a frenzied counter-attack by more than 3,000 enemy troops then continued to move forward.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Private Dale J. Crow, Infantry, a member of Company G. 35th Infantry, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Sibi-ri on 6 September. On this date, while participating in an attack against a strongly defended enemy position on Hill 285, he was seriously wounded. While his wound was being dressed by a comrade, an enemy grenade fell nearby. Without hesitation and with no concern for his own life, Private CROW threw his body over that of his comrade thereby receiving the full blast of the grenade, which took his life."
While the action on the front mounted in intensity, slowly driving the enemy back to the Naktong River which he had crossed on the night of 31 August, the refugee problem grew steadily worse. In Chong do alone, more than 97,200 refugees had gathered. In the area of Task Force Haynes the refugees were particularly heavy. Major Young, commanding the South Korean Police. together with Military Police units assumed responsibility for clearing the sector. A refugee raider unit was ordered to sweep the road from Changing to Chong do as soon as it could be formed.
Intelligence reports received during the first week of September began to indicate a new effort by the enemy to penetrate the 2d Division lines. Increased probing attacks, mostly at night, were encountered and it was believed the improved enemy defenses resisting desperate friendly attacks were screening a new buildup.
"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Private First Class Richard L. Fleischmann, army Medical Service, a member of Medical Company, Ad Infantry, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Changing, on 6 September 1950. On the afternoon of 6 September, Private FLEISCHMANN was assigned as aid man to the machine-gun platoon of Company H. 23rd Infantry Regiment. One section of the platoon came under extremely heavy machine-gun and mortar fire and the section leader was wounded. In spite of concentrated enemy fire on the immediate area, Private FLEISCHMANN ran forward to the gun position, removed the section leader to safety, and rendered medical treatment. A few moments later, the gunner of this weapon was also wounded, and once again Private FLEISCHMANN ran into point-blank machine-gun fire and removed this wounded man to safety. Although wounded on the second trip to the machine-gun position, he then took over the machine gun and held of] the enemy so that the remainder of the section could reorganize and move to a better position. He remained in position firing the machine gun until he was killed.
These signs pointing to a new communist offensive increased. On 8 September enemy artillery registered on the approaches to Yongsan and Changing and on the MSR running between the two towns. An enemy battalion attacked a 38th Infantry outpost but was beaten off. Infiltration continued as a total of 17,600 refugees were screened in less than five days at the Susan-ni screening point established in the southeastern tip of the Division zone. However, G-2 predicted the expected enemy assault would not jump-off before the battered North Korean forces had an opportunity to regroup, resupply and reorganize. In the meantime, plans for destroying all the communists east of the Naktong progressed.
South Korean soldiers, the first of 4,500, were incorporated into the Division during the first week of September to fill the depleted ranks. The ammunition supply was improved although a shortage of 155 mm howitzer ammunition now existed.
By 10 September, the need for further reinforcement of 2d Division combat forces became critical. Losses suffered by the Division since the initial attack- by the North Koreans had not been made-up, even with the addition of the ROK's. Consequently, 200 ROK's from the 9th RCT were shifted to the 23rd RCT, the most depleted of the combat teams. In addition, four company grade officers from the Division Headquarters staff were sent with the ROK's and a levy was placed on all service units and Headquarters Company. Ten percent of the enlisted personnel of these units with an appropriate number of officers were tagged for duty with the infantry regiments.
While the demands for replacement officers and men were being placed on the service units, the enemy buildup increased. A total of 26,700 enemy troops with supporting armor and artillery were known to be opposite the 2d Division sector. Artillery units were observed moving forward-a sure sign of renewed offensive. Supplies and reinforcements were grouping in strategic spots. The situation of that day was described in the Division Command report as "Improved but precarious."
Task Force Duncan, an unusual organization consisting of Headquarters Company of the 9th Infantry, three tanks from the 2d Tank Battalion, and "B' Battery of the 2d AAA Bn, initiated patrols on the Yongsan-Changing road the second week of September to clear it of infiltrating guerillas. And, as T. F. Duncan rolled along, an even more unusual force was engaged in clearing enemy patrols from behind our lines. Labeled 'Sand Flush," this unit was composed of two squads of riflemen, six military policemen, ten South Korean policemen, and 81 mm mortar section and an M l9 personnel carrier. But in spite of the unusual organization it was effective. An enemy patrol of one officer and 16 enlisted men was captured while engaged in reconnoitering the Changing area in preparation for a North Korean attack.
In the Ammunition Supply Point servicing the Division on 10 September there was a zero balance of 105 and 155 mm howitzer ammunition and even though this was eased somewhat the next day Division Artillery was limited to 25 rounds per gun per day.
The enemy buildup began to concentrate on 12 September in two areas. The first was in the north in the vicinity of Hill 409 and the second in the south near Changing and Hill 201. But an even more significant event occurred the same day. A courier from Eighth Army arrived at 2d Division Headquarters bringing with him the operation order which directed the Division to attack on 16 September. It was to be an attack which would turn the trebles of the war. Made in the face of overwhelming odds from the midst of what appeared to be almost certain defeat the 2d Division and the entire Eighth Army began preparing for an assault on which they pinned their hopes for victory. The depleted ranks of a battered but spirited United Nations force were to astound the world.
The next few days were frantic ones. On one hand the Division gathered its strength for an attack. On the other it warded off increasingly sharp enemy patrols while keeping an eye peeled for another red assault it knew was in the making.
The main effort of the Eusak attack was to be along the Taegu-Kumchon-Taejon-Suwon axis. The 2d Division was to drive directly west from its present position. The 38th RCT was to cross the Naktong in the center and hold the bridgehead. The 9th RCT was to take Hill 201 and then support the attack of the 23rd RCT. The 2d Engineer Combat Battalion was to assemble in Yongsan as division reserve. The 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry and the Tank Company, 9th Infantry were returned from Pohangdong and ordered to act as Eusak reserve. The Ivanhoe Security Force under Major Young was to secure Changing and clear all the enemy east of the town. Every unit of the Division was readied for the assault upon which hung the fate of the UN troops in Korea.
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