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My GuestbookThe 2d Division had made good use of the well-earned period in reserve when, on 8 July, it received notice to prepare for relief of the 1st Marine Division between 15 and 17 July. All units has been reorganized and resupplied. Rotation had gotten into high gear and, as a result, training was speeded up to prepare incoming replacements for the days which lay ahead. Special service shows had been sandwiched in between training problems and the other activities of the period. Many of the officers and men had the opportunity to see Jack Benny for the first time in person when he brought his troupe to the Division Command Post for a show.
But with the alert order in the hands of the units, all efforts were turned to put the finishing touches on the training program. Reconnaissance parties went out to view the Kansas line where the active defense would be undertaken. Teams from the 9th Infantry also toured the Wichita Line, south of the Kansas Line, which it was to prepare and organize as a secondary defensive position. Division engineers, who had been devoting their efforts to improving the roads in the reserve sector, shifted northward on 13 July and began extensive surveys and work on the roads in the new sector.
The X Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, was succeeded on 15 July by Maj. Gen. Clovis E. Byers who took command of the corps as the 23rd Infantry initiated relief of the 5th Marine Regiment. By 1300 hours of the 15th, the French and Third Battalions of the 23rd were entrenched on the Kansas Line. The following day, the 38th, with the Third Battalion of the 9th Infantry attached, had relieved the Korean Marine Corps and the 1st Marine Regiment. To the rear, the 72d Tank Battalion and the 9th Infantry ( - ) went into Division Reserve with the 9th occupying and improving the Wichita Line.
Patrols were immediately dispatched from the Kansas Line to feel out enemy positions. Their reports revealed the North Korean troops were using a prominent hill mass, centered on Hill 1179, from which to observe all movements of the Division on the Kansas Line and 20,000 meters to the south. Plans were immediately drawn up for an assault on the hill mass. Running north and south, the whole hill complex cut through both the enemy Main Line of Resistance and our own positions. The side having control of it possessed a definite advantage over the other.
Patrols went out across the entire front in the succeeding days so as not to tip off the enemy to the forth coming attack. The 23rd Infantry, operating on the right flank of the line, sent patrols into the "Punchbowl,' a marked depression in the hilly terraria of the area situated east of Hill 1179 and Hill 1100, another prominent section of high ground which controlled the approaches to 1179.
The attack was scheduled for 26 July and the 38th Infantry was named as the attacking element. The 23rd Infantry was to launch a series of diversionary attacks to seize three objectives in the "Punchbowl" from which it could cut-off escape of enemy elements from 1179 and also provide fire support for the 38th.
Air and artillery pounded the enemy positions on the 25th in preparation for the assault the next morning. Fifty-four air sorties were directed against the objectives and 7,000 rounds of artillery were hurled onto the well-bunkered positions.
At 0615 hours, 26 July, the First Battalion of -the 38th Infantry moved out in a dense fog to take Hill 1179, known to the Koreans as Taeu San, then known to the Americans as "Fools Mountain." Supporting by fire, although hampered by poor visibility were all the weapons of the 38th Regiment plus the Heavy Mortar Company of the 9th Infantry. "C" Company lead the assault. "A" and "B" Companies followed as they inched forward up the ridge east of the objective. Until 0930 hours, the slowly advancing infantrymen met no resistance. Then the enemy opened up. From deep entrenchments and bunkers providing interlocking fields of fire came solid streams of automatic weapons fire. The troops crawling up the sheer heights were alternately pinned down or driven back, but each time they moved out again and each time gained a little more ground as air and artillery fired in maximum support.
Dutch troops, attacking Hill 1100 from the south, were also stopped and failed to make any gains after 1100 hours.
To the west, tanks from the 38th Regimental Tank Company and "A" Company, 72d Tank Battalion nailed thousands of rounds into a carpet of steel against the sides of adjacent hills to prevent reinforcement of the North Korean garrison from the west. Eastward, the 23rd Infantry attacked its three objectives and met with heavy resistance.
As evening approached, plans were made to have the First Battalion of the 38th hold-up for the night near "Cathedral Rock," a ragged mass of rock east of 1179. However, a tragic error forced alteration of the plans. During an air sortie, one of the aircraft released its Napalm on "C" Company, the lead element, inflicting severe casualties and disorganizing the unit. This required the First Battalion to pull back from its hard won gains where it went into a perimeter defense.
The first day's action sketched the picture of the enemy defenses. He was determined to stay on 1179 at all costs. His elaborate preparations, plentiful supply of ammunition and determined resistance in face of terrific concentrations from all the supporting fire weapons including nine Battalions of artillery indicated the fight for Taeu San would be more difficult than first anticipated.
That night, the skies were kept a flaming red as the artillery fire was intensified. Dust from the roads swirled hundreds of feet into the air as trucks rolled around the clock to provide ammunition for the barrage.
Mist again filled the air as dawn broke on the 27th of July, and attacking through the haze and streams of enemy tracers came "B" Company of the 38th in its renewed attempt to take Taeu San. Close behind were "B" Company of the 9th, and "A" and "C" Companies of the 38th. Bitter fighting raged throughout the day, even super-human effort and courage failed, but by 1530 hours, with "B" of the 9th in the lead and the battered remains of the First Battalion of the 38th in support, a new attack began. Moving forward with the two "B" Companies in a line of skirmishers athwart the ridge and "A" of the 38th flanking in a column to the right, the heroic force inched upward. Suddenly the sun broke through the clouds, giving artillery and mortar observers a clear view of the enemy and immediately crashing salvos of exploding shells were called on the defenders. The infantry surged forward, following the artillery bursts within 75 yards, tossing hand grenades and firing every available weapon. By nightfall the inspired foot soldiers had battled to within 50 yards of the crest of the unnumbered hill east of 1179 and there they halted, digging in to wait until daylight for the final assault.
Meanwhile, the Second Battalion of the 9th relieved the Third Battalion of the 38th which then began moving forward to join the First Battalion. Eastward, "K" Company of the 23rd was struggling to take Hill 1059 and by nightfall its every attempt had been repulsed for the enemy, hanging onto 1059 to keep open his supply route to Hill 1179, was determined to stay. "K" pulled back and the 23rd made plans for a renewed attempt the following day.
Throughout the night, the big guns laid a protective screen of steel around the weary infantry clinging to their slim foothold just short of the crest of the unnumbered hill. At first light on 28 July, with "B" of the 9th again in the lead, the First Battalion of the 38th moved forward to take the peak guarding the natural, east approach to 1179. Braving a rage of machine gun, mortar and small arms fire, they finally were successful and by evening the hill was secure. The Third Battalion arrived soon afterward and reinforced the ranks of the First Battalion for the night's vigil.
And as the fanatic enemy persisted in his attempt to hold Hill
1179, equally determined North Koreans held-out against every
attempt by the 23rd Infantry to take Hill 1059. The commanding
general ordered the slopes covered with tank and artillery fire
and a renewed attempt was drawn-up for the following day.
The expected counter-attack against the hill held by the 38th
came during the night of 28-29 July but the forces refused to
yield and repulsed the North Korean troops with heavy losses.
The 38th, reinforced by "B" Company of the 9th, spent the morning and early afternoon of 29 July in preparation for another attack on 1179. Murderous artillery concentrations were laid on the slopes and at 1600 hours, "I" and "K" Companies struck out in face of the enemy cross fire. The assault was carried out with such vigor that the crest was reached and Hill 1179 was in the possession of the 2d Division by evening. The enemy fortress fell after some of the most intense offensive fighting the Division had undergone in months. The fanatic defenders had to be dug out of their deep entrenchments and it was a slow, bloody, body-tiring job. But it was done. The enemy was pushed off suffering more than 2,000 casualties with the annihilation of one complete regiment and the crushing of another. The decimated North Korean 27th Division withdrew, its thin ranks in disorder after the onslaught of the 2d Division attack. An attempted counter-attack by an estimated battalion was disorganized the following day when a six battalion artillery TOT slaughtered the enemy before he could get in range of the 38th's troops.
More than 115 tons of bombs had supported the attack on Taeu San. A total of 74,823 rounds of artillery had been hurled onto the hill and added to that were more than 49,000 rounds of mortar which had been fired in the assault.
Taeu San had been taken, another step on the ladder to the north up which the 2d Division was slowly but certainly climbing.
If you served with the 2ID during these times or have questions about anything that happen during these times, please leave a message in this guestbook.
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