Wonju and Twin Tunnels

The 2nd Infantry Division in Korea

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TERRAIN SKETCH

The Korean City of WONJU is a typical communication center for a mountainous country. It lies almost in the east-west geographical center of Korea and in the south end of a valley basin which is approximately eight miles in width. The city itself is comparable to a wheel, it being the hub and the roads being the spokes. Five important roads pass through this city. The WONJU-HOENGSONG road and the WONJU-SAEMAL road run north and northeast respectively, thus forming the avenues of approach from the north. These avenues were dominated by large hill masses to the north and by steep, rocky mountains directly east which ranged in elevation from five hundred ninety seven to one thousand two hundred eighty meters. Small trees, brush, and undergrowth covered the lower terrain features. To the southeast runs the road to CHECHON. The road to MOKKYE-DONG runs south from WONJU. The mountains to the east of WONJU, also dominated these roads. To the west lay the YOJU-WONJU corridor with its accompanying road. All five roads were primary routes, eighteen to twenty four feet wide, hard packed earth and gravel, and capable of supporting divisional loads. The engagement that followed was primarily for the controls of this important hub and its network of roads. Enemy troops attacked simultaneously from HOENGSONG, to the north, and the rugged mountains to the east. Again, winter hindered the supply problems with snow, ice, and temperatures dropping to thirty degrees below zero.

The early days of December revealed the 2d Division moving southward into Eighth Army reserve. On the 1st it was assembling south of Sunchon although elements of the 23d RCT, including the 72d Tank Battalion ( - ) and the 15th FA Bn, which had withdrawn down the coastal road were still in the Sukchon area. On 2 December orders were received to continue the southward movement and the tactical elements, service trains and the advance CP began moving toward Munsan-ni below the 38th parallel and south of the Imjin River.

However, the Division rear CP was still located in Pyongyang where it had been during the battle in the Kunuri area. At noon on 2 December, with the Chinese elements driving toward the former North Korean capital, the rear CP was ordered to prepare to withdraw to Seoul. By 1745 hours it was decided the move would be made by rail for although there was a critical shortage of locomotives there were no trucks to be had. The rear elements began loading in three serials.

The rail cars containing the Division rear personnel, records and equipment were moved into the main station of Pyongyang by 3 December but there the engine was detached to be used to pull a hospital train to the south. As the cars sat in the rail yards, hundreds of thousands of refugees and retreating ROK soldiers streamed through the area, bound for the safety of South Korea, so it was necessary for guards to be placed on all the cars to prevent looting.

At 0800 the next morning, the train commander announced that no locomotive was available to pull the cars laden with the personnel, equipment and records of the Division rear. However, it was decided to wait until the last moment before abandoning the cars. At 1130, on orders of the train commander, the postal officer began burning, the money order files, letters and military currency. At 1230, the milling thousands of civilians had begun looting some of the cars of the train; it was an almost impossible task to keep them clear.

An engine was finally obtained by 1300 but officials of the transportation office ordered that it be used only to pull cars carrying personnel. Consequently it was necessary to abandon all but the most vital records. After what seemed like days, the train began to pull out at 1720 hours and as it left the station the mobs of civilians were observed looting the abandoned cars.

Advance parties from all units of the Division were sent south from Munsan on 7 December to locate bivouac areas in the vicinity of Yongdong Po near the South Korean capital of Seoul. By nightfall, the division command post had been established in that city.

Maj. General Robert B. McClure assumed command of the 2d Division on 7 December, replacing Maj. Gen. Keiser who had been evacuated for medical reasons. He immediately ordered all units to ship non-essential equipment to Japan and decreed that every unit must be ready to move on a moments notice. Although intelligence reports indicated the Chinese advance had slowed while the enemy consolidated his gains, the need for mobility had been learned.

All units of the Division were assembled in the area between Seoul and Suwon to the South by 8 December. Then began the monumental task of reorganization, re-equipping, resupply and training. The battle-weary remnants of the Inidanhead Division faced the prospect of building the Division anew.

But the tasks of war went on. As the units trained, they also conducted extensive reconnaissance to the east and south. The 9th Infantry patrolled the roads east of Seoul to Hongchon, Hoengsong, and Wonju. Further south the 23d Infantry sent reconnaissance parties east from Suwon to Wonju, Chechon and Chungju; the 38th Infantry reconnoitered north east from Seoul to Chunchon and Hongchon and the 72d Tank Battalion mapped the roads to the south. From all the patrols came sketches of the terrain and reports of its suitability for defense.

Two additions to the Division were made on 11 December when battalion-sized detachments from France and the Netherlands became part of the 2d. The Dutch were attached to the 38th and the French to the 23d Infantry.

The balance of the month of December was spent in extensive training, patrolling and reorganization as replacements were received and equipment was added to the Division to replace that which has been lost in the battle of Kunuri. Numerous defense plans were drawn up and later discarded as estimates of the enemy's plans and capabilities varied with each new report. By 15 December, the Division was declared sufficiently supplied to make it combat effective but there was much training to by done and the shortage of motor transport was still acute.

Finally, after many false starts, the Division began moving to the Chungju area in central Korea. Its mission upon arrival was to conduct aggressive patrols while protecting right flank of the Eighth Army.

At that time there were increasingly frequent reports of heavy North Korean infiltration to the east where the ROK Army units has thus far failed to establish a solid defense line.

The 38th RCT was given the difficult mission of protecting this open east flank of the Division and 8th Army. Its battalions were occupying positions at Chechon, Tanyang and Wonju with its tanks at Andong, a distance of approximately 60 miles along the Chechon-Andong Road. There were no friendly troops between the regiment and the east coast.

And together with the activity on the east flank and to the rear of the Army front came reports that the main body of the enemy force was now in a position to launch a new attack on the UN troops. Along the front the 8th Army readied itself to meet the new onslaught.

The 2d Division, moving into the area around the central Korean town of Chungju, was beginning one of the most critical and successful periods of its history. Still short in men, equip- and training after the retreat from the North, it was slowly rounding into fighting shape once again. The addition of the French and Netherlands detachments did much to increase its battle potential. Another addition, the First Ranger Company, joined the ranks of the 2d Division on 23 December to add even more strength.

The new Division sector posed supply problems such as had not hampered the Division since the early days of August. Corps and Army supply points were far to the rear. Every road was a sheet of ice and snow as the effects of the severe winter became evident. The shortage of trucks imposed further burdens on the services. Nevertheless, the Division gradually increased its meager stocks of supplies and equipment and the thin stream of replacements and returnees continued to arrive.

Christmas Day, the 2d Reconnaissance Company moved north of the Division assembly area to Hoengsong where it established a patrol base and commenced screening the Division's west flank. Hoengsong was located north of the vital road junction town of Wonju which intelligence reports pointed to as the next target for a major Communist offensive. It was only necessary to glance at any map to see the importance of Wonju. Five major supply routes formed a hub in Wonju and an important rail terminal on the Kyonggyong Railroad leading to Pusan was located there. Wonju also marked the center of the Eighth Army front. Any penetration there would succeed in splitting the front and blocking the main routes to the south, placing the enemy astride the United Nations's principal artery of supply and evacuation in the central section.

The 2d Division was alerted on 29 December for a move. The area of responsibility charged to the Division was shifted to the North. One regimental combat team was ordered to defend the city of Hongchon, north of Wonju, while two others were to be prepared to counter-attack. An increase in guerrilla activity and probing attacks from the main body of enemy to the north indicated that increased action was not too far off. It came the next day.

The Third Battalion of the 23d Infantry became the first element of the 2d Division to go into battle as the Division moved forward. Moving up to secure Hongchon, the battalion encountered an enemy roadblock on the Hoengsong-Hongchon road. As it came to grips with this force, composed of North Korean army units, air observers reported large numbers of enemy troops massing in the area. Realizing that defense of Hongchon was impossible until the roadblock was eliminated, the 23d RCT pulled its support forces back to Hoengsong and attacked the roadblock anew. Comprising the RCT at that time were the 23d Infantry Regi meet, the 15th FA Bn, a platoon from "B" Company of the 2d Engineers, and elements of "B" Battery of the 82d AAA.

The 38th Regiment was alerted to move to the Hoengsong area when news of the roadblock went from the 23d RCT to Division and the 9th was ordered to Wonju as Division Reserve.

The last day of December saw the Second and Third Battalions of the 23d locked in battle with an enemy blocking force north of Hoengsong while the First Battalion continued defensive preparations to the south. While the fight raged, elements of the II ROK Corps, which had been engaging the enemy, commenced a rapid withdrawal to the South, streaming through the new sector of the 2d Division. The 38th RCT (-3d Bn) closed into Hoengsong on the 31st and the 9th arrived in Wonju minus the French Battalion which was ordered to join the 23d RCT.

New Years Day dawned with the 23d still heavily engaged on the Hoengsong-Hongchon road. The First and Second Battalions of the 38th with the 38th FA Bn, a platoon of "C" Company, 2d Engineers and "C" Battery of the 82d AAA were well entrenched in Hoengsong.

Fighting in continued bitter cold weather with the temperature in the minus twenties, the 23d RCT finally eliminated the roadblock north of Hoengsong on 2 January. It immediately established blocking positions there which it maintained until 5 January. The plan to occupy Hongchon was postponed.
While the 23d was digging in, the Division received orders attaching it to X Corps and with these orders came instructions that a new defense line was to be established. It consisted of an arc north of Hongchon encompassing two main routes of approach to the south, the Chunchon Hongchong road and the Hangye-Hongchon road. On both sides of this new defensive sector, the ROK's were withdrawing, leaving the Division once again holding a wedge upon which the enemy moved from three sides. By evening of the 2d of January, however, the Division defense was being hastily established with the 23d still blocking north of Hoengsong and the 38th dug in in Hoengsong with all of its battalions plus the Dutch detachment. The 9th, in the south in the vicinity of Wonju, was sending out ex tensive patrols, one of which uncovered an enemy force of 430 dressed in GI uniforms. The patrol engaged the group then withdrew, called for an air strike, and watched as the Air Force slaughtered the enemy. After the action more than 400 enemy dead were counted by members of "G" Company and the regimental I & R platoon of the 9th Infantry.

Not all the action of 2d Division units was taking place in the critical Wonju, Hoengsong, Hogchon sector, however, for as the three RCT's I braced themselves to meet the communist offen sive in central Korea, the 72d Tank Battalion I embarked on a mission all its own.

During the last days of December, the 72d Tank Battalion, commanded by Lt Col E. W. Brubaker had assembled its tanks in the town of Sangju far to south where, because of the treacherous ice-coated roads, it seemed destined to remain until sufficient engineer work on the mountain passes would enable it to move for ward to rejoin the Division. However, the critical tactical situation in the north demanded additional armor support. An order was flashed on 30 December to the 72d to move its tanks to Kumchon, south of Sangju, load them on flat cars and move north. The destination was not revealed even to the Battalion. The order arrived at 1130. Three hours later the entire battalion was on its way to Kumchon. By 1800 hours, orders came through attaching the batta lion to IX Corps. At 1900 the first tanks were being loaded on the flatcars. Loading continued all night with the huge tanks being guided onto the decrepit cars by flashlight At 0730 the next morning as the train pulled out it was learned the destination for the tanks was Uijongbu where a battle already was in progress.

With the battalion wheeled vehicles going by road and the tanks by rail, the tanks on the first train arrived at Uijongbu well in advance of the wheel column. "B" Company, the first to depart from Kumchon, unloaded at noon on I January and rolled from the flatcars into blocking positions with the 5th RCT. After a stiff engagement with the attacking Chinese forces that night it was released from assignment to the 5th at 0600 on 2 January and reverted to its parent unit, the 72d, which arrived in the Seoul area at 1415 that afternoon.

The remainder of the tanks of "A" and "C" Companies had arrived in the Seoul area by this time and were unloaded there since Uijongbu was already in enemy hands. The following days the battalion did yoeman duty in delaying the enemy advance to the south with its line companies attached to practically every major UN force operating in the western sector of the front. By the 8th of January, after the whirlwind trip north and being shuttled back and forth across the front to points of enemy penetration, the weary members of the battalion found themselves again in Sangju from whence they had begun their frantic trip to the north. In 15 days the tanks had covered more than 600 miles and had operated with the 24th Division, 187th Airborne RCT, Ist Cavalry Division, 27th British Brigade, 6th ROK Division and their own parent unit, the 2d Infantry Division.

While the line companies of the 72d Tank Battalion were operating with withdrawing United Nations units in the northwest below Seoul, the major forces of the 2d Division were preparing for a communist attack expected at any moment. On 3 January, with the 23d RCT still in blocking positions north of Hoengsong, ROK elements on both flanks of the Division continued their withdrawals. Guerrilla units were operating to the east and south of the Divi. sion positions and had succeeded in cutting the vital rail line from the south at Tanyang.

The 9th Infantry, patrolling northeastward from defensive positions in Wonju, was encountering small enemy groups attempting to enter the town. One group of 100 infiltrators was beaten off on 3 January by "B" and "C" Companies of the 9th after "F" had been surrounded earlier by an estimated enemy battalion and had fought its way clear in a brilliant withdrawal of over two and a half miles.

Early on the 4th of January, an estimated two CCF regiments were identified 15 miles north of Yoju on the Division's left flank. At the time only five-hundred 2d Division and ROK troops were in that town and they requested immediate reinforcement. Col. James P. Barney, deputy assistant division commander, was dispatched to Yoju to form Task Force Barney to hold the town. Upon arrival he found UN units on the left withdrawing, exposing the west flank of his position. This development was reported to higher headquarters and the task force organized for defense.

Elements of the 38th RCT were dispatched from Hoengsong on what turned out to be a futile operation that same day. A large enemy force had been reported southeast of Hoengsong where the 38th was in blocking positions. Immediately, the Second and Third battalions with a regimental command group were sent out to engage and destroy the force. The Third Battalion went by truck but because of a shortage of transportation the Second Battalion marched the entire distance. Both units arrived near the reported enemy assembly area that night after dark, and though they sighted enemy personnel,

they buttoned up for the night and made plans to attack at first light on the following day, 5 January. However, they had no sooner jumped off on the attack at 0755 than orders were received from Division to disengage and return to Hoengsong. A major enemy thrust was considered Every unit of the Division would be needed, so the two battalions broke contact with the enemy and retraced their route to Hoengsong, the Third again by truck and the Second by foot.

While the Second and Third Battalions of the 38th were planning their return to Hoengsong, "C" Company of the 38th on outpost duty west of Hoengsong was coming under heavy enemy attack, the forerunner of the main enemy effort.

At approximately 0550, according to members of the company, men on a roadblock the company had established west of its main position observed approximately 200 soldiers marching along the road toward their positions. One member of the roadblock shouted, "Don't shoot, they're ROK's;" this call was carried down the line toward the company. (Apparently the members of the roadblock mistook the enemy for ROK's whose patrols were active in the area.) It was not until the marching soldiers came abreast of the roadblock that they were discovered to be enemy. It was too late; the enemy quickly overran the blocking positions and head ed straight for the company's mortar positions. Simultaneously with this action, another group of enemy, numbering about 200, skirted the company flank and came up a draw to the rear going directly to the CP. In this maneuver, a rifle platoon was entirely cut off from the ren.......~ainder of the company. The enemy rushing toward the CP went directly up to the individual soldiers in foxholes in the CP area and motioned for them to give up their arms. Three North Koreans walked into the CP proper and directed the company commander by arm and hand signals to turn over his weapons to them. A soldier standing behind the commander stepped to one side and with a burst from an automatic carbine killed all three.

Meanwhile, the enemy group which had penetrated to the mortar positions turned the mortars to the south and fired approximately 15 rounds. These were observed by other elements of the First Battalion who were unaware of what was happening at "C" Company forward positions, since all communication had been cut oft by the attack.

By this time the company was fighting in separated groups. The isolated platoon began fighting its way back toward a Netherlands company, the nearest friendly unit. The Heavy Weapons, forming the roadblock, and the mortar crews suffered worst. Having lost their crew-served weapons, they joined the rifle platoons and fought their way to friendly positions.

By noon, the survivors of the company had made their way to friendly lines and the enemy had withdrawn. During the action "C" Company sustained only four KIA's, four WIA's and nineteen MIA's in spite of the confusion.

With the enemy threat to Wonju mounting hourly, a supply train loaded with critically needed fuel and rations pulled into Wonju, a week after it had been scheduled to arrive. It was imperative that the supplies be issued immediately and the train sent south so a maximum forced issue to all the units in the area was made. Simultaneously all heavy equipment was dispatched to the rear and Division headquarters began displacing to Chungju. All movements were hindered by the swarms of refugees who jammed the MSR's leading to the south and safety.

At 0900 hours, a Corps order was received issuing new defensive instructions to the Division. The 23d, which was still forward on the Hoengsong-Hongchon road, was to pull back to Wonju, blowing the bridges as it moved. The 38th was to hold its present positions at Hoengsong until all ROK elements to the north were clear and then it, too, was to pull back to Wonju, blowing the bridges in its sector. To the west in Yoju, where Task Force Barney awaited an enemy attack, went an order to disband the force, send the 2d Reconnaissance Company to Wonju and the remaining elements to Chongju. And the 50 ton bridge which "D" Company of the 2d Engineers had just completed at Yoju was to be blown when the Task Force was clear. The 9th Infantry was to hold blocking positions between Wonju and Hoengsong until the 23d and 38th had established their new positions in the vici nity of Wonju and then it was to move south on the Wonju-Chechon road and be prepared to attack with elements of the 7th US Division which were east of the 2d Division.

As the Division began forming into its new defensive positions large enemy forces were observed moving forward to launch their long expected offensive to wrench Wonju from the United Nations forces and open the way for a drive to Pusan.

An enemy force of more than 10,000 troops surged toward the line between Wonju and Chechon on the 6th of January. To the west the ROK's continued their withdrawal, exposing the flank of the 23d. At 1500, the 23d and 38th Regiments began movements to the best defensive ground in the area around Wonju. Supporting the defense were the 37th and 38th FA Bns emplaced south of Wonju and the 15th FA Bn at Sillim-ni, east of Wonju in the 9th Infantry Sector. The 503d, still not recovered from the battle of Kunuri, was not committed but continued to reorganize and re-equip in the vicinity of Kumchon.

Three North Korean divisions, the 6th, 10th and 27th, began hitting at Wonju from the southeast on 7 January while the 12th North Korean division simultaneously drove down the MSR from Hongchon to the north. Unidentified Chinese forces launched their assaults from the west on the stout defenses of the 23d and 38th. Intense fighting raged all day of the 7th and by midnight an enemy force had succeeded in infiltrating the lines of the 23d and entering Wonju in strength. Both the 23d and 38th made slight withdrawals on Division order, but stopped on the high ground south and east of Wonju and prepared to stand. Before leaving, however, the ammunition train which had of necessity been left in Wonju was blown. Orders to blow the railroad bridge went amiss, however, when the charge failed to explode. Realizing the extreme importance of demolishing the bridge, the platoon leader of the attached Engineer platoon braved a wall of enemy small arms fire, advanced to the bridge, doused the ties with gasoline and set fire to the structure, denying its further use to the enemy.

Without letup the battle see-sawed back and forth all night long. A new defensive line was outlined in an arc to the south encompassing Mokkey-dong on the west and Chechon on the east, to be withdrawn to only on orders. However, neither of the two hard-pressed regiments gave-up their positions immediately south of Wonju.

At 0300 hours on 8 January, orders came from X Corps that Wonju must be retaken. Four battalions were ordered to hold the defensive positions on the high ground south of the town while a minimum of one battalion was to attack and clear Wonju and secure the airstrip on the south edge. The Second Battalion of the 23d was designated as the attacking force and it jumped off against fierce resistance, fighting from house to house and making some progress in the initial stages. However, enemy reinforcements poured against both flanks of the attacking Second Battalion and it was forced to withdraw to its former positions.

To the southeast, the 9th Regiment was defending the Chechon-Wonju road from bases at Chupori and at 1500 hours on 8 January was engaged with elements of an enemy regiment attempting to cut the vital route. The encounter lasted throughout the clay and at night the Second Battalion of the 9th was secure in the threatened area and buttoned up until daylight.

The following day, 9 January, with elements of the 23d, 38th, the French, Dutch and Ist Ranger Company occupying the high ground south of Wonju, another attempt by the 23d to clear Wonju met with failure as the enemy fought fiercely to hold his advantage. The en" tire battle was waged in weather similar to that of the November encounter in North Korea.

The 10th of January opened with air observers reporting thousands of enemy troops moving south from Wonju to attack the defenses of the 23d and 38th RCT's. From the high ground, friendly troops poured a rain of fire on the enemy who threatened the blanks and the front. Friendly artillery and air pounded the masses of advancing communists inflicting staggering casualties while the bitter weather exacted an increasingly heavy toll on attackers and defenders alike. Finally, after savage fighting during which the Ist and 2d French Companies repulsed four successive attempts by the enemy to envelop their positions, the enemy was turned back, his attack broken, friendly lines remaining intact. All the next day the two forces poured murderous barrages of fire at one another while friendly units were shuffled through knee deep snow to locate maximum strength at the most critical points. The Second Battalion of the 23rd with the 3rd French Company attached moved forward from the 2d Division defenses and struggled to wrest important positions from the enemy on the southern outskirts of Wonju from which he had been laying down bases of fire on the friendly positions. Hill 247, a low lying enemy-infested hill mass, was taken by the French only after they fixed bayonets and cut their way to the top where, they held in spite of savage counterattacks and sub-zero winds which cut through winter clothing.

By the 12th of January, the major units of the 23d and 38th were formed into one defensive ring. Beginning on the right were the First Battalion of the 38th, Ist Ranger Company, two companies of French Troops, the Second Battalion of the 23d, Second Battalion of the 38th, two more French companies, a company from the Dutch Detachment, Third Battalion of the 23d, the remaining elements of the Dutch, and finally "K" Company of the 38th. The First Battalion of the 38th, Dutch and Third Battalion, 38th were under command of the 38th Infantry. The remainder were commanded by the 23d Infantry.

The 9th RCT was still to the east and the Third Battalion ( - ) of the 38th was occupying defensive positions with the 9th on the WonjuHokyedong Road. The First Battalion of the 23d was also attached to the 9th while the 503d FA Bn was now operating with the 187th Airborne RCT to the east.

The Dutch, 1st and 2d French Companies, and the Second Battalion of the 38th blunted several enemy attacks during the night of the 12th. On the 13th, elements of the 23d beat off attempts by two enemy battalions to pierce friendly lines. UN air and artillery took a heavy toll of the attackers who finally withdrew in confusion after our firepower poured down upon them.

"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Private First Class Elmer E. Lewellyn, Infantry, a member of Company E, 38th Infantry, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Oneamsong, on 13 January 1951. On 3 January 1951, Company E was defending a key terrain feature in the Wonju area when a numerically superior enemy force launched several fanatical attacks against the company positions. In the initial attack, Private LEWELLYN, a newly assigned replacement who had joined the company the proceeding day, was thrown from his foxhole by the force of an enemy concussion grenade which exploded near his position Quickly recovering from the shock of the blast, he crawled back to his position and aided in repulsing the attack by placing withering fire on the enemy. When the enemy troops rallied and launched a second attack, Private LEWELLYN, heedless of the intense enemy fire, moved from one position to another in order to gain a better field of fire and thus inflict greater casualties on the enemy. Although seriously wounded during the second enemy assault, Private LEWELLYN refused to retire for medical attention. When the enemy closed in f or the third and final assault, Private LEWELLYN leaped from his foxhole and stood fully exposed to the hostile fire, yelling taunts at the enemy and shouting words of encouragement to his comrades. During the final assault, enemy troops approached to within a few yards of Private LEWELLYN's position but he steadfastly refused to fall back and killed several enemy soldiers at his position before he fell mortally wounded. [aspired by the intrepid courage and self-sacrifice of Private LEWELLYN, his comrades tenaciously held their positions, inflicted tremendous casualities on the enemy and successfully repelled the hostile assaults."

On 14 January, with all elements of the Division locked in battle, Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, former Chief of Staff for X Corps, assumed command of the 2d Division.

Although fighting still flamed over the entire ba ttle line, the back of the enemy attack had been broken. Staggering casualties had been inflicted on the communists in their last attempt to annihilate the defending forces. Following his abortive offensive, the enemy began to slowly withdraw large units to the north. At the same time it was necessary for the UN forces in the Wonju area to shorten and strengthen their lines. The order directing the movement was published at midnight on the 14th and called for a withdrawal to a new X Corps defensive line designated "3-3-3" which formed an arc extending from Unnam-ni on the west to Mossan-ni on the east. This line encompassed the two major routes leading south from Wonju and denied to the enemy an approach to the south.

The readjustment was initiated at 1000 hours, 15 January, and was completed by 1900 hours the following day with remarkable success. In the process, the artillery units echeloned southward enabling them to keep continuous fire cover while displacing to new positions. The entire Division was reassembled with detached battalions being returned to their parent unit.

The new line was established with the First and Third Battalions of the 23d on the left replacing elements of the 8th ROK Division, the 38th in the center and the 9th on the right. Thus the Division was established in excellent defensive positions and the withdrawal of the ROK units placed the 7th US Division on the 2d's right flank and the 24th US Division on the -2d's left flank.

Immediately the Division instituted unit instruction in preparing fields of fire, use of range cards, construction of individual implacements, and cold weather training. Extensive patrolling was ordered and the system of tactical air control was revamped to improve its efficiency. Plans were also drawn up to coordinate the con trot of all fire support weapons and agencies under a single command and by 9 January the FSCCFire Support Coordination Centerwas established.

On 17 January, all regiments were sending out patrols deep into unoccupied territory to the north to find the enemy and determine his intentions. One such patrol from "E" Company of the 38th Infantry advanced by motorized transport to a point two miles south of Wonju where a blown bridge forced it to dismount. Foot patrols were sent into Wonju itself and no enemy was found. Later the patrol withdrew to positions one mile south of the town where it buttoned up for the night. Night patrols, were sent out, but no contact with the enemy was made.

Early on the morning of 18 January, a 30 man patrol from "'B" Company of the 9th Infantry started toward the northwest to reconnoiter possible enemy routes of approach. Leaving five men with the vehicles at the dismount point, the patrol continued on foot until it reached a suspected enemy route. The patrol leader sent seven men to the south while he and the remainder of the patrol, 18 in all, advanced to the north. Warned by civilians that an enemy force was located in a village less than a mile to his front, the patrol leader continued to advance until reaching the village where he deployed his men and opened fire on the houses. An estimated 150 enemy were surprised sleeping and in the resulting action 20 enemy were killed, 9 wounded and two prisoners taken. The patrol returned to the company late that night with the PW's, having taken no casualties of its own during the entire action.

On 19 January, it was decided to send a battalion to occupy Wonju after patrols had reported the enemy had evacuated the town. The Second Battalion of the 9th Infantry was chosen for the job and moved out with attached "E" Company of the 38th, "B" Battery of the 15th FA Bn, "D" Battery of the 82d AAA and elements of the regimental tank company. In the following days, the reinforced battalion under Lt. Col. Barbaris made its base immediately south of Wonju from which it daily sent strong patrols out beyond Wonju where they engaged the enemy, inflicted heavy casualties, and forced him to withdraw. Severals stiff fights with enemy units of battalion and regimental strength resulted but by 21 January the Second Battalion had cleared the area immediately adjacent to Wonju of enemy units. However, there still existed strong communist troop units south of Wonju which had been hit repeatedly by friendly air in the proceeding days. The First Bat talion of the 9th under Lt. Col. Landahl relieved the Second Battalion on 22 January and con tinued the job of cleaning out the remaining elements of the enemy forces. By the end of the following day, after a stiff battle by "B" Company with enemy dug-in near the air strip, the enemy withdrew to the north and northeast leaving the Wonju area and the area to the south relatively clear.

With Wonju and the surrounding area under control of the 2d Division, the 9th Infantry dispatched a series of motorized patrols to seek out and destroy the enemy. On 24 January, three of these patrols were sent to cover a sector extending north, northwest and northeast of Wonju. One of these embarked on the northern road leading to Hoengsong. Five thousand yards south of that city, North Korean rearguard elements were encountered but the patrol deployed and placed fire on the groups which then dispersed. Two thousand yards further on an enemy concentration of 3,000 troops was sighted, fired upon and dispersed to the north. After clearing the way, the patrol entered Hoengsong, reported it free of enemy and then withdrew again to its base in Wonju.
The other two patrols, all from the First Battalion of the 9th, reported no contact.

The French Battalion was released from the 23d Infantry on 24 January and assigned to the 38th when the 23d was ordered to assemble as Division reserve at Chupo-ri.

Throughout the remainder of the week, the 9th continued to send out patrols. On the 25th, the 23d Infantry in reserve initiated patrols running west from Wonju to the east bank of the Han River on the Division's left Flank.

On 26 January, a reinforced French Company went out from the Munmangni Valley to engage an enemy force of 50 reported by a previous patrol. Selecting a difficult route through the hills, the French surprised 450 enemy troops, inflicted 32 counted KIA's and came back in spite of several enemy ambushes. Said General Ruffner, "This may be the information we have been seeking for the last 10 days. . ."
On 27 January, patrols operating in the Hoengsong area reported the enemy was preparing defensive positions five to six miles north of the town so on the following day a task force was organized to engage the enemy in the area. The force, composed of "A" Company, 9th Infantry; elements of the Regimental Tank Company; "B" Battery, 15th FA Bn; and a section from "D" Battery, 82d AAA moved out early on the 28th. Entering Hoengsong at 1145, the assault group came under enemy small arms but returned the fire and dispersed the enemy. Continuing further north for two miles it sighted and placed heavy fire on newly constructed enemy positions in the area for several hours before withdrawing to its base in Wonju.

The 503d FA Bn, which had been on detached assignment, reverted to the Division on the 28th and began a rail move to Mokkyedong.

Patrolling continued by all elements of the Division to search out and engage the enemy. A new SOP directed that it any patrol met an enemy force it could not disperse it was to be followed-up by a larger force capable of destroying the enemy. In this manner, the entire area from Hoengsong to Chupori was swept continually for infiltrating enemy groups.

On 28 January, a patrol from the First Battalion of the 23d Infantry returned from the "Twin Tunnels" area east of Chipyong-ni with a report of enemy sightings but no ground contact. Plans were made to send a larger force out to the same area the following day to clear the enemy.

The 38th Infantry relieved the 9th Infantry in the Wonju sector on 30 January and the 9th reverted to Division reserve at Mokkyedong. At the same time, elements of the 8th ROK Division moved into the area adjacent to the former 9th sector on the east and also assumed responsibility for a portion of the eastern flank of the former Division sector.

The planned patrol from the 23d Infantry to the "Tunnels" area moved out on the 29th from the Second Battalion. Upon nearing the area where the enemy had been sighted the previous day it was attacked and surrounded by two North Korean battalions which appeared from out of the wooded hills along the road. A call for aid was sent back to the battalion and "F" Company was dispatched, having to fight its way through to the embattled patrol before it could effect a rescue. Then on the 30th, orders went out to the Third and French Battalions of the 23d to move up to an assembly point four miles south of the "Tunnels" area to counter the developing enemy threat. Accompanying the two battalions were the "B" Battery of the 37th FA Bn and "B" Battery of the 82d AAA.

In the meantime, the Second and Netherlands Battalions of the 38th were ordered to Wonju to join the rest of the regiment which had closed into the Wonju area the previous day. The 72d Tank Battalion was alerted for employment in the 23d sector and moved up to a position east of Mokkyedong.

The 23d initiated a two-battalion offensive on the 31st with the mission of cleaning out the enemy in the "Tunnels" area. The French attacked the area on the left and the Third Battalion on the right, supported by the RCT artillery. Intermediate objectives were secured without contact and it appeared the enemy force had pulled back. At 1630, the task force pulled into a tight perimeter for the night encountering only sporadic enemy fire. Simultaneously, "E" Company of the 23d screened the force's right flank, contacting elements of the Third Battalion at 1830 hours and returning to its base at Munmang-ni. To provide close-in support for the 37th Field Artillery, B" Company of the 23d moved up from its base at Iho-ri and established defenses around the gun positions.

The 23d's perimeter was attacked early in the morning of I February. Two enemy regiments came roaring down on the defensive positions at 0450 hours. Blowing their bugles and whistles, the horde threw the weight of their attack against the sector defended by the "L" Company on the east side of the road and the 3rd French Company on the west side. Furious fighting soon raged all around the perimeter. Reinforcements were requested.

"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Sergeant First Class Clarence G. Brown, In fantry, a member of Company L, 23d Infantry, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Twin Tunnels on 1 February 1951. On 1 February 1951, Company L was occupying defensive positions in the Twin Tunnels area when a numerically superior enemy force launched an attack against the position, f orcing two platoons to withdraw in order to establish a tighter perimeter. As the two platoons were effecting this maneuver, a second enemy group launched an attack that threatened to cut of] one of the platoons from the remainder of the company. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, Sergeant BROWN immediately deployed his squad and began placing effective fire on the second enemy group. Throughout this ac lion, he moved among his men encouraging them to hold their positions despite the intense hostile fire received from three sides. When the two platoons had completed their withdrawal and established a new defense perimeter, Sergeant BROWN ordered his squard to withdraw to the reestablished friendly line, then remained behind alone to furnish covering fire for the movement. He was killed at this position while hurling hand grenades at the advancing enemy."

The First Battalion, located at Iho-ri, was ordered to join the embattled units in the "Twin Tunnels" area and hastily moved out from its reserve positions at 0830 hours. The Division commander assured the 23d, "If necessary, the entire division will be moved up to do the job." At 0700. the enemy launched powerful attacks on all positions occupied by the French including Hill 453 where biter hand-to-hand fighting took place and in the Muchon valley where the enemy broke through the French Heavy Weapons Company and came within 200 yards of the road before it was repelled by a counterattack of the French Pioneer Platoon supported by two tanks. "L" Company was forced to give up slight ground about 1030 hours when severe pressure caused the lines to sag but by 1200 hours the ground was regained and the fighting continued to rage. In the French sector, the defenders were inflicting terrific casualties on the attackers in bayonet fighting.

By 1430 hours, the First Battalion was well on its way to assist the French and First Battalions. The Second Battalion went to Munmang-ni and moved into the positions vacated by the First Battalion. The 9th Infantry occupied the vacated Second Battalion posts. The 23d Tank Company began moving to the "Tunnels" area to lend its' weight to the defense.

Enemy attacks succeeded in penetrating into the positions of the 37th Field Artillery during the afternoon and the invaders were placing fire on the gun positions. "B" Company of the 23d, providing close-in support for the artillery, engaged the enemy troops attempting to knockout the artillery while the guns continued to pour out heavy volumes of fire on enemy masses attempting to rush the entire perimeter.

"Award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Second Lieutenant Albert B. V. MacDonald, Artillery, a member of Battery C, 37th Field Artillery Battalion, for action against the enemy in the vicinity of Chipyong-ni on 1 February 1950. On 1 February 1951, an enemy force on all of the positions occupied by the estimated at one regiment launched at attack against the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry Regiment, and succeeded in forcing a breach in the line defended by Company I. When the artillery forward observer with Company I was killed early in the attack, Lieutenant MacDONALD volunteered to join the company as forward observer. Realizing the importance of close in artillery fire, he moved to an exposed position with the left flank platoon on Hill 333 from which he could accurately adjust artillery fire on the advancing enemy. As the intensity of the fighting increased, Lieutenant MacDONALD refused to leave his observation post but continued directing artillery fire on the enemy troops until they approached within 25 yards of his position. When the platoon fell back to the base of the hill and reorganized for a bayonet charge on the enemy, Lieutenant MacDONALD joined the riflemen in the assault. Reaching his former position, he found that his telephone and radio had been destroyed by enemy fire, however, he effectively continued to direct orders orally, calling for artillery fire to within 25 yards of his position. When the enemy launched a counter-attack and again drove the platoon from the hill, Lieutenant MacDONALD joinded the riflemen in a second bayonet charge that carried them to the crest of the hill. Five times the hill changed hands and each time Lieutenant MacDONALD would remain in position directing artillery fire orders until the close proximity of the enemy rendered artillery fire useless, then fall back and rejoin the platoon to help retake the hill in hand-tohand combat. His courageous actions and tenacity d uring the bitter engagement were instrumental in the final success of the platoon in driving the numerically superior enemy from the hill and securing the position."

By 1800, the pressure began to ease and at 1830 the lead elements of the First Battalion arrived having had to fight their way with the assistance of the 2d Recon Co through two enemy road blocks to reach the position.

By 1900, the first company of the Second Battalion arrived in the perimeter with the reminder of the Second Battalion anticipated by 0200 hours. "B" Battery of the 37th Field Artillery arrived with elements of the Second Battalion, adding its fire to that of the rest of its battalion.

And while the perimeter in the "Tunnels" area was being reinforced amid lessening enemy pressure, a company-sized patrol from the Third Battalion of the 38th was heavily engaged with a battalion of enemy troops northwest of Wonju.

Supported by artillery and air, the patrol was able to count 63 enemy dead before withdrawing to its base.

The following day, 2 February, all units of the 23d RCT were closed in the "Tunnels" area and were consolidating their positions following an enemy withdrawal. Patrols fanned out on all sides to maintain enemy contact and flush him from hiding places. The regimental tanks forced one large group from a village and as the enemy broke for cover, air, artillery and tank fire rained down upon him, inflicting heavy casualties. Throughout the night artillery laid down a curtain of fire around the position.

The First and Third Battalions of the 38th, meanwhile, closed in on Hoengsong at 2330 hours to assume blocking positions in the face of the threat uncovered the previous day by elements of the Third Battalion.

On 3 February, the 23d RCT began moving west from the "Tunnels" area toward the town of Chipyong-ni, key to an important road network on the Division left flank. Resistance was slight and by 2000 hours the town was secured with only sporadic enemy fire from the vicinity of Hill 586 overlooking the Chipyong sector. In setting-up a perimeter defense for Chipyong, the RCT commander, Col. Paul L. Freeman, decided to use a ring of low-lying hills surrounding the town. Better, more easily defensible hills were available further out but would have required more forces than were available within his command so he chose to dig-in on the less desirable hills where his units would not be so widely dispersed.

The circular clock-like defense, when established, situated the First Battalion on the perimeter from the 12:00 o'clock position to the 1:00 o'clock position. The Third Battalion was occupying the hills from 2:00 o'clock to 5:00 o' crock, the Second Battalion from 5:00 o'clock to 7:00 o'clock, and the French from 7:00 o'clock to 11:00 o' clock.

In RCT reserve was "B" Company and, subsequently, the 1st Ranger Company, both placed within the perimeter behind "A" and "C" Companies. The high hills overlooking those occupied by the regiment were registered on by the RCT artillery, 37th FA Battalion and "B" Battery, 82d AAA. The mission of the force was to (1) deny to the enemy the use of the road net controlled by Chipyong and (2) hold the left flank of the X Corps defense line until the 3rd ROK Division, which was in Corps reserve, could be brought abreast and launched into an attack to the north. Extensive patrols were planned by the RCT while in the Chipyong area.

The occupation of Chipyong by the 23d RCT was part of an over-all plan by the Division to occupy a new X Corps defense line, "QQ", which had its left boundry at Chipyong and its right boundry running east through Hoanhung-ni. This placed the 24th US Division on the 2d Division's left flank and the 187th Airborne RCT on the right, this latter unit having relieved the 8th ROK Division.

The 9th RCT was on the right of the 23rd. Its First Battalion was in defensive positions at Yanghyon-ni; the Second Battalion was securing the pass on the MSR leading to Chipyong from the southeast; the Third Battalion was patrolling the Wonju-Yoju road.

The 38th RCT was concentrating in the vicinity of Hoengsong, preparing to support the 8th ROK Division. The 8th ROK Division, in conjunction with the 5th ROK Division, was to launch an offensive mission, "Operation Roundup," aimed at a double envelopment of enemy units in the Hongchong area. The 2d Division was to give air, artillery and armor support to the 8th ROK's. Preparing for this, the First Battalion of the 38th with "L" Company attached was given the mission of providing part of this support. The Second Battalion of the 38th served as Division reserve at Wonju while the Third Battalion ( - "L") was to occupy blocking positions north and east of Hoengsong. The 72d Tank Battalion was moved to Wonju to serve with the Second Battalion as Division reserve.

In order to provide maximum support to the ROK units in the forthcoming attack, orders were published by the 2d Division on 4 February, setting up support units. They were organized as follows: Support Force 21 - 15th FA Bn; "A" Btry, 503d FA Bn; "D" Btry, 82d AA; and Ist Bn, 38th Inf to provide close-in support to the artillery. Support Force 22 - "B" Btry. 503d FA Bn; "C" Btry, 37th FA Bn; one section from "C" Btry, 82d AAA; and a Company, 23d Infantry. Support Team A"K" Company, 9th Infantry; 3d Platoon, 9th Infantry Tank Company; and elements of the Heavy Mortar Com- pany of the 9th Infantry. Support Team B "L" Company, 38th Infantry and 3d Platoon, 38th Infantry Tank Company. Both Support Team A and B were under the operational control of the commanding general, 8th ROK Divisions.

The days prior to "Operation Roundup" found all units of the Division sending out extensive patrols which encountered small enemy groups. Frequent probing attacks were repulsed by the Division, and daily there was increasing evidence of a possible communist thrust. Adverse weather hindered all activities during the period. Freezing nights and thawing days inundated the roads and open country with mud, snow and slush, making unit supply and patrols extremely difficult and forcing the line troops to undergo extreme hardships in the field.

"Operation Roundup" jumped-off on 5 February with the 2d Division Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) acting as coordinator for the intense air and artillery support rendered the ROK units by the Division. Coincident with the attack, the Netherland's detachment relieved the First Battalion of the 38th in positions north and east of Hoengsong so the battalion could assume its duties as a member of Support Force 21, moving northward to keep pace with the ROK attack.

"Operating Roundup" maintained an unsteady movement north on 6 February although poor weather somewhat hindered the air cover. By 1200 hours, Support Force B had arrived in Saemal, 15 miles north east of Wonju. The Third Battalion, 38th Inf also closed later in the day into Saemal and relieved a ROK regiment for further commitment in "Operation Roundup".

On 7 February, the First Battalion of the 9th Infantry and Third Battalion of the 23d launched an attack on the village of Sogu, five miles east of Chipyong to eliminate an enemy strongpoint there and to "energize" the attack of the ROK's. Determined enemy resistance supported by an unusually large number of automatic weapons prevented capture of the town but, after fierce fighting, the two battalions secured the high ground over-looking the town on 9 February and thus succeeded in localizing the threat. It was believed that the same force which had ambushed a company-sized patrol from "C" Company of the 9th on the previous day was the one which defended Sogu.

Support Force 21, built around the First Battalion of the 38th, closed in the vicinity of Chadong at 1100, continuing its mission of supportir,g the ROK attack. Meanwhile, the Ist Ranger Company successfully raided an enemy force in the village of Changmal, killing an estimated 50 enemy before withdrawing.

The following days were repeat performances of the initial days of "Operation Roundup" with slight gains made in the face of extremely poor weather, rugged terrain and moderate resistance'. In Sogu, elements of the 9th and 23d RCT's were still unable to disperse the enemy in spite of repeated attacks.

Support Team Baker, on 9 February, engaged an estimated 200 enemy in the vicinity of Changan for two hours. The same day, the 1st Ranger Company was attached to the 23rd RCT and placed in reserve within the force's Chipyong perimeter. The continuing poor weather hampered supply and in Wonju large airdrops were being made to keep up the Division ammunition stocks.

Also on 9 February, the 3rd ROK Division was attached to X Corps and began assembling northwest of Hoengsong.

An unusual incident occured in the Tank Company of the 38th Infantry on 9 February. One of the tank commanders serving with Support Force Baker reported overhearing Chinese radio messages on his tank radio and they seemed to be coming from not too great a distance.

The presence of Chinese troops in the vicinity was confirmed on the following day when, with clearing weather, air observers reported large numbers of enemy troops moving south into the X Corps sector. Forward of the 23rd positions in Chipyong, the Chinese appeared to be massing in strength. Agents, returning from enemy lines, reported pre-assault concentrations of thousands of enemy troops. Every new report served to reaffirm the rapidly accepted opinion that another major CCF offensive was in the making.

And in the Chipyong perimeter itself, the entire 23rd RCT prepared for the test it knew was soon to come. Ammunition was stock-piled, medical sections readied for an influx of casualties. Because of the threat posed to the 23rd, fire priority for the 37th FA Bn, formerly given to Support Force Baker, was shifted to the 23rd and immediately the rate of fire was stepped up to inflict maximum casualties on the massing enemy troops. lucreased air support, possible with the improved weather, was called onto the communist buildup across the Division front and B-26's were used to strike the enemy concentrations one of which included 1,200 horses.

On 11 February, Support Force 21, had moved forward to Changbong-ni, half-way between Hoengsong and Hongchon on the MSR. Support Team B was a little to the west and almost the same distance north of Hoengsong. Both were continuing to give fire support to the ROK attack.

During the early part of the day there was little enemy activity. However, in view of the threatened Chinese offensive, "Operation Roundup" was halted and the 8th ROK Division was ordered to hold its present positions. All 2d Division units were instructed to concentrate on short-range, combat patrols and prepare for a new Red attack.

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